



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

July 31, 2019

MR. JASON LEOPOLD



FOIPA Request No.: 1193607-000
Subject: KHAN, SAMIR

Dear Mr. Leopold:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552

☒ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☒ (b)(3)

50 USC 3024(i)(1)

☐ (b)(4)

☒ (b)(5)

☒ (b)(6)

☒ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☒ (b)(7)(C)

☒ (b)(7)(D)

☒ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (k)(5)

☐ (k)(6)

☐ (k)(7)

1338 pages were reviewed and 687 pages are being released.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☒ Documents were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agencies [OGA].
- ☒ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.


You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following website: <https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

The enclosed documents represent the fifteenth interim release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request.

Inquiries regarding your OGA referral may be directed to the following agency at:

Aaron Graves
Office of Freedom of Information
1155 Defense Pentagon (OSD Mailroom – Room 3C843)
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

You were previously advised we were consulting with other agencies concerning information related to your FOIA request. A portion of that information has been returned to the FBI and has been processed: 17 pages were reviewed and 11 pages are being released. You will find these documents within this release.

Upon receipt of the enclosed Compact Disc (CD), please go to www.pay.gov to make an electronic payment* in the amount of \$15.00, or make a check or money order payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and mail it to the Work Process Unit, Record/Information Dissemination Section, Information Management Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602. Please include the FOIPA Request Number with your payment. Failure to pay for this release within thirty (30) days from the date of this letter will close any pending FBI FOIPA requests from you. Nonpayment will also cause an automatic denial of any future FOIPA requests.

**Pay.gov is a secure web-based application that accepts credit card and ACH payments online, and is hosted by the United States Department of Treasury, Financial Management Service. For frequent FOIPA requesters, it is recommended to create a Pay.gov account to retain an online history of payments made through Pay.gov and to retain specific information for future payments. To make an electronic payment, complete the FBI Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Form located on Pay.gov. Please note: if a refund is necessary, there is less processing time to refund a credit card payment than an ACH payment.*

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum includes information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records. For questions regarding Parts 1, 2, or 3, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." Previously mentioned appeal and dispute resolution services are also available at the web address.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010))]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **National Security/Intelligence Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of national security and foreign intelligence records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and PA exemption (j)(2) as applicable to requests for records about individuals [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2); 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that national security or foreign intelligence records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching those systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A reasonable search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled and maintained by the FBI in the course of fulfilling law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization and encompasses the records of FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide and includes Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records. For additional information about our record searches visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheets. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **The National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1193607-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 124

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03/09/11
12:08:33

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FD-192

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICC
ON 04-22-2019

ICMIPR01
Page 1

b6
b7C

Title and Character of Case:

KHAN, SAMIR, ZAFAR

Date Property Acquired: Source from which Property Acquired:

03/08/2011

FBI LAB

Anticipated Disposition: Acquired By: Case Agent:

b6
b7C

Description of Property:

Date Entered

b7E

Barcode: E4485193

Location: ECC

CAB2

S3

03/09/2011

(U)

Case Number:
Owning Office: CHARLOTTE

~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

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b3
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/19/2011

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

From: Counterterrorism

b7E

Contact: IA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(U) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]
(U) (S)

b3
b7E

(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - AL QEADA - CORE

(U) (S) [REDACTED]

Synopsis: (U) [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20360719

Administrative: (S) [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Charlotte From: Counterterrorism
Re: (S) [redacted] 07/19/2011

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(S)

b1
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Details: (S) [redacted]

(S)

X

X

X

X

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Charlotte From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 07/19/2011

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Charlotte From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 07/19/2011

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b3
b7E

(S)

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(U) To: Charlotte From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 07/19/2011

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(S)

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(U) To: Charlotte From: Counterterrorism
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 07/19/2011

b3
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) For SA [REDACTED] for information and action as
deemed appropriate.

b6
b7C

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/06/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

b6
b7C
b7E

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

(S) Case ID #: (U)

(X)
(X)
(U)

b1
b3
b7E

Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(X)
(X)

(S)

b1
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(U)

(X)

ANWAR NASSER AULAQI
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM-MIDDLE EAST

(S)

Synopsis:

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b7D

(U)

(X)

Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301
Declassify On: 07/06/2036

(U)

b7E

Administrative: (S) For file, attached in

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

SECRET

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/06/2011

b3
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

AT [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

AT [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

♦♦

SECRET



COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT

CTC SENTINEL

OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS

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The Combating Terrorism Center is an independent educational and research institution based in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses the Center's global network of scholars and practitioners to understand and confront contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence.

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The Death of Usama bin Ladin: Threat Implications for the U.S. Homeland

By Philip Mudd



President Barack Obama attends a wreath laying ceremony at Ground Zero after the death of Bin Ladin. - Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images

WITH THE DEATH of Usama bin Ladin in May 2011, Americans will be safer in the long-term. Without Bin Ladin's magnetic appeal, al-Qa`ida's revolutionary movement will likely wither and its message, combined with the peaceful revolutions in the Arab world, will lose credibility. In the short-term, however, the U.S. homeland remains at risk. In many ways, U.S. security services today face more challenges than ever before because the threat profile has become so diverse, with multiple terrorist groups and individuals—many with no connection to established terrorist organizations—intent on striking the United States.

In the wake of 9/11, for example, al-Qa`ida sought to maintain momentum by planning and executing another "spectacular" attack on the U.S. homeland. American authorities found

that subsequent terrorist plots targeting the homeland were tied directly back to operational planners in al-Qa`ida's core organization.¹ Threat briefings at the time were not yet dominated by homegrown terrorists, or by militants part of al-Qa`ida's affiliate groups. As a result, U.S. intelligence resources could focus on a hard target—al-Qa`ida's operationally savvy leadership—with the classic tools of human and technical penetration and partnership with an informal global network of security services. Today, authorities have to detect plots that may have no connection to established terrorist groups or known operatives.

¹ In the immediate years after 9/11, the mix of U.S.-centric intelligence reporting from human and technical sources, as well as detainees, regularly flowed from the tribal areas of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Indeed, the stream of broken terrorist plots in the United States offers a striking contrast to those early, core al-Qa`ida-driven plotlines. From Somali youth in Minnesota to individuals across regions of the United States, the broken plots frequently involve youth who were ideologically inspired by the al-Qa`ida revolution, but the plotters had never met an al-Qa`ida member. Bin Ladin's death in Pakistan may well accelerate this shift in plots from those with some linkage to al-Qa`ida—training, funding, or operational guidance—to those only inspired by a message.

In conjunction with these unaffiliated extremists, the United States also faces growing threats from al-Qa`ida's affiliate organizations, such as its branch in Yemen known as al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that was responsible for two recent plots on the U.S. homeland. Without the leadership coherence Bin Ladin brought to al-Qa`ida, subordinate commanders might pursue their own plotlines more aggressively, resulting in different threat strands directed against the United States. Before Bin Ladin's death, these threats may have developed under a more unified al-Qa`ida umbrella as documents recently found in Bin Ladin's compound show that he had direct involvement in pressing for attacks against the U.S. homeland. Today, however, al-Qa`ida operatives or affiliated militants may seek to attack the United States without any consultation with al-Qa`ida's core leadership or other al-Qa`ida affiliates, making plot detection more difficult. These efforts might run in parallel to the cementing role of AQAP as the successor to the leadership in Pakistan, especially for Western Muslims who might be susceptible to the English-language propaganda of Samir Khan, Anwar al-Awlaqi, and *Inspire* magazine.

This article explains why Bin Ladin's death will weaken al-Qa`ida's central leadership, as well as al-Qa`ida's ideological attraction. Yet it warns that the threat from al-Qa`ida's affiliates, such as AQAP in Yemen, will only grow more pronounced now that Bin Ladin is dead. The article concludes by showing why U.S. authorities face an even greater challenge today, as threat detection has become more labor intensive due to the disconnected nature of current terrorist plots.

Bin Ladin's Death Will Weaken Al-Qa`ida's Central Leadership

In the long-term, Bin Ladin's death will reduce al-Qa`ida ideological reach in the West. His ability to generate star power that attracted a wave of disaffected youth worldwide to the al-Qa`ida banner is now gone. Bin Ladin was a revolutionary, not just an operational leader, and the already-declining revolutionary message of al-Qa`ida will wither faster without its undisputed leading messenger. Over time, the decline in al-Qa`ida's ability to recruit followers virtually will help reduce the threat to the United States. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the group's second-in-charge, lacks Bin Ladin's global appeal, and he is not as respected within the organization. Al-Zawahiri was seen as fractious and difficult during his time leading Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and he has never been nearly as revered among al-Qa`ida acolytes as has Bin Ladin. Furthermore, he lacks Bin Ladin's charisma globally, and his public pronouncements veer from those of a respected leader to angry diatribes. He almost certainly will lack the ability to keep the organization focused with strong leadership, and the group may suffer leadership fissures, or even fractures, as leaders buck al-Zawahiri's command and consider how to move forward among themselves.

Some commentators have suggested that the al-Qa`ida core group in Pakistan might execute an "off-the-shelf" operation quickly in retaliation. Yet al-Qa`ida's core leadership has been struggling to conduct attacks against the U.S. homeland for years, and Bin Ladin's death will only impede this further. Information acquired from Bin Ladin's compound in Pakistan indicate that he was pressing, repeatedly and over time, for more attacks; his group's inability to act on his insistent demand for more plots suggests that al-Qa`ida still lacks capacity in the West, and rapid-turnaround plotting might simply lead to less sophisticated attacks such as the shooting of the Saudi Embassy employee in Pakistan in mid-May. Moreover, al-Qa`ida's leadership will highlight security in the coming weeks as they absorb the implications of their leader's death and try to determine how it occurred.

Even if a plot is being prepared, the group's past operations clearly show that cell leaders will move when they are ready, not according to symbolic timetables. The security risks of delaying an operation for any amount of time are too high to hold operatives in check for long periods. Their failures

"An attack in six months would be a success in the eyes of the adversary, and a six month timeframe, although long for Americans, would seem insignificant if the target were substantial enough."

in the United States have been frequent: allowing a plot to sit on the back-burner would strike an operator as a mistake in an environment where days and weeks raise the risk that U.S. intelligence and law enforcement will identify plotters.

Without Bin Ladin's captivating appeal, the key question in coming months, beyond whether al-Qa`ida members in the tribal areas unite or begin to fragment, will be whether affiliated groups, especially in Yemen, redouble efforts to strike an iconic U.S. target. Their motive would be not only to avenge the death of Bin Ladin, but also to highlight their emergence as a new center of jihadist gravity for recruits and donors who feel they cannot travel to Pakistan's border belt or who may decline to donate to a group that is losing credibility because of inaction.

The Threat From Al-Qa`ida's Affiliates

AQAP, widely acknowledged as the most significant threat to the U.S. homeland outside of core al-Qa`ida, already has leadership that is benefiting from Westerners. Its propaganda is augmented by an egotist jihadist, Anwar al-Awlaqi, who appears to be as focused on spreading his brand as on developing the more detached Bin Ladinist image of a charismatic, thoughtful leader who is above the fray. If there is an opportunity to insert a trainee from the Arabian Peninsula into North America, AQAP will be able to

springboard from Bin Ladin's death to an opportunistic strike focused as much on casualties as on branding AQAP as the new al-Qa`ida center of action. Al-`Awlaqi's access to Western recruits, in a country that is seen as both an inexpensive center for Arabic language training and an easier travel destination than Pakistan's tribal areas, may well translate into a steady stream of plots against the U.S. homeland emanating from Yemen, especially if AQAP's leadership attempts a less strategic, more scattershot approach to targeting.

AQAP may redouble efforts to hit hard targets—embassies and other facilities that were targeted earlier in the decade but that are now too difficult to reach for most extremist cells—but these efforts would take some time, perhaps months, to organize. Similarly, the attempt against a U.S. airliner over Detroit in December 2009 suggests that they might push again for an iconic target on U.S. soil; with the number of recruits from which they can draw, including a large volume of U.S. students in Yemen, homeland plotting is a certainty. The lawlessness of Yemen might now give them the time and space to plot carefully. The training and plotting opportunities in Yemen might be coupled with more sophisticated recruiting. Al-`Awlaqi's use of the internet shows AQAP's media savvy toward the West, and the recent plot involving a British Airways employee underscores the fact that AQAP can be technologically adaptive, similar to the efforts of al-Qa`ida's core plotters to find potential candidates from YouTube.

Revenge attacks by all al-Qa`ida affiliates will put a premium on personal safety for U.S. businesses operating overseas. Companies and individuals will probably witness strikes against high-profile locations such as hotels, resorts, nightclubs, bars, or other locations in high-threat areas that are known as venues where Westerners gather; these are easy to organize, have soft security, and are highly recognizable internationally. Besides the threat from al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), like-minded militants in Indonesia, for example, have repeatedly targeted Westerners, and the rise of independents in Indonesia who appear at the center of plots there all raise the prospect that they might be an

outlier threat in coming years, pushing not only for more strikes internally but for more targeting elsewhere. It is also possible that terrorists might target U.S. strategic interests, such as oil facilities, but this is less likely. Strategic sites are not easy to access for terrorists seeking a fast fix for vengeance. As with copycat plots in the United States during recent years—such as the backpack bomb plotters in New York—soft strikes overseas against cultural emblems such as nightclubs could easily spark copycat attempts in the United States.

Time will favor jihadists from Yemen and elsewhere as they seek to avenge the death of Bin Ladin by hitting Americans at home. They are committed, and their sense of time is different from the

“Even harder to track are the local threats, youth who lack connectivity to couriers, communications, or trainers from known terrorist entities. The ideology that motivates them is dying, but its death is proving unsurprisingly slow.”

short lenses of Western publics and governments. From the Western optic, no retaliatory response in the next two months would lead many to suspect that nothing is being prepared, and that the slow crippling of the al-Qa`ida movement has accelerated. This would be a mistake. An attack in six months would be a success in the eyes of the adversary, and a six month timeframe, although long for Americans, would seem insignificant if the target were substantial enough.

The Growing Challenges for Security Services
Time will not favor security services, including federal, state, and local law enforcement in the United States. The plots that crossed security officials' desks every morning nine years ago often emanated from core al-Qa`ida, and more plots—significant, but still declining in number—will appear on the daily Threat Matrix as the inheritors of

Bin Ladin's mantle, such as AQAP, try to make a name for themselves to prove to those who fund them and travel for training that they are still in the game. Even harder to track are the local threats, youth who lack connectivity to couriers, communications, or trainers from known terrorist entities. The ideology that motivates them is dying, but its death is proving unsurprisingly slow. Bin Ladin's message has been compelling: overthrow corrupt leaders and return to a time that better reflects Islam's golden age. His death may accelerate the decline of that message—especially combined with the peaceful revolutions sweeping the Arab world—but it may take years.

The expansion of the threat base in the United States will raise the risk of a successful, lower-level plot. More diverse plotters make intelligence and prevention far more difficult to track. With the overdone reaction to Bin Ladin's demise, there is no focus on the nature of plots in the past few years. There have been plots linked to al-Qa`ida's core leadership, such as Najibullah Zazi's plan to attack targets in New York, as well as attacks from like-minded militants, sometimes called homegrown, such as Nidal Malik Hasan who went on a shooting rampage at Ft. Hood in Texas. Additionally, there have been plots or terrorist activity from al-Qa`ida affiliates or associated groups: the Pakistani Taliban (implicated in the Times Square bombing and Miami funding cases), Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (implicated in David Headley's activities), AQAP (implicated in the December 2009 airliner plot as well as the October 2010 cargo planes plot), and al-Shabab (implicated in a number of recruitment efforts where members of the Somali diaspora in the United States traveled to fight in Somalia). All of these disparate plots and activities demonstrate why security services in the United States will be overburdened in tracking multiple, unconnected strands of intelligence.

In the midst of budget limitations and competing priorities—Mexican cartels, the rise of national gangs, and the continued threat of drug violence in city streets—spending money chasing less sophisticated al-Qa`ida fellow travelers may well lose traction. The operations of today are labor intensive: finding

small clusters of youth in major cities and following them to determine the extent of their networks is painstaking, and these clusters' lack of connectivity means that they are hard to find through national intelligence programs. Local law enforcement, with federal support, will be crucial, but expensive. In the past, most plots were uncovered by federal authorities, who needed local support and who operated in an environment where there were fewer questions about the threat or the need to spend on counterterrorism programs.

Conclusion

The commitment of al-Qa`ida ideologues has proven durable over time. They believe what they are doing is not only right, but required, and religiously sanctioned. Too many commentators are already speaking of Bin Ladin's demise as a "watershed," with the implication that threat in critical areas, particularly the United States, might decline as a result. Over the long-term, this makes sense: a revolutionary movement will ultimately fail if the message lacks credibility. Yet as the series of broken homegrown plots in the United States has proven during recent years, the half-life of revolutions is long. Smaller, more dispersed, less lethal operations might initially appear to represent a rising threat of homegrown extremists. This is unlikely. Without a standard-bearer, and in the midst of the decline in the al-Qa`ida messaging draw in recent years, homegrown strikes in the United States would more likely represent the adoption of al-Qa`ida's ideology by a small group who have no hope of sparking the kind of global wave many feared in the years after 9/11.

Bin Ladin's death makes the United States safer in the long-term, but still at risk in the short-term. It is critical not to lose focus on, or divert resources from, the terrorist threat facing the U.S. homeland almost 10 years after 9/11.

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Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety

By Shaun Gregory

TWO HIGH-PROFILE attacks by terrorists on highly secure military bases in Pakistan, the first on the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi in October 2009 and the second on the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran near Karachi in May 2011, have renewed international anxiety about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

This article addresses several worrying trends in Pakistan that are coming together to suggest that the safety and security of nuclear weapons materials in Pakistan may very well be compromised at some point in the future.

The Growing Challenge of Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal

In recent months, a variety of media sources have reported a significant escalation of nuclear weapons production by Pakistan. According to some of these sources, Pakistan has been building between 12 and 15 nuclear weapons a year, effectively doubling the size of its nuclear arsenal during the past three to four years to around 100 nuclear weapons.¹ More disconcerting, Pakistan is engaged in a rapid expansion of its fissile material production through two new reactors, the Khushab II, thought to be operating in some form since 2009, and Khushab III, which has been under construction since 2005-2006 and is likely to come on-stream around 2013-2014. There is further evidence from the respected Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security that a fourth Khushab reactor may also be under early phase construction.² Intended primarily to offset rival India's conventional military advantage, the open-ended escalation of Pakistan's nuclear weapons production explains why Pakistan has led the opposition

to the international Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), a treaty which would cap fissile material stockpiles.

Aside from the intricate politics of international arms control, the steady rise in the size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal presents the rather more prosaic, though arguably more serious, challenge of ensuring the physical security of an ever increasing number of nuclear assets. This is not a simple matter. Safeguarding 100 weapons is a significantly greater challenge than safeguarding 50 weapons because strategic and operational realities require that those weapons are dispersed and that dispersal locations are adapted to the complex requirements of safely and securely storing nuclear weapons in various degrees of operational readiness.³ As Pakistan's nuclear arsenal grows in the years ahead, these challenges will multiply.

As many as 70,000 people in Pakistan reportedly have access to, or knowledge of, some element of the Pakistani nuclear weapons production, storage, maintenance, and deployment cycle, from those involved in the manufacture of fissile material, through those engaging in nuclear weapons design, assembly and maintenance, to those who transport and safeguard the weapons in storage and would deploy the weapons in crises.⁴ That number will also rise steadily as the size of the nuclear arsenal grows.

3 If concentrated in too small a sub-set of locations, the weapons constitute a lucrative and vulnerable set of targets.

4 This figure includes the 8,000-10,000 staff of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division and 7,000-8,000 scientists of whom 2,000 are reported to have "critical knowledge" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The latter figure was originally attributed to the director of the Strategic Plans Division, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, in January 2009. For details, see David E. Sanger, "Obama's Worst Pakistan Nightmare," *New York Times*, January 8, 2009. It also includes up to 18,000 troops reported to guard the nuclear assets. For details, see Andrew Bast, "Pakistan's Nuclear Surge," *Newsweek*, May 15, 2011. For a development of these issues, see Christopher Clary, "Thinking About Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis and War," Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis, September 2010; Matthew Bunn, "Securing the Bomb 2010," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, April 2010.

1 Karen DeYoung, "New Estimates Put Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal at More than 100," *Washington Post*, January 31, 2011.

2 "Pakistan Appears to Expand Nuclear Site - Report," Reuters, February 10, 2011. For fuller details of this expansion, see the Institute for Science and International Security's website at www.isis-online.org.

This figure is important because of the complex and highly polarized debates about nuclear weapons safety and security in Pakistan. All sides of that debate agree that Pakistan has, with considerable U.S. assistance, put in place a range of robust measures to seek to assure the safety and security of its nuclear weapons. The consensus breaks down, however, on the issue of whether

“Terrorist groups have now shown themselves capable of penetrating even the most securely defended of Pakistan’s military bases and of holding space within those bases for many hours even against the elite SSG, more than enough time with the right equipment and sufficient numbers to carry out terrorist acts with enormous political or destructive pay-off.”

these measures provide adequate safety and security for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The Pakistan Army, which has overall control of the weapons, and Pakistan’s government argue forcefully that they do, although even they have recently moderated their statements of reassurance.⁵ Critics point to a number of vulnerabilities that place these reassurances in some doubt. These vulnerabilities boil down to three core concerns: a) that the physical security of

5 It is interesting that the official Pakistani narrative has moved from a comprehensive insistence that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are totally safe and secure, to a rather less absolute (and more realistic) acceptance that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are “at least as safe and secure as those of any other nuclear country.” This is an important change because all nuclear weapons states that have put information in the public domain have accepted that accidents, breaches of security, and unintended events are an inevitable part of operating a nuclear arsenal. None of these states, however, face the terrorist threat level that confronts Pakistan. For senior Pakistani articulation of the latter position, see, for example, “Strategic Assets Are Safe, Says FO,” *Dawn*, November 13, 2007.

nuclear weapons—across the weapons cycle—may not be robust enough to withstand determined terrorist assault; b) that among the estimated 70,000 people with access to the nuclear weapons cycle, some may be willing to collude in various ways with terrorists;⁶ c) that the threat extends beyond terrorists gaining access to complete and viable nuclear weapons, and include the immense political and security implications of terrorists gaining access to fissile material, nuclear weapons components, or penetrating nuclear weapons facilities.

A July 2009 article in the *CTC Sentinel* explained in detail the robust measures Pakistan has established to assure the safety and security of its nuclear weapons. It argued that terrorists have shown themselves able to carry out violent attacks at facilities that were reliably identified as having a nuclear weapons role. These facilities include the military complex at Wah, suspected to be involved in the manufacture of nuclear weapons parts; Kamra, suspected to be the designated base for the dispersal of nuclear assets in a crisis; and Sargodha, suspected to be a storage facility for nuclear delivery systems.⁷

6 There must also be a risk that among this number are terrorists or their sympathizers who have applied for jobs to gain access to part of the weapons cycle, with the smuggling of fissile material a key vector of concern. For an insightful analysis of these issues, see Brian Cloughley, “Fission Fears,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, April 2011.

7 It must be conceded here that the claimed roles of the sites at Wah and Kamra are robustly contested by some in Pakistan and cannot be definitively resolved on the basis of unclassified sources. Wah is Pakistan’s main conventional weapons production facility and home to at least 14 separate complexes dealing with technologies including explosives, heavy artillery ammunition, steel and alloy, propellants, and weapons manufacture. These are precisely the subset of technologies necessary to manufacture and assemble the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons (warhead cases, conventional explosive triggers, etc.) into which the fissile core can be fitted. In the absence of comparable alternative facilities in Pakistan, Wah remains the most likely location for the manufacture and assembly of nuclear weapons parts. What is less clear is whether fissile material is enriched or otherwise worked at Wah or whether fissile material is brought to Wah for final assembly. For details on these matters, see www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/wah.htm and www.cns.miis.edu/reports/pdfs/pakistan.pdf. Pakistan’s Air Weapons Complex Kamra,

In none of these cases, however, were the terrorist attacks themselves aimed at penetrating the bases or at seizing nuclear assets; rather, they were mass casualty bomb attacks that took advantage of the fact that Pakistani security personnel were concentrated and relatively static at base entry points as they waited to go through security barriers.⁸ Some analysts criticized the article, arguing that: a) terrorists in Pakistan had never shown themselves capable of penetrating high security bases; b) that the secrecy of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons sites would ensure that terrorists could not know the locations of the weapons. Within a few months, the validity of both these counterarguments would be seriously undermined when Pakistani militants penetrated the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.

The Attack on Pakistan’s Army Headquarters
On October 10, 2009, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi militants staged an audacious attack on the Pakistan Army’s GHQ in Rawalpindi, arguably one of the most secure military complexes in Pakistan, housing within its sprawling campus not only the chief of army staff, but also many of Pakistan’s most senior military commanders, including the director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the director-general of Strategic Forces Command (SFC)—Pakistan’s two most senior operational nuclear commanders.

close to Wah, is reported to have a role in air-delivered nuclear weapons and to be a dispersal site for aircraft armed with nuclear weapons in crises. For details, see www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/kamra.htm and Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service, January 13, 2011, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf. There was no similar contestation of Sargodha’s possible role as a storage facility for nuclear ballistic missiles. For details on Sargodha, see www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/sargodha.htm.

8 The sources used in the article make entirely clear the nature of the attacks to which the argument was referring. See Shaun Gregory, “The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” *CTC Sentinel* 2:7 (2009).

The modalities of this attack add up to a virtual blueprint for a successful attack on a nuclear weapons facility:

- the penetration of layers of security checkpoints, barriers, and obstacles on the approach to the sensitive military site;

- the terrorist use of army uniforms and—according to some reports—a military vehicle with appropriate license plates, and forged ID cards, to deceive checkpoint personnel;

- the use of a safe house relatively close to the target site for several weeks before the operation to allow the build-up of a detailed intelligence picture;

- the use of a “sensitive” map (or maps) of the GHQ to allow detailed operational planning. The use of this map (or maps) point to one of two main possibilities: either that the attack had inside help, or that this kind of sensitive information is poorly controlled by the Pakistan Army/ISI;

- use of the kind of weaponry—small-arms, grenades and suicide vests—which allow final tier barrier defenses to be penetrated;

- use of tactics that allow final tier barriers to be penetrated: grenades and/or suicide detonations at entry points which then allow penetration by follow-up commando-style groups;

- use of diversionary tactics: attacking one gate first to draw off and weaken the defenses at a secondary entry point, perhaps closer to the main objective.⁹

In all, at least 10 terrorists were involved in the operation, with four attacking the first gate, and a further six attacking the second gate. The terrorists gained entry to the complex where they took at least 40 people hostage. It took the Pakistan Army's elite commandos, the Special Service Group (SSG), more than 20 hours to

kill or capture all of the militants and free most of the hostages. Two civilians, seven Pakistani soldiers and five SSG commandos were killed in the raid.

In the months that followed the assault, several other disturbing aspects about the attack emerged. Among these was the assertion that intelligence about the attacks had been known to Pakistan's Punjab government well before October

“A frontal assault of this kind on nuclear weapons storage facilities, which are the most robustly defended elements of Pakistan's nuclear weapons cycle, is no longer an implausible event.”

10 and that this intelligence had even been published in two Pakistani newspapers, *The News International* and *The Daily Jhang*, four days before the attack, but had been ignored by the Pakistan Army and ISI.¹⁰ It also emerged that the terrorists had, ironically, almost certainly learned their tactics from the SSG, which had trained earlier generations of Pakistani/Kashmiri militants in similar tactics for operations against India. In addition, there was a concerted effort by the Pakistan Army and ISI to manipulate the media reporting of the attacks, forcing several private TV channels temporarily off the air, contradicting or retracting certain details, and seeking to play down the significance of the assault.¹¹

The second set of features of the attack relate to secrecy, and they weaken the argument that Pakistan can ultimately rely on concealment to protect its nuclear assets. The use of “sensitive” maps in the attack, the time and proximity to conduct intelligence gathering, the level of knowledge of details such as uniforms, military

plates, and possibly ID cards, point to a high level of terrorist knowledge of sensitive military information and protocols, whether through insider help or not. Furthermore, detailed knowledge of Pakistan's security force movements and *modus operandi* has been a consistent feature of terrorist actions in Pakistan for many years, from the repeated assassination attempts against former President Pervez Musharraf, at least one of which included the insider involvement of Pakistani military officers,¹² through the targeting of the ISI headquarters and vehicles,¹³ to the murders of senior military figures.¹⁴

Pakistan's Nuclear Security at Risk

In this context, given that nuclear weapons and delivery systems demand construction and other visible physical necessities (such as road widening, unusual levels of security, and bunker construction), and given that the growth of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal will significantly expand the construction of nuclear weapons infrastructure and the number of individuals with nuclear-related roles, it is simply not possible that the location of all of Pakistan's nuclear weapons can remain unknown to terrorists in perpetuity.¹⁵

As evidence of this, on August 28, 2009, the U.S. Federation of American Scientists published the first open source satellite imagery of a suspected Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor airbase outside Karachi.¹⁶ Within its perimeter walls,

12 “Air Force Officers Held for Attack on General Musharraf,” *Daily Telegraph*, November 5, 2006.

13 “Bombers Hit Pakistan Spy Agency,” BBC, November 13, 2009.

14 Those killed include Lieutenant General Mushtaq Baig, at the time Pakistan's surgeon general, blown up at a road junction in February 2008, and Major General Amir Faisal Alvi, former head of the SSG, gunned down on his way home. See respectively “Rawalpindi Suicide Blast: Kills 8 with Pakistan Army Surgeon General,” *Pakistan Times*, February 25, 2008; Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Top Pakistan Ex-Commando Killed,” BBC, November 19, 2008.

15 Nor should it be doubted that some terrorists at least continue to seek nuclear weapons or components. For an interesting discussion, see Abdul Bakier, “Jihadis Discuss Plans to Seize Nuclear Assets,” *Terrorism Monitor* 7:4 (2009).

16 To view the U.S. Federation of American Scientists' document, see www.fas.org/blog/ssp/category/pakistan.

9 This list has been put together from interviews and a range of sources, including: “Press Review: Rawalpindi Attack,” BBC, October 12, 2009; Shahid Rao, “Terror Attack on GHQ,” *The Nation*, October 11, 2009; Pakistan's Inter Services Public Relations, press releases, May 2011; Hassan Abbas, “Deciphering the Attack on Pakistan's Army Headquarters,” *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2009.

10 “GHQ Attack Report Published in Daily Jhang, The News on 5th October,” *The News International*, October 11, 2009.

11 These are some of the reasons it is difficult to be definitive about all of the attack details.

the satellite image shows three potential storage bunkers linked by looping roads.¹⁷ The fact that this image is available online, and that the unusual configuration of the base is clear, argues strongly that knowledge of the location of at least some nuclear weapons storage and other related facilities has reached terrorists in Pakistan.

As the number of nuclear weapons facilities grows, and the number of those with access to nuclear weapons or related components rises, the complex challenge of assuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components will become ever more difficult. Terrorist groups have now shown themselves capable of penetrating even the most securely defended of Pakistan's military bases and of holding space within those bases for many hours even against the elite SSG, more than enough time with the right equipment and sufficient numbers to carry out terrorist acts with enormous political or destructive pay-off, from video broadcasts with the attention of the world's media, through potentially destroying by explosions nuclear weapons or materials and the creation of a radiological hazard, to the possibility of the theft of nuclear weapons components or materials for subsequent terrorist use.

Indeed, on May 22-23, 2011, only about 15 miles from the suspected nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor, a major terrorist attack targeted the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran in Karachi. Early reports suggest that between six and ten terrorists stormed the high security base from several entry points, that they had knowledge of the location of intruder detection cameras that they were able to bypass, and that they penetrated deep inside the base before using rocket-propelled grenades, explosives and small-arms to destroy several aircraft and take hostages. It took the base security and additional Pakistan Army rangers and commandos more than 18 hours to end the siege. At least 13 people were killed.

A frontal assault of this kind on nuclear weapons storage facilities, which are the most robustly defended elements of Pakistan's nuclear weapons cycle, is no longer an implausible event. The successful location and penetration of such a site by terrorists, even if they were ultimately unsuccessful in accessing nuclear assets, would itself be a transformative event both in terms of the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear relationship and in terms of international anxiety about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Such an assault would also critically undermine Pakistan's reassurances about the security of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the weapons cycle, particularly in transit. As the number of Pakistani nuclear weapons inexorably continues to rise, and as the nuclear weapons security challenges thereby steadily multiply, the odds that Pakistan's nuclear weapons security will eventually be compromised continue to rise.

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The Syrian Uprising: Evaluating the Opposition

By Mahmud Hasan

IN MID-MARCH 2011, the arrest and torture of teenagers who had written anti-regime graffiti sparked a wave of demonstrations in the southern Syrian city of Deraa. As a result of the brutal reaction by security forces, protests rapidly escalated and spread to the coastal cities of Latakia and Banyas, the suburbs of Damascus, and the central governorates of Homs, Hama, and Idlib. Protestors initially demanded democratic reforms, yet the Syrian government's violent response to the demonstrations—which has now taken the form of armored divisions besieging the rebellious towns and cities—has led many to openly call for the fall of the regime.

From the point of view of the authorities, the most threatening phase of the uprising so far was the massive demonstration that saw tens of thousands flooding the main square of Homs, Syria's third largest city, on April 19. Following the bloody suppression of the gathering, the Syrian Ministry of Interior declared that the country was witnessing "an armed insurgency" aimed at "establishing Salafi emirates."¹ Such discourse is beyond any doubt part of a poor attempt at concealing the fact that the regime is actually facing a genuine popular uprising. Nevertheless, it has succeeded in convincing part of the population, in particular members of religious minorities that have been traumatized by the failed Islamic revolution of the early 1980s, that Islamist militants are seeking to take control of the state. Moreover, if the situation deteriorates further, the regime might well create the reality it pretends to fight, as its unrestricted use of violence against civilians and manipulation of sectarian divides are likely to fuel Sunni radicalism.

Assessing the Depth of the Crisis

To some extent, the bloody crushing of the 1979-1982 Islamist uprising in Syria was the last stage of the coup carried out by the Ba'ath Party in 1963. Indeed, what Syrians still remember as "the events"

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹ Syrian Arab News Agency, April 19, 2011.

were nothing but the final showdown between a regime dominated by sons of peasants, the most powerful of them belonging to the Alawite minority,² and the scions of their historical foes, the conservative Sunni merchants.

As for the current wave of unrest, it seems to be exactly the opposite. The central quarters of Damascus and Aleppo have remained relatively calm so far, which suggests that despite widespread corruption and unfair competition on the part of regime cronies, the majority of the merchant bourgeoisie has benefited enough from the last decade of economic liberalization to prioritize stability.

Instead, the uprising started in Deraa, the administrative center of the Hauran, a Sunni rural and tribal region that is a historical stronghold of the ruling Ba`ath Party. Indeed, it is the homeland of such senior officials as Vice President Faruq al-Shara` and Vice President of the National Progressive Front (the alliance composed of the Ba`ath and satellite parties) Suleiman al-Qaddah. It must be noted that unofficial media outlets of the intelligence service have attacked al-Qaddah, apparently for his lack of enthusiasm at supporting the regime's repressive policies, which have also been openly denounced by several representatives of the Deraa governorate in the (rump) national parliament.³ All of this, in addition to the rallying of senior local clerics and tribal leaders to the "revolution," suggests that the movement relies on a broad popular base that encompasses both the grassroots and the notables.

Other signs that a significant part of the Ba`ath's rural support base has turned against the regime have come from the

governorates of Homs, Hama and Idlib, in central Syria, where many villages and agricultural towns (al-Rastan, Talbisa, Ariha) have witnessed large and brutally suppressed demonstrations.

Other major hotbeds of unrest have been the suburbs and satellite towns of Damascus (in particular Duma, Ma`damiyya, and Dariya) that are home to members of the working and lower middle-classes.

These developments at first suggest that the current events have an obvious social and economic dimension and might be seen as consequences of the regime's shift from socialism to a so-called "social market economy." Such a reading of the situation, however, does

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not explain why the uprising has taken roots in the cities of Latakia and Banyas, on the coast, and of Homs, in the center, since these economies are much better than that of the rural hinterland. Nor does it help explain the relative calm that prevails in the countryside of Aleppo (North) and in the Jezireh (North East), where social and economic conditions are by far the worst in the country, all the more so since local agriculture has been devastated by drought since 2007.

An alternative explanation is the sectarian factor. Indeed, all of Latakia, Banyas and Homs are home to sizeable Alawite communities that have migrated from the mountains and countryside during the 20th century and live in relatively homogeneous neighborhoods. Of course, the mere presence of Alawites did not stir up Sunni resentment; rather, it could be their massive recruitment into the local security apparatus, whose corruption and voracity has increased

while the redistributive capacities of the state have diminished. Of course, the situation is no different in the north and northeast, but in those regions, in the absence of Alawites, the intelligence services have mostly recruited among (Sunni) Bedouins and Kurds, which has possibly allowed for relatively smoother relations between the population and the security apparatus.

Since the rallying to the opposition of the merchant bourgeoisie of Damascus and Aleppo does not seem plausible in the short-term, the real key to the fate of the regime is the loyalty of the countryside of the north/northeast, and more particularly of the governorate of Aleppo, which is home to 25% of the country's total population. Were the uprising to spread there, the Syrian army would be quickly overstretched, since there are good reasons to think that only a small proportion of its 300,000-strong active manpower would be as loyal against civilians as the (predominantly Alawite) 4th Brigade, which has been besieging Deraa, or the Republican Guard, which defends the capital.

The Role of the Islamists and the Prospects for Radicalization

Contrary to official allegations, Islamic forces have played a minor role so far in the Syrian protests. The exiled Society of the Muslim Brothers, which was completely eradicated inside the country following the insurgency of the early 1980s, kept a low profile for more than one month after the start of the uprising, probably to avoid feeding the regime's propaganda campaign against the domestic opposition. The Brothers nevertheless changed their mind with the conference of the Syrian opposition held in Istanbul in late April, following which they issued their first formal call to demonstrate.⁴

In Damascus, although some senior Muslim scholars initially vowed support for demonstrations, most of them have been quickly silenced through a mixture of threats and concessions such as the closure of Damascus' casino, the opening of a new institute for higher Islamic studies, the reinstatement

2 The Alawites ("supporters of Imam Ali"), also known under the (derogative) name of "Nusayris," are a Muslim sect that has been considered as "heretical" by most Sunni and (until very recently) Shi'a theologians throughout history. A downtrodden minority, they have lived in the coastal mountains of Syria for centuries. During the 1960s, Alawite officers became extremely influential within the Syrian military, to the extent that one of them, Hafiz al-Assad, became the head of the state in 1971. Upon his death in 2000, his son, Bashar al-Assad, succeeded him as president of Syria.

3 Ignace Leverrier, "Des dissensions se font jour dans le système syrien," www.syrie.blog.lemonde.fr, April 24, 2011.

4 "Communiqué of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Syria Concerning the Assessment of our Position," www.ikhwasysyria.com, April 28, 2011.

of face-veiled teachers that had been transferred to administrative positions, and the creation of an Islamic satellite channel.⁵

Local clerics have joined the opposition and, in some cases, have become its main speakers in rebellious cities such as Deraa (imam of Grand Mosque Ahmad Sayasne and Mufti Rizq Abazayd, who resigned from his position in protest at the crackdown, then accepted to be reinstated under official pressure) and Banyas (Anas `Ayrut). This is apparently, however, not the result of any active involvement in the early stage of the protests but rather that demonstrators have put forward these well-known and respected figures.

Whereas the demands of the aforementioned clerics have remained focused on democratic reforms rather than on a specifically Islamic agenda, there were at least two substantiated cases of men of religion giving fiery sectarian speeches in front of the demonstrators. In one of them, however, the contrast between the speaker's enthusiasm at vilifying "infidels" and his refusal to call for the fall of the regime gives some credence to the theory that this established cleric was actually sent by Syrian intelligence services to undermine the credibility of the protest movement.⁶

The Syrian official press has repeatedly pointed to the killings of several dozen soldiers and policemen as proof of the involvement of Saudi-backed "extremists" in the uprising. For its part, the opposition has accused the regime of executing members of the military who refused to shoot at civilians. In fact, there is no need to resort to any of these theories to make sense of the death of security operatives. Light automatic weapons such as AK-47s are widespread in the Syrian countryside and coastal region, where they are used for hunting, protection of livestock against hyenas, and feuds. Therefore, it would not be surprising if people sought revenge for relatives killed by security forces during the recent demonstrations, all the more so that the most violent clashes

occurred in regions where tribal bonds are strong.

In addition to its ruthless character, the regime's handling of popular unrest is also distinctly sectarian, which might help jihadist groups promote their narrative among the Sunni population. As soon as the first demonstrations started in the Sunni neighborhoods of Latakia, the government labeled them as a sectarian *fitna* (discord) while *agents provocateurs* reportedly sought to create tensions between the Sunni and Alawite communities of the city. In addition to the fact that repression chiefly relies on the most loyal (predominantly Alawite) units of the army, the authorities have resorted to Alawite paramilitaries and thugs called "Shabbiha." In a video that quickly went viral on YouTube, plainclothes militiamen are seen beating trussed up prisoners in the Sunni village of al-Bayda (Banyas) while shouting to one another with distinctly Alawite names such as "Ali Abbas."⁷

At the moment, Syria does not seem to be home to organized jihadist networks that could exploit such a situation in the short-term. Throughout the 2000s, the country has exported most of its radical Islamists to Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon (such as to the group Fatah al-Islam). As a result, Syria has suffered relatively little from terrorism during the last decade; with the exception of the bombing in September 2008 that killed 17 near a center of the intelligence service in Sidi Qazzaz, a suburb of Damascus, the country witnessed only three failed (and, for two of them, somewhat curious) attacks by Islamic militants,⁸ in addition to a series of skirmishes between the latter and security forces in 2005-2006. Moreover, dozens of jihadists perished in the suppression of a riot at the prison of Seydnaya in the summer of 2008.

In late 2004, London-based Syrian jihadist scholar `Abd al-Mun`im Halima (also known as Abu Basir al-Tartusi) launched the online magazine *Risalat al-Mujahidin* (The Mujahidin's Newsletter) with the aim to encourage

fellow Islamic militants to identify Syria as a "land of jihad." With U.S. troops in Iraq, and because of Syria's anti-Western policy, the magazine failed to attract any attention, with the result that it stopped printing after a couple of issues. The current events have led al-Tartusi to focus on Syria again.⁹ With the rising number of (mostly Sunni) victims of state repression, and the active involvement in the latter of *de facto* sectarian Alawite militias, there are some reasons to fear that he might end up being more successful this time.

Conclusion

After two months of unrest and the killings of almost 1,000 people, the situation remains uncertain. Although President Bashar al-Assad has made full use of his military might, he has failed to crush the movement. At the same time, the number of demonstrators has remained limited to probably less than 50,000 nationwide, and protests have still not taken root in the central districts of Damascus and Aleppo or in the populous northern countryside. The Syrian "revolution" is thus increasingly looking like a war of attrition whose result is impossible to foresee, since neither side seems to lack determination.

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⁵ *Al-Watan* [Damascus], April 6, 2011.

⁶ Sermon of Sheikh As`ad Khalil on "Freedom Square" in Homs, April 18, 2011, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=owu3WF4VWxE.

⁷ This can be viewed at www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVPDZji4-f4.

⁸ Against an empty UN building in April 2004, an empty building of the national television in June 2006, and the U.S. Embassy in September 2006.

⁹ See, for example, "Important Advices and Orientations for Demonstrators," www.abubaseer.bizland.com, April 30, 2011.

Can Al-Qa`ida Survive Bin Ladin's Death? Evaluating Leadership Decapitation

By Jenna Jordan

WHAT WILL THE death of Usama bin Ladin mean for the war on terrorism? While Bin Ladin's death was a major tactical victory for the United States, decapitation alone rarely results in the demise of terrorist organizations. Killing Bin Ladin may destabilize al-Qa`ida temporarily, but his death is unlikely to be a significant blow to the organization.

This article examines the effectiveness of leadership targeting based on a dataset compiled by the author. It shows what factors determine whether leadership decapitation will be effective, and it concludes that the death of Bin Ladin is unlikely to weaken the al-Qa`ida terrorist group.

Research on Leadership Targeting

To assess the effectiveness of leadership decapitation against terrorist groups, the author compiled a dataset of 298 incidents of leadership targeting from 1945-2004. In brief, the findings suggest that decapitation is not an effective counterterrorism strategy. In fact, the rate of decline is lower for groups whose leaders have been killed or arrested. Moreover, in certain cases decapitation can have adverse and counterproductive consequences. Decapitation is the least effective in the context of groups that are older, religious, or relatively large.¹

Comparing the rate of decline for groups that have undergone leadership decapitation to those that have not, the data shows that decapitation does not increase the likelihood of organizational collapse beyond a

baseline rate of collapse for groups over time. Organizations that have not had their leaders removed are more likely to fall apart than those that have undergone a loss of leadership. While 53% of decapitated terrorist groups fell apart, 70% of groups that have never experienced decapitation are no longer active. The marginal utility for decapitation is actually negative—the rate of collapse is almost 20% less for decapitated organizations—particularly for larger, older, religious, and separatist organizations.

There are three key variables that can help determine whether and under what conditions decapitation is likely to be effective: an organization's age, size, and type.

First, a group's age was the strongest predictor of when decapitation results in group collapse. Older groups tend to withstand attacks on their leadership, and decapitation is counterproductive the older a group becomes. This variable was coded according to the year in which the organization began conducting terrorist activity and was coded in 10-year increments. The data shows that organizations under 10 years of age were the most susceptible to collapse. Decapitation is seven percent less effective than doing nothing for groups under 20 years of age, and becomes 20% less effective for groups between 20-30 years of age. Groups that had been active for more than 40 years were always resistant to collapse following the removal of a leader. There are strong reasons to expect that larger groups possess organizational attributes, which increase their resilience to counterterrorism measures in general.

Second, large groups are better able to regroup after the removal of leaders; decapitation rarely works against groups with more than 500 members. This variable is coded according to the number of active members. The smallest organizations, those with fewer than 100 active members, were susceptible to collapse. Generally, as a group gets larger, the success rate of decapitation declines. Once a group exceeds a membership of 500, the rate of decline is higher for groups that have not experienced decapitation. Decapitation essentially becomes counterproductive. For groups with between 500-1,000

members, the rate of decline for decapitated organizations is 46% less than for non-decapitated organizations.

Third, religious and separatist groups are difficult to destabilize through leadership targeting, while ideological organizations are the most susceptible to targeting efforts.² Religious groups that have undergone decapitation are less likely to fall apart than those that did not. The rate of decline for decapitated religious groups is 15% less than for religious groups whose leaders have not been targeted, while decapitated ideological groups fall apart about seven percent less than non-decapitated ideological groups. Overall, the data shows that decapitation is not an effective strategy, and in certain cases it actually increases organizational resilience.

Organizational Resilience

To explain why small, young, and ideological groups are easier to destabilize than older, larger, and religious, the author developed a theory of organizational resilience. Organizational resilience is a function of two variables: bureaucratization and communal support. Decapitation is unlikely to result in the demise of groups that have bureaucratized administrative functions or that have high levels of communal support. Groups have an easier time regrouping after an external shock if they have bureaucratic features at the upper levels of the organization or if they have significant levels of communal support.

First, bureaucratization is an internal mechanism that increases group stability and facilitates a clear succession process. Older or larger organizations are more likely to develop bureaucratic traits including an organized administrative staff, a hierarchy of authority, and a system of rules and regulations, making it more stable and less likely to fail. As organizations grow in size

1 Jenna Jordan, "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," *Security Studies* 18:4 (2009). For other studies on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation, see Michael Freeman, "The Headless Horseman: A Theoretical and Strategic Assessment of Leadership Targeting," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 30 (2010); Patrick Johnston, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," Harvard University, 2010; Bryan C. Price, *Removing the Devil You Know: An Empirical Analysis of Leadership Decapitation and Terrorist Group Duration* (West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, 2010).

2 In the dataset generated for this study, cases are coded as religious, ideological, or separatist. While religious organizations certainly have ideological aspirations, "ideological" is a category that includes Marxist, Leninist, social revolutionary, fascist, and white supremacist organizations. This is a dummy variable to allow for overlap. For example, organizations can be classified as religious/separatist, separatist/ideological, or ideological/religious.

and/or age, they often require a more complex administration to function effectively. An administrative staff, hierarchy, and stable rules can allow the group to operate efficiently and, most importantly, increase its stability and capacity to withstand leadership attacks.

Second, communal support is essential in providing the resources necessary for a terrorist group to function and survive.³ Accordingly, groups with higher levels of local support should have access to more resources, decreasing their vulnerability to destabilization. While not in all cases, religious and separatist groups often have a higher degree of support from the communities in which they operate. As religious and separatist doctrine tends to be rooted within local communities, its reproduction is not necessarily dependent upon the leader. As a result, the loss of a leader would be less disruptive to the group's doctrinal coherence. In comparison, the doctrine upon which ideological organizations are based is usually dependent upon a particular set of beliefs that is exclusive to the group or to the leader itself. Groups with higher levels of local support should thus have access to resources necessary to survive attacks.

Past Examples

Hamas

Many of the most prominent cases of leadership decapitation fit this pattern. For example, Hamas leaders have been targeted repeatedly with unsuccessful results. Hamas has had a high amount of popular support, due in part to its ability to provide social services, education, and religious institutions to the Palestinian community.⁴ Hamas' organizational structure has made it difficult to destabilize in the face of

repeated attacks on its leadership. Its bureaucratic hierarchy, combined with a largely decentralized structure of local networks, further increased its ability to withstand decapitation.⁵ While the targeting of key leaders may have decreased the lethality of Hamas' attacks, the number of operations increased over time.

Two top Hamas leaders, Shaykh Ahmad Yassin and Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, were both targeted and killed by Israeli forces in 2004.⁶ Although the organization was temporarily disrupted, these and other past cases of targeted killings incited retaliatory attacks and outrage, ultimately increasing communal support for the organization.⁷ Civilian deaths, which can occur during the process of targeting leaders, have also fueled Palestinian support for Hamas.⁸ Eventually, public support reached such a high level that Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006.⁹

Al-Qa'ida

Al-Qa'ida fits this pattern as well. While Bin Ladin's death may destabilize the group in the short-term, decapitation alone is not likely to result in its demise. First, al-Qa'ida formed in 1988, which makes it more than 20 years old—this should significantly increase its ability to withstand Bin Ladin's death. Decapitation is almost 20% less effective than doing nothing against groups between 21-30 years of age. Second, al-Qa'ida is clearly a religious organization—its goals include the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, overthrowing non-Islamic regimes, and expelling infidels from Muslim countries—which also tends to make terrorist groups more resistant to attacks on its leadership.¹⁰ Finally,

the issue of whether al-Qa'ida's size will work in its favor is less clear-cut, since experts disagree over the group's exact numbers.¹¹ Yet it is reasonable to believe that the group has more than 500 militants—which would put it over the threshold at which terrorist organizations become better able to withstand decapitation. Even if the group has less than 500 members, the rate of decapitation success for groups with between 100 and 500 members is still very small.

Religious and separatist organizations often do not depend upon the specific ideology of the leader. While Bin Ladin has provided a key inspirational role, the organization has an ideological resonance that extends beyond the spiritual leadership he provided. Rather, Bin Ladin developed and broadened the appeal of al-Qa'ida's ideology to attract a broad base of support.¹² His anti-Western message was able to attract widespread support. Some of al-Qa'ida's prime recruiting tools this past decade have been U.S. military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which may continue to draw fighters to Bin Ladin's cause after his death. It is this broad ideological position that has made al-Qa'ida's support and infrastructure both global and resilient.

Bin Ladin's death may temporarily destabilize al-Qa'ida's core in Pakistan; however, its decentralized structure should increase its resilience to long-term destabilization. The organization is highly bifurcated, with local affiliates—al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—operating largely independently. Decentralized organizations are more difficult to destabilize through leadership attacks.¹³

3 Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 95; Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 104; Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 81; Risa Brooks, *Societies and Terrorist Violence: How Social Support Affects Militant Campaigns* (Chicago: Northwestern University, 2009).

4 Ziad Abu-Amr, "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22:4 (1993).

5 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision Violence and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 152.

6 In another prominent instance of decapitation, Yahya Ayyash's death in 1996 directly resulted in multiple retaliatory attacks with high casualties.

7 Khaled Hroub, "Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33:4 (2004).

8 Ibid.; Daniel Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" *Foreign Affairs* 85:2 (2006); Avery Plaw, *Targeting Terrorists* (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2008).

9 Azzam Tamini, *Hamas: A History from Within* (Ithaca, NY: Olive Branch Press, 2007), p. 18.

10 Cronin, p. 182.

11 See Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, "The Al-Manac of Al Qaeda," *Foreign Policy*, 2010; Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, "Assessing the Terrorist Threat," A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group, 2010.

12 Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 71-72.

13 On the stability of decentralized organizations, see Kathleen Carley, "A Theory of Group Stability," *American Sociological Review* 56:3 (1991); Kathleen Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt, "Destabilizing Networks," *Connections* 24:3 (2002).

While these affiliates initially focused on local and regional affairs, they have increased their efforts at transnational terrorist activity. AQAP allegedly helped plan the 2009 Little Rock recruitment office shooting, the 2009 attempted Christmas Day bombing of a U.S. airliner over Detroit, and the 2010 cargo planes bomb plot. Even if Bin Ladin's death significantly weakens al-Qa'ida's core, which given the data seems unlikely, the local affiliates have shown that they are committed to al-Qa'ida's larger agenda. While al-Qa'ida's core has already been significantly weakened since fleeing Afghanistan in 2001, its quasi-bureaucratic system of administration should increase its capacity to endure this latest setback. Groups can be both hierarchical at the upper levels and decentralized at the lower and more operational levels. It is the combination of these two factors that can make groups difficult to weaken.¹⁴

Conclusion

Overall, the appeal of al-Qa'ida's ideology, the growth of its decentralized networks, and the regrouping of al-Qa'ida's leadership suggest that Bin Ladin's death will not destroy the group. There is also a potential not only for decapitation to be counterproductive, but to result in adverse consequences. The killing of high-profile leaders such as Bin Ladin, who become symbols of martyrdom, can generate a desire for revenge and retaliation, resulting in more attacks.

This all indicates the importance of following up on this successful attack in ways that will decrease support for al-Qa'ida. Terrorist groups depend upon popular support to function, survive as covert organizations, and execute attacks. Support is necessary for a group to replenish its membership, raise money, provide resources, and ensure its ability to operate covertly. While the type of support that al-Qa'ida depends upon is very different from that of Hamas or Lebanese Hizb Allah, it is still important that groups have support in the areas where they operate. The more support, the easier it is for them to carry out activity. While its tactics are less popular, al-Qa'ida has managed to build a sizeable base of

support. In fact, public opinion polls in Pakistan have found that substantial minorities feel that al-Qa'ida's cause is legitimate and believe that it is seeking justice for Muslims.¹⁵ It is the ideological resonance of al-Qa'ida's doctrine that allows the group to recruit new members and can increase its ability to withstand attacks.

American leaders could help dry up this popular support for al-Qa'ida by beginning to withdraw ground forces from Afghanistan, thus neutralizing one of the causes for which Bin Ladin's militants have been fighting. While al-Qa'ida is driven by religious doctrine, the presence of U.S. ground forces in Muslim countries has been a key tool in recruitment. Much of Bin Ladin's support initially stemmed from opposition to U.S. forces in the Arabian Peninsula in the 1990s.¹⁶ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan served to further resentment toward a U.S. military presence, incite attacks, and promote recruitment. By completing the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and removing considerable troops from Afghanistan, the United States could mitigate critical sources of support for al-Qa'ida.

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15 C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights from a National Sample," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22:4 (2010). Also see Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," *International Security* 34:3 (2009/2010).

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Hizb Allah's Position on the Arab Spring

By Benedetta Berti

IN JANUARY 2011, before the arrival of the wave of massive sociopolitical and geostrategic change that has spread through the Middle East, the regional balance of power began shifting in Beirut, when the Hizb Allah-led opposition forces resigned from Saad Hariri's executive cabinet, leading to the collapse of the "pro-Western" March 14 government and to the rise of a Hizb Allah-dominated parliamentary majority. In the months following its "takeover" of Lebanese domestic politics, Hizb Allah is now capitalizing on its enhanced domestic status while attempting to improve its regional standing and power. To do so, Hizb Allah has been following the Arab spring closely, while using its political and military power to support—mostly indirectly—popular revolutions in the Middle East and to increase its regional involvement.

This article explores Hizb Allah's response to the ongoing protests in the Middle East and analyzes both the group's direct and indirect support for these movements, as well as the strategic shift that took place within the Lebanese-Shi'a organization in reaction to what the group views as a favorable shift in the regional balance of power.

Embracing the Protest Movements

Hizb Allah's stance with respect to the ongoing protest movements in the Middle East has been one of unequivocal support. This should not come as a surprise. Since the end of the July 2006 war against Israel, the group has gradually shifted away from its traditionally conciliatory strategy with respect to existing Arab regimes. Instead, in the aftermath of its 2006 confrontation with Israel, Hizb Allah has been vocal in expressing its hostility with respect to the so-called "moderate Arab regimes," while advocating in favor of radical change in the region. For instance, during the September 18, 2009 al-Quds (Jerusalem) day celebrations, Hizb Allah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah clearly stated that "we have to replace the regimes in the Arab

14 Hamas is a good example of a terrorist group that has a highly organized hierarchy and is also decentralized.

countries with other regimes that are convinced of war in order to send their armies to war."¹ Under this predicament, regime change among "moderate" countries (including Mubarak's Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) is seen as an important step to strengthen what the group defines as the Iranian-led "axis of resistance."²

Accordingly, following the outbreak of mass protests in Tunisia and Egypt, Hizb Allah has been extremely vocal in expressing its ideological support for these movements.

During his first public display of support for the Tunisian and Egyptian people on February 7, 2011, Nasrallah explained that his group's initial silence over these movements' achievements was a measure adopted to shield them from criticism. In fact, he argued that if Hizb Allah would have openly sided with them at an early stage, "it would have been said that the demonstrators in Tahrir Square...are motivated by cells affiliated to Hizb Allah or Hamas...or to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards."³ Following this initial expression of solidarity and vow to "defend" the revolution and campaign in the media to ensure its popularity, Hizb Allah has maintained a high level of indirect support for the protest movements in both Tunisia and Egypt.⁴

The fall of the Egyptian regime, specifically, has been especially welcomed by Hizb Allah, which saw in the demise of Mubarak also the decline of one of the group's main regional opponents. Defined by the organization as an Israeli and American puppet, Mubarak had been critical of the Lebanese-Shi'a group during the 2006 Lebanon war and, in the past few years, Hizb Allah has repeatedly expressed its opposition to the Egyptian regime, criticizing its relationships with Israel, its opposition to Hamas, and its role

during the 2009 Gaza War, and going as far as calling for a popular uprising against the government.⁵

In addition, the Egyptian ousting of Mubarak has another, very concrete, implication for the Lebanese group: it led to the escape of Sami Chehab (Muhammad Youssef Ahmad Mansour), the leader of the Hizb Allah-affiliated Egyptian cell who—along with 26 more alleged Hizb Allah militants—was convicted in April 2010 by the Supreme State Security Court on charges of conspiracy to perpetrate terrorist acts.⁶ On February 2, 2011, following the beginning of the popular unrest within Egypt, Chehab and the other Hizb Allah militants managed to escape from the Wadi el-Natrun prison, where they had been detained.⁷ A couple of weeks later, on February 16, 2011, Chehab was spotted during a Hizb Allah-organized demonstration in Beirut,⁸ where Nasrallah explicitly stated that "this [Egyptian] revolution was the true reason behind the liberation of brethren captive Muhammad Mansour who is participating in our celebration and whom we welcome whole-heartedly."⁹

In the weeks following the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Hizb Allah continued with its line of indirect support, openly speaking in favor of the protest movements in Yemen and Libya, while investing particular efforts in supporting the popular protest movement in Bahrain.¹⁰

In the case of Bahrain, Hizb Allah immediately spoke out in indirect assistance of that country's Shi'a population, while sharply condemning

what the group saw as "excessive" use of violence against the protestors.¹¹ Nasrallah's accusations against Bahrain in his March 19 speech eventually led to the country to file an official protest, with Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh Khalid bin Hamad al-Khalifah declaring they would hold Lebanon responsible for such statements and that, if the criticism continued, it would directly affect the bilateral relations of the two countries.¹²

In addition, in the case of Bahrain, the group's involvement could have extended beyond indirect support, into direct participation, although evidence proving this is thin. While the Bahraini government's accusations against Hizb Allah should be taken lightly—as the Bahraini government has a direct interest in depicting the local protests as a "foreign plot"—there have been past connections between the local Shi'a community in Bahrain and the Lebanese-Shi'a militia. As a result, Hizb Allah's involvement in Bahrain is not an entirely new phenomenon: a recently leaked U.S. diplomatic cable from 2008 already contained allegations that the country's opposition had been receiving training from Hizb Allah.¹³ More recently, in the wake of the local protests, the Bahraini authorities arrested a number of Lebanese nationals, accusing them of being Hizb Allah militants.¹⁴ On March 30, the Bahraini foreign minister, in an interview with the Saudi newspaper *al-Hayat*, accused Hizb Allah of involvement in the local protests, stressing that the country defined the group as a "terrorist organization."¹⁵ Hizb Allah responded to these accusations by denying any

1 "Nasrallah Commemorates Al-Quds Day," speech transcript, September 18, 2009, translation by Mideast Wire.

2 Ibid.

3 "Speech Delivered By Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah During The Solidarity Rally With Egypt That Was Held In Ghobair Municipality Square - Jnah," press release, Hizb Allah, February 10, 2011.

4 Ibid.

5 Benedetta Berti, "Hizb Allah's Domestic Containment and Regional Expansion Strategies," *CTC Sentinel* 2:11 (2009).

6 Yasmine Saleh, "Egyptian Court Convicts 26 Men Of Hizballah Links," Reuters, April 28, 2010.

7 "Sami Chehab and Members of the 'Egypt Cell' Escape Natroun Prison," *al-Rai al-Aam*, February 2, 2011, translation by Mideast Wire.

8 Dominic Evans, "Hezbollah Chief Threatens To Seize Control Of Galilee," *National Post*, February 17, 2011.

9 "Speech Delivered By Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah During A Ceremony Marking The Anniversary Of The Martyr Leaders Held In Sayyed Ashuhada Compound On Wednesday February 16, 2011," press release, Hizb Allah, February 19, 2011.

10 "Hizb Allah Condemns 'Heinous Crimes,'" *al-Manar*, March 18, 2011.

11 "Commenting on the Bloody Repression that Targeted Protesters in Bahrain," press release, Hizb Allah, March 17, 2011.

12 Youssef Diab, "Lebanese Officials Trying to Contain Effect of Nasrallah's Statement," *Asharq al-Awsat*, March 22, 2011, translation by Mideast Wire.

13 Oren Kessler, "Iran's Opposition to Hold Mass Protest Today. Demonstrators Return to Bahrain Capital's Central Square. Wikileaks: Bahraini Opposition Got Training From Hezbollah," *Jerusalem Post*, February 20, 2011.

14 "Bahraini Security Arrests Hezbollah Members, Controls Turbulent Areas," *al-Watan*, March 18, 2011; *Al-Akbar*, March 23, 2011, translation by Mideast Wire; Sandeep Singh Grewal, "Hizbollah Links' Five Arrested," *Gulf Daily News*, March 24, 2011.

15 Raghdad Dirgham, "Interview with Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh Khalid Bin-Hamad Al Khalifah," *al-Hayat*, March 30, 2011.

link or involvement, consistent with the group's strategy of rejecting accusations of any regional activism.¹⁶

The only exception to Hizb Allah's indirect and alleged direct support for the protest movement across the region has been, unsurprisingly, with respect to Syria. In the case of its traditional political ally, in fact, the group has refrained from supporting the protests, while the Hizb Allah-controlled media has been engaged in a campaign to discredit the anti-regime movement by downplaying its size, or by accusing the protesters to have been paid to take part in the anti-regime demonstrations.¹⁷ In addition, since February 2011 there have also been reports of Hizb Allah units deployed along the Lebanese-Syrian border to monitor the situation and assist Bashar al-Assad's regime.¹⁸

Hizb Allah's Strategic Realignment: Emerging as a Stronger Regional Actor?

In Hizb Allah's worldview, the ongoing protest movements, from Tunisia to Egypt to Libya, are seen as marking a watershed for the region, and the group has been trying to capitalize on the ongoing social and political unrest to strengthen its regional standing and increase its strategic alliances.

To accomplish this, the group has linked the protest movements to its own "resistance" agenda and has attempted to portray the ongoing revolutions as part of a regional realignment away from the West and closer to the Shi'a organization and its allies, especially Iran. For instance, in his February 7, 2011 speech, Nasrallah claimed that the ongoing protests represented

the revolution of the poor, the free, the freedom seekers and the rejecters of humiliation and disgrace which this [Egypt] nation was subject to due to giving up to the will of America and Israel...

It is the revolution...against...the regime's policy in the Arab-Israeli struggle.¹⁹

In addition, he compared the protest movements to "the Lebanese resistance in July War 2006 and the historic steadfastness of the Palestinian resistance during Gaza War in 2008,"²⁰ again riding the wave of regional turmoil to promote its cause.

In addition to this propaganda campaign to shape the understanding of the ongoing political unrest in a way that is favorable to the group's agenda, Hizb Allah has also been promoting the idea that—as a consequence to the regional changes—the group's strength and power have increased exponentially.

In Hizb Allah's discourse, the end of the Mubarak regime is described as tantamount to the beginning of the "ousting" of the U.S. allies from the region and to the parallel rise of the "resistance axis." In his February 16, 2011 speech, Nasrallah eloquently explained this paradigm by stating: "The major blow to the resistance... was the participation of the Egyptian regime in Camp David Agreement and consequently the emergence of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli struggle."²¹ The fall of Mubarak is then seen as marking the end of the Israeli-Egyptian detente, which will in turn change the balance of power in the Arab-Israeli conflict in favor of the "resistance." Similarly, the political unrest in the broader Middle East is also seen as a sign of the local populations embracing Hizb Allah's agenda of "resistance."

In other words, Hizb Allah believes the current regional changes are weakening Israel and the United States and strengthening itself, along with its main regional partner, Iran. As a result of this perceived geostrategic advantage, the group has been more vocal in articulating

its post-2006 military strategy with respect to Israel. This new approach, first disclosed in the aftermath of the 2006 war, is centered on strategic parity and proportional retaliation in the context of a renewed conflict with the Jewish State. Even if the shift in military doctrine is not necessarily a new element, in the aftermath of the Arab spring Hizb Allah has been more eager to publicly articulate this notion. As early as mid-February, Nasrallah stated that, in the course of the next round of confrontation with Israel, Hizb Allah would respond to territorial invasion by the Israeli Defense Forces with its own territorial invasion, by sending its units to occupy the Galilee region.²² This concept was further reiterated by Hizb Allah MP Hassan Fadlallah, who said that Hizb Allah was planning on "taking control of land in return for taking control of land,"²³ also confirming the group's renewed self-perception of power and its desire to use the regional events as a weapon in the psychological war against Israel.

Moreover, the same self-perception of strength has led the group to pursue an even more aggressive foreign policy with respect to the Arab regimes that it deems too "moderate" or hindering the formation of a regional "resistance axis." The ongoing campaign against Bahrain, for example, has to be interpreted as part of this larger anti-status quo policy. Within Lebanon, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri explained this posture by stating that Hizb Allah wants to use Lebanon as a "base to fuel internal conflicts in the Arab countries," while attempting to export the revolution "Iranian-style."²⁴ Hariri also specified that the "campaign targeting Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and all the GCC states is—to say the least—the implementation of a foreign operations order," alluding to the strategic interest of Iran in forcing the implosion of the "moderate" Arab regimes and the regional shift toward its sphere of influence.²⁵

16 Yusuf Diyab, "Lebanon: Hezbollah Denies Training Bahrainis and Underlines its Political Support for the Opposition. Source in '14 March' Warns of Danger of its Interference in Other Countries' Affairs," *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, April 1, 2011.

17 "Lebanese Hezbollah TV Reports 'Million-Strong' Rallies Backing Syrian President," BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 30, 2011.

18 "Hezbollah Used in Syrian Security," Middle East Newsline, February 7, 2011.

19 "Speech Delivered By Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah During The Solidarity Rally With Egypt That Was Held In Ghobairy Municipality Square - Jnah."

20 Ibid.

21 "Speech Delivered By Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah During A Ceremony Marking The Anniversary Of The Martyr Leaders Held In Sayyed Ashuhada Compound On Wednesday February 16, 2011."

22 Evans.

23 "Resistance Setting New Equations to Protect Lebanon," *al-Manar*, February 19, 2011.

24 "Al-Hariri: Hezbollah Demanding Change, Iranian-style," March14.org, March 22, 2011, translation by Middle East Wire.

25 Ibid.

Conclusion

Hizb Allah reacted to the ongoing processes of sociopolitical and geostrategic change at the regional level by openly siding with the revolutionary protest movements. For the most part, this support has expressed itself indirectly, with the group employing its media apparatus and its grassroots network to promote the Arab revolutions. In addition, in the case of Bahrain, the open political support may have been matched by more direct involvement in the protests, allegedly through providing logistical assistance to the local protesters (although the evidence provided by the authorities in Bahrain to substantiate this claim is at the moment thin).

The reason behind the group's unequivocal standing behind the local protest movements goes well beyond ideological affinity with these movements and their agendas, or "Arab solidarity." Specifically, Hizb Allah sees the wave of regional change as a key element in shifting the regional balance of power away from the West and its local allies, and in empowering the "resistance axis." Furthermore, Hizb Allah believes that such changes are equally beneficial to the group, boosting its regional status and power, as well as its military leverage on Israel, and leading it to more openly embrace its post-2006 "tit-for-tat" military doctrine with respect to Israel.

Whether Hizb Allah is accurate in its assessment of a new era of regional alliances remains to be seen. Yet the fact that Hizb Allah currently believes it is in a position of strength domestically, regionally, and with respect to Israel will have an important impact in its future strategy and foreign policy.

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Israel, Hizb Allah, and the Shadow of Imad Mughniyyeh

By Bilal Y. Saab

IN MID-FEBRUARY 2011, the Israeli government closed temporarily four diplomatic missions abroad and put others on high alert, amid fears that Lebanese Hizb Allah may attack Israeli targets to mark the third anniversary of the killing of Imad Mughniyyeh, the Lebanese-Shi'a group's iconic military chief.¹

Since Mughniyyeh's death, Israel has accused Hizb Allah and Iran of plotting to bomb Israeli embassies abroad and trying to assassinate senior Israeli diplomats and military chiefs.² Israel has claimed publicly that its intelligence services have managed to foil several attempted terrorist operations by Hizb Allah and Iranian personnel in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.³ Hizb Allah has denied involvement in any of the alleged plots.

At Mughniyyeh's funeral in 2008, Hassan Nasrallah, Hizb Allah's secretary general, warned Israel that Mughniyyeh would be avenged.⁴ There is little reason to believe that Nasrallah's words are not credible or serious. In the past, Hizb Allah avenged several of its senior leaders, often in spectacular fashion. For example, Israel's February 1992 assassination of Shaykh Abbas Moussawi was followed one month later by Hizb Allah's bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, killing 29 people. In addition, Israel's May 1994 kidnapping of Shaykh Mustafa Dirani and bombing of a Hizb Allah training base (which killed more than 20 fighters) was followed in July by Hizb Allah's (and Iran's) Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA)

attack, also in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people.

Nasrallah's threat to avenge Mughniyyeh, while real, creates a dilemma for the group. If the militant group does follow through on its threat and conducts a spectacular terrorist operation against Israeli targets, this could cause a massive military reaction on the part of Israel and possibly ignite war between the two belligerents. If Hizb Allah decides not to retaliate, its credibility and tit-for-tat approach could be severely damaged, which could undermine its military strategy toward Israel in the event of war or another similar situation in the future.

It is not at all clear which path Hizb Allah will choose. It is possible that Hizb Allah has already made a strategic decision to avenge Mughniyyeh; therefore, the only uncertain variables are the timing, location, and lethality of the operation. Yet it is also accurate to say that Hizb Allah does not want to risk another large-scale military confrontation with Israel given the significant material losses it suffered following the summer 2006 war.

A closer look at the life story of Mughniyyeh and an assessment of his value to Hizb Allah could help shed more light on Hizb Allah's cost-benefit calculations with regard to a potential revenge operation against Israel. Aided by extensive interviews conducted by the author with several members of Hizb Allah and Mughniyyeh's own family during the past two years, this article offers a detailed, though not definitive, profile of Mughniyyeh, revealing new information about his life, beliefs, and career as a leading member of Hizb Allah. Emphasis is intentionally placed on aspects of Mughniyyeh's life that few observers, specialists, and practitioners have known about, including his early beginnings, his ideological influences, and perhaps most important his strong ties to the Palestinians.

A more comprehensive profile of the man who managed to elude some of the world's most competent intelligence services is still relevant three years after his death because of the lasting impact he will probably have on Hizb Allah. Indeed, Mughniyyeh was anything but an ordinary member of

1 "Terror Threat: Number of Israeli Embassies Closed," YNet, February 15, 2011.

2 Yaakov Lappin, "Hezbollah Terror Attack on Israelis Abroad 'is imminent,'" *Jerusalem Post*, April 21, 2011; Sebastian Rotella, "Azerbaijan Seen as New Front in Mid-east Conflict," *Los Angeles Times*, May 30, 2009.

3 "Tel Aviv Accuses Hezbollah of Plotting Attacks Against Israeli Targets in South America," *Yedioth Ahronoth*, August 13, 2009.

4 "Hezbollah Warns Israel it Will Avenge Slain Commander," Reuters, February 16, 2011.

Hizb Allah. In fact, after Nasrallah, he might be the most influential yet least acknowledged leader of the group to date. His mindset, work ethic, unconventional strategies, and overall behavior have profoundly influenced the thinking of Hizb Allah's leaders and future generations of the Shi'a group.

The Secret Guardian of the Resistance

In the murky world of intelligence and counterintelligence, few characters have elicited more awe and bewilderment than Imad Mughniyyeh. More than three years have passed since Mughniyyeh's February 12, 2008 assassination in Damascus (most likely at the hands of Israel's Mossad), yet his life story and death continue to be shrouded in mystery.⁵

A shadowy figure, Mughniyyeh avoided publicity. Keeping a low-profile was as crucial to his work as conducting military operations or training Palestinian and Lebanese fighters. Indeed, Mughniyyeh was very secretive, even to his own Hizb Allah colleagues, who often complained to their superiors about the special status and flexibility he enjoyed. He only worked with people who he fully trusted (mostly from his own family and inner circle). He was a major part of Hizb Allah's military and paramilitary apparatus, having created and developed it since its beginnings in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but he was not bound by hierarchy or organizational rules. In a sense, he was larger than Hizb Allah, an independent operator who had one foot inside Hizb Allah and another in Tehran.

Mughniyyeh's Religious Upbringing

Based on interviews with members of Mughniyyeh's family in southern Beirut in the summers of 2009 and 2010, Imad was born on January 25, 1962 in the poor neighborhood of al-Jiwar in the district of al-Shiyah, located in the southern suburbs of Beirut. His family is from the small southern town of Tayr Dibba. Mughniyyeh went to elementary and preparatory school in al-Jiwar and lived with his father Fayez and mother Aminah Salamah at home until the age of 14.

Mughniyyeh was a religious person at an early age.⁶ As a teenager, he would spend most of his time in the evenings in the Sheikh al-Kobeissi mosque near their house. When he turned 13, he planned to travel to Iraq to delve deeper into his spirituality at Najaf.⁷

The onset of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) forced Mughniyyeh to change his travel plans to Iraq and stay in Beirut instead. The harsh realities of sectarian conflict in Lebanon forced him to become a militiaman at the age of 14. At first, he mingled with several leftist ideological movements, from the Syrian social nationalists to the communists, and from several Lebanese militias

"In the murky world of intelligence and counterintelligence, few characters have elicited more awe and bewilderment than Imad Mughniyyeh."

under the umbrella of the "National Front" to the Palestinians who at the time had a sizeable military presence in Lebanon. His role as a young militiaman was initially limited to stuffing sandbags to protect party members from snipers and to night shifts to guard his neighborhood. Despite his interest in and close contacts with these Lebanese parties, Mughniyyeh felt alienated and unwilling to join any of them.

In 1985, tragedy struck Mughniyyeh's family. Mughniyyeh's younger brother, Jihad, was killed by a heavy bombardment that targeted Lebanese-Shi'a spiritual leader Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah

6 Even though Mughniyyeh was devout, he was fascinated by the atheist ideology of Leon Trotsky. He was eccentric, a dreamer who would read a lot and listen to the music of revolutionary singer and songwriter Marcel Khalifeh. A short, handsome boy, he had a noticeable soft side. Yet he also had a passion for history and the military sciences and an obsession with strategy and issues of war. Carl von Clausewitz was his favorite military historian.

7 Najaf is a major center of Islamic theological teaching (al-Hawza) for Shi'a and the site of the shrine of Imam Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad.

in the district of Bir al-Abed. In 1994, Imad lost his other brother Fouad, a member of the "Lebanese resistance" against the then-Israeli occupation, who was assassinated, allegedly by the Israeli intelligence services, in the area of al-Sfeir in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

The loss of his two brothers in a short time frame had a profound impact on Mughniyyeh. It solidified his faith and consumed his intellect and worldview. Politically, solitude made him more focused and attentive to the needs of the Palestinian resistance movement. His strong interest in the political thinking and activism of Lebanese-Shi'a leader Imam Musa al-Sadr notwithstanding, Mughniyyeh was equally fascinated by the revolutionary ideas of the Palestinians and their biggest party, Fatah. He had the opportunity to undergo military training at several Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut and outside Lebanon.⁸ His most intensive coaching took place in the camp of Abou Louay, where the famous Palestinian female fighter and "martyr" Dalal al-Maghribi trained and planned operations against Israel.⁹

Mughniyyeh's Relationship with the Palestinians

Mughniyyeh's relationship with Fatah ran deep. He began as the deputy of Abu Hassan Salameh, the famous Palestinian military commander who was responsible for countless operations against Israeli forces.¹⁰ Yet despite his close relations with Fatah's leaders, Mughniyyeh did not last long with the movement. Some Palestinians saw him as a rebel, a loner who was not comfortable following orders or working within tight-knit organizational structures.

8 Personal interview, Ali Shibani, Hizb Allah member, southern Beirut, Lebanon, August 28, 2010.

9 Ibid.

10 Abu Hassan Salameh was a trusted lieutenant of and potential successor to Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization. As chief planner for the terrorist organization Black September, Abu Hassan was behind the raid at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games in which 11 Israeli athletes were killed, and a wide assortment of other terrorist attacks and murders. He was killed by the Mossad in Beirut in 1979. See "Death of a Terrorist," *Time Magazine*, February 5, 1979.

5 He was killed by a bomb placed in his car seat.

Furthermore, Mughniyyeh was far more religiously inspired than his fellow Palestinian comrades. When Mughniyyeh heard the news of an attempted kidnapping operation of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, he returned to the Lebanese-Shi'a cleric's neighborhood and decided to serve with his friends as his personal bodyguards.¹¹ In 1980, he traveled with Fadlallah to Mecca for pilgrimage and since then Mughniyyeh was known as Hajj Imad.¹²

The assassination of Iraqi religious leader Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr in Iraq in April 1980 was another turning point in Mughniyyeh's life. He found himself at war with the secular Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein who he accused of systematically eliminating all Shi'a leaders in Iraq. Because of Fatah's links to the Ba'athists at the time, Mughniyyeh decided to completely sever his relationship with the Palestinian movement in mid-1981.¹³

When Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in 1982, Mughniyyeh was on his way to visit the holy places in Iran. Soon after he heard the news, he returned to Syria and from there to Lebanon. On his way home, he was kidnapped by the Christian rightist Lebanese party, the Phalanges (Kataeb), but was released after political intervention by Lebanese-Shi'a leaders and entered Beirut where he rejoined ranks with his former Palestinian friends.¹⁴ Throughout his military encounters with the Palestinian factions, Mughniyyeh learned of the locations of several heavy arms depots. With his close Lebanese inner circle, he formed an elite force that was later to be called the "Islamic Resistance."¹⁵ The force had fighters in Beirut, the western Bekaa, and the south. They waged sophisticated military operations, set ambushes and created sniper units against the Israeli occupying forces.

Their most successful operation was on November 11, 1982, when "martyr" Ahmad Kassir conducted a suicide operation against an Israeli military base in Tyre/Sour, destroying it and causing heavy casualties.¹⁶

Given his links to the Palestinians,¹⁷ Mughniyyeh had little difficulty managing the relationship and steering it in ways that were most effective in the fight against Israel. He led several Lebanese-Palestinian military operations against Israel and trained and armed many Palestinian fighters and offered them logistical support. In 1984, Abu Hassan Salameh, Mughniyyeh's old companion and former boss, parted ways with Fatah and joined the Islamic Resistance, where he became Mughniyyeh's right-hand man.¹⁸

Mughniyyeh was proud of the close links he and his colleagues in the Islamic Resistance developed with Palestinian groups inside the occupied territories. He always spoke highly of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, saying that "the leftist and secular elements in Palestine were the first to work with us. But now we have a strategic alliance with Hamas and Islamic Jihad."¹⁹ He added:

we in Hizb Allah did not accept that a movement in Palestine would form and have allegiance to us organizationally, administratively, or even religiously. Those who became Shi'a tried hard to convince us to create a Hizb Allah branch in Palestine, but we rejected the idea because we found in the resistance not just a choice for liberation but also a place to counter sectarian

divides (*fitna*), where all are united to fight the occupation.²⁰

Mughniyyeh had a special relationship with the leaders of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). He was determined to provide financial and media support (through Hizb Allah's satellite television station al-Manar and radio station al-Nour) to the Palestinian intifada. He established a bond with the late Dr. Fathi al-Shikaki, the former secretary general of PIJ and also his successor, Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shalah. Contacts among Mughniyyeh, Hamas and PIJ were so close that few inside Hizb Allah knew that moments before he was assassinated in Damascus in February 2008, he was purportedly in a meeting with Hamas leader Khaled Meshal and other Palestinian militants.²¹

With the help of Syria and Iran, Mughniyyeh was also in charge of transferring fighters and cadres from inside Palestine to Syria, Lebanon, and Iran to undergo military training.²² His main preoccupation was the Palestinian youth and how to train them to become fighters against the Israeli occupation. Through his contacts, he would send directions on how to form elite and specialized units inside Palestine including infantry, engineering squads, snipers, and missile, anti-tank, and guerrilla units. Mughniyyeh was so hands-on in the Palestinian theater that when the Gaza war broke out in 2008, one senior commander in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades said that they felt Mughniyyeh was among them as a partner in the battles.²³ When Palestinian militants were caught by the Israelis, Mughniyyeh would help release them by kidnapping soldiers along the Lebanese-Israeli border.²⁴ This was in large part seen by him as repaying his Palestinian friends in Lebanon who had helped him create Islamic Resistance.

11 Personal interview, Ibrahim al-Amin, chief editor, *al-Akhbar* newspaper, Beirut, Lebanon, July 12, 2010.

12 Ibid. Hajj is a title preserved for Muslims who go on a pilgrimage to Mecca.

13 Personal interview, Ibrahim al-Amin, chief editor, *al-Akhbar* newspaper, Beirut, Lebanon, July 12, 2010.

14 Personal interview, Ibrahim Bayram, Hizb Allah insider and *Annabar* newspaper columnist, Beirut, Lebanon, July 11, 2010.

15 Ibid.

16 Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: Saqi, 2005), p. 49.

17 Although he tried to distance himself from the Palestinians due to their divisions, links with the Ba'athists, disorganization, and different belief systems, Mughniyyeh still had great sympathy for their cause. As many Palestinian leaders and fighters were forced by Israel to leave Lebanon and go to Tunisia, Yemen, and Sudan, Mughniyyeh stepped in to unite the remaining few and encourage them to join the collective fight against the Israeli army.

18 Personal interview, Ala'a Musulmani, Hizb Allah member, Beirut, Lebanon, July 14, 2009.

19 Quote taken from Ibrahim al-Amin, "The Charmer of the Resistance," *al-Akhbar*, February 12, 2010.

20 Ibid.

21 Personal interview, Ibrahim Bayram, Hizb Allah insider and *Annabar* newspaper columnist, Beirut, Lebanon, July 11, 2010.

22 Personal interview, Ibrahim al-Amin, chief editor, *al-Akhbar* newspaper, Beirut, Lebanon, July 12, 2010.

23 Al-Amin, "The Charmer of the Resistance."

24 Personal interview, Mohammad Tihfe, Hizb Allah member, southern Lebanon, July 21, 2010.

Within the Palestinian resistance movement, Yasser Arafat, its late chairman, had great admiration for the intelligent and determined Mughniyyeh.²⁵ He always made sure to keep close contact with Mughniyyeh, despite the religious differences between the two. He often wrote letters to Mughniyyeh with the introduction "Dear Son."²⁶

Mughniyyeh's Accomplishments and Core Beliefs

For Mughniyyeh, the goal of his Islamic Resistance was clear: to eliminate Israel. He once told a visitor of his that

there is no debate or compromise, and we are not concerned with any decision by anyone in the world to grant Israel the right to exist. We are not talking about something unrealistic. Along with our religious convictions, we have plenty of rational reasons which further our belief that Israel's eradication will depend on what we do, the people of Palestine inside and outside, in their Arabic and Islamic environment.²⁷

Mughniyyeh had a strategic plan after the liberation of southern Lebanon in May 2000. He told the same visitor:

After the liberation in 2000, and when we got to learn more about the enemy and his capabilities, the dream of liberating Palestine became achievable. We formed a committee tasked with the elimination of Israel. In the Islamic Resistance, there is a special unit for Palestine. We do not work on behalf of the Palestinians, and we will never do that. But we are in a political, moral, and religious position that requires us not only to help them stay alive where they are, but also to resist the occupation and force the Israelis to withdraw, even if on a gradual basis.²⁸

25 Arafat could see Mughniyyeh's unique potential and his ability to unite the Palestinian-Lebanese resistance fronts against Israel. He also knew about Mughniyyeh's solid operational relationship with the Iranians and the Syrians, which made the establishment of close contact with him even more important.

26 Al-Amin, "The Charmer of the Resistance."

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

Mughniyyeh did not distinguish one resistance fighter from another. He did not believe in any political or logistical constraints when it came to fighting the Israeli occupation in Palestine. The fight was one, be it in Lebanon or Palestine. For a Lebanese national, Palestine was his *raison d'être*. Everything began and ended in Palestine.²⁹

No one inside Hizb Allah, not even Nasrallah, had a more instrumental role than Mughniyyeh in building the relationship with Iran and taking it to new heights. Soon after the Islamic revolution in 1979, Mughniyyeh traveled to Tehran and began to form extensive links with senior Iranian clergy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He also built a military academy inside Hizb Allah that has become a military institute.³⁰

His partnership with the Syrians continued to be marred with mistrust. Yet he saw no alternative. He, just like all Hizb Allah leaders before and after him, understood that while Iran was the godfather of the group, related to it by religion and ideology, Syria was the necessary link, the weapons and logistical facilitator that made the fight against Israel possible. Mughniyyeh's mistrust of Syria was justified. After all, it was on Syrian territory that he was killed, prompting many analysts to speculate whether his death occurred with the knowledge or even facilitation of the Syrian intelligence services.

Insights on Hizb Allah for the Future

Given the leadership role Mughniyyeh played inside Hizb Allah for more than 15 years, it is reasonable to draw inferences from his thinking and activities about Hizb Allah overall.

1. *Hizb Allah has relatively low trust in Syria.* Hizb Allah's strategic alliance with Syria has endured primarily because both parties continue to have an interest in standing up to Israel and regaining lost territory and rights which they feel Israel has usurped.³¹ Yet it is widely

29 Personal interview, Makram Jaafar, Hizb Allah member, Beirut, Lebanon, June 14, 2010.

30 Personal interview, Ali Fayad, Hizb Allah member and al-Manar satellite television producer, Beirut, Lebanon, June 13, 2010.

31 The triangular relationship between Syria, Iran, and Hizb Allah has not been easy or without fault lines; it

assumed that in the event that Syria regains the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and consequently terminates its state of conflict with Israel (and manages to reinstitute direct control over Lebanon), Damascus' military relationship with Hizb Allah is likely to end. Hizb Allah is acutely aware of that potential scenario and has most likely worked on contingency plans with Iran. The group has no interest in going back to the days when Syria was militarily present in Lebanon (1990-2005) and in charge of its military actions and daily political affairs.

Also affecting the durability and nature of the long-term relationship between Syria and Hizb Allah is the very survival of the al-Assad regime. If the regime collapses and a more democratic government replaces it, it is possible, though not inevitable, that the new leadership in Damascus will have less cooperative relations with Hizb Allah and focus on more urgent domestic priorities instead. It is unclear whether the al-Assad regime will survive the ongoing popular uprising or how exactly a potential Syrian-Israeli peace agreement would affect Hizb Allah's future and staying power.

2) *Hizb Allah's organizational structure is hierarchical but also flexible.* Open source information on Hizb Allah's organizational structure is accessible, yet more detailed information on its military apparatus is much harder to find and what is available is less than reliable.³² Unlike other social

often witnessed tensions in the 1980s between Iran and Syria on the one hand, and armed confrontations between Syria and Hizb Allah on the other. In short, Hizb Allah is related to Iran in ways it can never be to Syria—through shared culture, ideology, and religion. Syria is far more pragmatic in foreign policy than Hizb Allah and Iran given that its leadership has fewer, if any, idiosyncratic characteristics that could prevent it from making deals with Israel and the West (Syrian policy prior and during the 1991 Gulf War is one example).

32 Hizb Allah's organizational structure is complex and highly compartmentalized, with several units and departments and much functional differentiation. At the head of the pyramid is the secretary general, currently Hassan Nasrallah, but he operates within a seven-member consultative council—the group's highest body. Perhaps the most important aspect about Hizb Allah's organizational structure is that it is hierarchical. Yet that does not mean that Nasrallah is involved in every aspect of decision-making or in all the details of military planning

movements, Hizb Allah's ability to keep its secrets has been remarkable and since its creation there have been no defections (that are publicly known) from the group's military and paramilitary wings. The result is that little is known on how Hizb Allah conducts its military and clandestine affairs.

Mughniyyeh's life story suggests that when an exceptional military commander or operative comes along, he is given much operational independence, on the condition that he undergo proper indoctrination and develop close relations and maintain coordination with Iranian and Syrian personnel. Whether Hizb Allah has decided to institutionalize Mughniyyeh's special role is unclear but it is assumed that given the instrumental role he played throughout his career and the benefits he accrued to the organization, Hizb Allah would have an interest in retaining that multidimensional capacity in its skills repertoire. Some news reports have suggested that Hizb Allah has already found a replacement for Mughniyyeh, although his identity and skill-set are, unsurprisingly, still unknown.

3) *Hizb Allah is actively and unchangingly committed to the Palestinian cause.* Since its creation, Hizb Allah has had a keen eye on developments in the Palestinian Territories (even during times when Israel was occupying Lebanese territory), speaking against the Israeli occupation and often offering material and non-material support to armed Palestinian groups in the West Bank and Gaza.

Mughniyyeh was devoted to developing the military and paramilitary wings of Hizb Allah to more effectively fight the Israelis, but he was equally determined to help his Palestinian contacts wage their armed struggle against Israel. If his beliefs and career are any indication, Hizb Allah, as a movement, is also committed to unite the Palestinian

and Lebanese fronts against Israel. Of course, given the ambitious and perhaps unrealistic nature of Hizb Allah's strategic goal, it is not likely to cause much anxiety in Tel Aviv, radically change Israeli threat perceptions, or force serious reallocation of military resources. Hizb Allah's objectives, while real, face obvious organizational and technical limitations, political challenges and realities, and Israel's own, so far successful, efforts to counter them. Yet that could change if political and military circumstances in the Middle East become more favorable, including, among other developments, the emergence of a more pro-Palestinian leadership in Cairo.

Revenge, but on Hizb Allah's Own Terms

A successful and spectacular revenge operation by Hizb Allah against Israel is an immediate trigger and flashpoint for a return to arms between the two belligerents. The next war, according to Hizb Allah, will make the previous conflict look like a "walk in the park."³³ Israel knows that Hizb Allah will not forget Mughniyyeh, or for that matter any of its fallen "martyrs." Instead, Hizb Allah honors their memory when it sees fit as it has done so in the past.

Hizb Allah is likely to be prudent, however, with the timing, target, and techniques it might use. It is expected that it will wait for the moment when Israel is vulnerable and caught sleeping. Most important, Hizb Allah is likely to conduct its operation at a time when Israel will not be in a position to retaliate with massive force. Hizb Allah's goal is assumed to be limited: to hurt Israel and restore some level of deterrence. Should war happen, however, the organization says it will be ready for it.

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³³ Interview by Nicholas Blanford with Hizb Allah commanders, the content of which was revealed to this author in person during a conference in Virginia in summer 2010.

The Taliban's Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

By Ben Brandt

THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY of the post-9/11 insurgency in Afghanistan, reports have emphasized the Afghan Taliban's impressive ability to collect and exploit intelligence effectively. Researchers and media outlets describe the Afghan Taliban as possessing an "impressive intelligence network"¹ which conducts numerous functions such as giving Taliban fighters early warning of U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) patrols, or providing U.S. forces with misleading information.² U.S. and ISAF soldiers have been consistently quoted regarding the efficacy of Taliban intelligence operations, stating that "the enemy intelligence network is on top of every move we make," "there is always someone who can be listening to what we are saying," and that the group has sources "in many places."³ A striking example of the Taliban's intelligence collection capability occurred last year, when UK Prime Minister David Cameron was forced to cancel plans to visit a military outpost in Helmand Province after intercepts indicated that the Taliban was aware of his itinerary.⁴

Given the efficacy of the insurgents' intelligence operations, detailed analysis of the history, scope, and structure of the Taliban's intelligence function is crucial for successful counterinsurgency operations, as is an understanding of the collection and counterintelligence tactics it employs, and the aims which it seeks to achieve by the use of intelligence.

1 Gilles Dorronsoro, "The Taliban's Winning Strategy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009.

2 C.J. Chivers, "In Eastern Afghanistan, at War with the Taliban's Shadowy Rule," *New York Times*, February 6, 2011.

3 James Astill, "Taliban Spies Keep Strong Grip on South," *Guardian*, December 11, 2003; Bill Graveland, "Troops Told Loose Lips Can Kill, Taliban Spies Everywhere," *The Canadian Press*, 2008; Tim Shipman, "Taliban Have Spies Everywhere," *Daily Mail*, August 27, 2010.

4 Matthew Green, "More on the Taliban Plot to Kill Cameron," *Financial Times*, June 10, 2010.

and implementation. He is more like a master coordinator and strategic communicator, working closely with his consultative council, his personal advisers, and the leadership in Tehran and Damascus. An imperfect analogy is the U.S. director of national intelligence, whose primary role is to coordinate the affairs of the U.S. intelligence community (and not so much to get involved in the CIA's and other spy agencies' operational planning and implementation).

Taliban Intelligence Operations Prior to 9/11 Media and government accounts indicate that the Taliban possessed a massive and effective, if somewhat fractious, intelligence apparatus prior to 9/11. It operated in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and was responsible for gathering information on opponents to the regime, as well as covert actions such as bribing Northern Alliance commanders to switch sides and conducting assassinations.⁵ Taliban intelligence officials maintained extensive ties with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),⁶ as well as with members of the Pakistani political party Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI)⁷ and foreign terrorists. Evidence presented at the administrative review board of former Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister Abdul Haq Wasiq, who is currently imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, described Wasiq as having "arranged to have an Egyptian Al Qaida member, Hamza Zobir, teach Taliban intelligence officers about intelligence work."⁸

Accounts of the Taliban's pre-9/11 intelligence infrastructure indicate that in addition to the Ministry of Intelligence, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice was an important collector of intelligence,⁹ with the two ministries sharing information on an informal basis.¹⁰ Contemporary accounts suggest that

the Ministry of Intelligence possessed some 20,000 spies and 100,000 informants in 2001, with children or former KHAD agents constituting many of its informants.¹¹ Informants were reportedly recruited on every city block to monitor neighborhoods, while foreign journalists were closely monitored.¹² The Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice reportedly supplemented this with informants in ministries, hospitals, aid agencies, and military units.¹³ The Ministry of Intelligence was notorious for detaining suspected spies and Northern Alliance personnel, and using torture tactics such as electric shocks and beatings during interrogations.¹⁴

The leadership of the Taliban's intelligence ministry appears to have changed frequently, likely due to Mullah Omar's commonly described predilection for reshuffling ministerial portfolios.¹⁵ Mullah Khaksar Akhund was described as having been the head of intelligence prior to September 1996,¹⁶ Khairullah Khairkhwa was described by the U.S. State Department as the Taliban's minister for intelligence in late 1997,¹⁷ and Mullah Hamdullah was listed as intelligence minister in 1998.¹⁸ Qari Ahmadullah, who was later killed in a U.S. airstrike, was the Taliban's minister for intelligence when 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom occurred.¹⁹ Maulawi Mohammad Wali,

reportedly a close ally of Mullah Omar, appears to have retained control of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice from 1998-2001.²⁰ The Taliban enjoyed a number of significant intelligence successes, such as the capture and execution of Pashtun opposition leader Abdul Haq,²¹ and the possible uncovering of a U.S. plot to assassinate Usama bin Ladin.²² At the same time, Taliban intelligence suffered setbacks such as the escape of imprisoned Northern Alliance leader Ismail Khan in 1999,²³ and the failure to detect a former intelligence chief who defected to the Northern Alliance in late 2001 after maintaining a secret dialogue with Ahmad Shah Massoud for several years.²⁴

Taliban Intelligence Operations Post-9/11

Operation Enduring Freedom had a major impact on the Taliban's intelligence services, with numerous key leaders such as Khairullah Khairkhwa, Qari Ahmadullah, and Ahmadullah's deputy Abdul Haq Wasiq captured or killed by U.S. and Afghan forces.²⁵ At least some Taliban intelligence personnel, however, managed to evade capture or death, and appear to have assisted in the formation of insurgent efforts.²⁶ In addition, the ISI provided significant support for fleeing Taliban members (Ahmed Rashid has described how ISI officials "waved" fleeing Taliban fighters across border checkpoints into Pakistan and helped facilitate Mullah Omar's arrival in Quetta),²⁷ and lingering

5 "Report on Fact-Finding Mission to Pakistan to Consider the Security and Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan," Danish Immigration Service, November 1, 2001; "Taliban Intelligence Chief Killed in US Bombing: Afghan Officials," Agence France-Presse, January 2, 2002.

6 Ibid.; B. Raman, "Buddha, Taliban & Gen. Musharraf," South Asia Analysis Group, June 3, 2001. Raman, a former head of the Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing, described Taliban intelligence as being "run" by ISI officers. Other reports indicate that Pakistani intelligence officers were heavily involved in training their Taliban counterparts.

7 Mashal Lutfullah, "Al Qaida Planning Next Phase," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 28, 2001.

8 Summarized transcripts from Abdul Haq Wasiq's administrative review board, July 18, 2005.

9 Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). Rashid described the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice as the Taliban's most effective intelligence agency.

10 "Report on Fact-Finding Mission to Pakistan to Consider the Security and Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan."

11 Julian West, "Child-Spy Network a Key Weapon in Intelligence War," *Telegraph*, October 31, 2001. The Taliban's use of children to conduct espionage continues in the post-9/11 era as well. For details, see Alex Crawford, "Ruthless Taliban Using Children As Spies," *Sky News*, October 17, 2010.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 "Taliban Intelligence Head Reported Killed in U.S. Bombing," CNN, January 2, 2002.

15 "Afghanistan: The Taliban's Decision-Making Process and Leadership Structure," U.S. Embassy Islamabad, December 31, 1998.

16 "Biographical Data on Mullah (Omar) and the Council of Ministers," U.S. Department of Defense, November 2001.

17 "Afghanistan: Taliban Decision-Making and Leadership Structure," U.S. Embassy Islamabad, December 30, 1997.

18 "Afghanistan: The Taliban's Decision-Making Process and Leadership Structure," U.S. Embassy Islamabad, December 31, 1998.

19 "Taliban Intelligence Chief Killed in US Bombing: Afghan Officials," Agence France-Presse, January 2, 2002.

20 "Terrorism Finance: Updating the Taliban Names Designated under UNSCR 1267," U.S. SecState Cable, May 2002.

21 Rahimullah Yusufzai and Tim McGirk, "Taliban Spies: In The Cross Hairs," *Time*, November 12, 2001.

22 Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

23 Khan was assisted in his escape by a Taliban intelligence officer. See Carlotta Gall, "A Nation Challenged: Warlords," *New York Times*, January 27, 2002.

24 Peter Baker, "Bin Laden Reportedly Used Cash to Curry Taliban Favor," *Washington Post*, November 30, 2001.

25 According to his own account, Ahmadullah had been tasked by Mullah Omar with organizing a guerrilla effort prior to his death. See Mashal Lutfullah, "Al Qaida Planning Next Phase," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 28, 2001.

26 "Taliban Names Anti-U.S. Leadership Council," Reuters, June 24, 2003; Representative Robert E. Andrews, "Message of the Day," May 6, 2002.

27 Tim McGirk, "Rogues No More?" *Time*, April 29,

pro-Taliban sympathies coupled with grievances against U.S. and ISAF forces helped the Taliban quickly reactivate formidable intelligence networks in southern provinces such as Helmand, and commence plotting attacks.²⁸

Military authors have described the Taliban's current intelligence gathering structure as being one where local Taliban units collect intelligence and share it with neighboring units and the Taliban's "higher hierarchy," which provides top-down intelligence support as well.²⁹ At the same time, a recent article in the *Los Angeles Times* argued that the Taliban's decentralized structure makes it difficult for the group to collate and effectively analyze the information gathered; if so, increased U.S. and ISAF efforts against the Taliban's field commanders are likely to have exacerbated this weakness.³⁰ In addition to collection efforts by local Taliban units and other personnel who conduct intelligence collection alongside alternative roles,³¹ the Taliban possess dedicated intelligence officers.³² These are deployed to at least the regional and provincial levels, and presumably help facilitate the flow of information and run informant networks.³³ At least

one Western official has stated that the Afghan Taliban have a de facto head of intelligence, although the identity of this individual remains unclear.³⁴ With this in mind, it is reasonable to speculate that Hafiz Abdul Majeed, a member of the Quetta *shura* with significant intelligence experience, continues to oversee Taliban intelligence efforts to some extent.³⁵

The Taliban continue to utilize a wide variety of largely human intelligence and open source intelligence based collection methods, with the group's signals intelligence capability stunted by an inability to listen in on the heavily encrypted radio transmissions of U.S. troops.³⁶ As during the pre-9/11 era, village and neighborhood level intelligence networks continue to provide the Taliban with a large quantity of information on U.S. and ISAF movements³⁷ and potential spies or government collaborators,³⁸ as well as providing a population control function: fear of the Taliban's purportedly omnipresent spies is a major factor in many Afghans' decision to obey the Taliban's edicts and avoid assisting counterinsurgency efforts.³⁹ Taliban intelligence efforts focus heavily on Afghan government employees (such as police) and Afghans working for foreign militaries (such as interpreters), who are monitored while entering or departing foreign military bases, and later targeted for

intimidation or murder.⁴⁰ As noted in many media outlets, the Taliban derive actionable intelligence from informants within military bases, prisons, and in the Afghan security forces, including those hired by military contractors; these have been used to identify informants,⁴¹ provide intelligence on military movements and facilities of interest to the Taliban,⁴² and intimidate or coerce other Afghan personnel.⁴³ The Haqqani network is believed to possess high-ranking informants within Afghan security forces as well.⁴⁴ Given a recent spate of attacks against security facilities and the reported collusion of guards in a recent mass escape of Taliban prisoners from a facility in Kandahar city, it is possible that Taliban informants are used to help facilitate direct action as well.⁴⁵

Taliban informants appear to be motivated by multiple factors, including ideological fervor and financial inducements.⁴⁶ It is unclear where the Taliban's dedicated intelligence personnel receive their training, although it is possible that the ISI continues to train some individuals. It should be noted as well that the Afghan Taliban and its close ally the Haqqani network likely obtain

2002; Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (New York: Viking Press, 2008).

28 James Astill, "Taliban Spies Keep Strong Grip on South," *Guardian*, December 11, 2003; "Car Blast Kills 4 Near U.S. Afghan Airfield," *Washington Post*, April 14, 2003.

29 Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples and Thomas Wood, "The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis," *Military Review*, May-June 2008.

30 Borzou Daragahi, "Afghan Taliban Intelligence Network Embraces the New," *Los Angeles Times*, April 13, 2011.

31 Dexter Filkins, "Karzai is Said to Doubt West Can Defeat Taliban," *New York Times*, June 11, 2010; "Taliban Member Responsible for Selecting Suicide-Bomb Sites Targeted," ISAF, December 29, 2010.

32 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, "The Dirty Dozen," *Newsweek*, April 10, 2011. Additionally, Amrullah Saleh, the former director of Afghanistan's intelligence service, and General Hilaluddin Hilal, a former Afghan deputy interior minister, have made reference to "senior Taliban intelligence officials." For details, see Filkins, as well as "Government's Writ Extended to 95% of Afghanistan: Saleh," *PakTribune.com*, March 5, 2008.

33 Ron Moreau, "Do the Taliban Get PTSD?" *Newsweek*, December 6, 2010; Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, "How the Taliban Lost Its Swagger," *Newsweek*, February

27, 2011.

34 Daragahi.

35 Bill Roggio, "The Afghan Taliban's Top Leaders," *The Long War Journal*, February 23, 2010.

36 Daragahi. It is unclear whether the Taliban conducted signals intelligence collection prior to 9/11. However, given numerous accounts of Northern Alliance personnel listening to Taliban radio frequencies and impersonating Taliban fighters on the radio to gather intelligence during Operation Enduring Freedom, it is reasonable to assume that the Taliban possess a similar capability. For an example of the Northern Alliance's use of signals intelligence, see "Interview: U.S. Special Forces ODA 555," PBS Frontline, undated.

37 One article described members of the Taliban's informant network using mirrors and smoke signals to provide advance warning of U.S. patrols. See C.J. Chivers, "Afghanistan's Hidden Taliban Government," *New York Times*, February 6, 2011.

38 Antonio Giustozzi, *Decoding the New Taliban* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

39 Gretchen Peters, *Crime and Insurgency* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2010).

40 See, for example, Ruhullah Khapalwak and Carlotta Gall, "Taliban Kill Afghan Interpreters Working for U.S. and its Allies," *New York Times*, July 4, 2006; Chivers, "Afghanistan's Hidden Taliban Government."

41 Carol Grisanti and Mushaq Yusufzai, "Taliban-style Justice for Alleged U.S. Spies," NBC News, April 17, 2009.

42 Chivers, "Afghanistan's Hidden Taliban Government."

43 "Inquiry into The Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan," U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, September 28, 2010.

44 Matthew Rosenberg, "New Wave of Warlords Bedevils U.S.," *Wall Street Journal*, January 20, 2010.

45 NATO has indicated that 10 of the 21 incidents since March 2009 where a purported member of the security forces attacked coalition troops were executed by Taliban members impersonating Afghan government security personnel, while a number of the remaining incidents were related to combat stress. With this in mind, it is possible that Taliban informants in the security forces helped provide attackers with credentials, schedules, and access. See Rahim Faeiz and Lolita Baldor, "9 Americans Dead after Afghan Officer Opens Fire," Associated Press, April 27, 2011.

46 Giustozzi; "If you have a problem, the Taliban solves it," *Herald Scotland*, January 3, 2009.

information from liaison with the ISI.⁴⁷ As noted above, the Taliban have attempted to exploit open source intelligence to gain useful information on U.S. and ISAF operations, with perhaps the best-known example being the Taliban's stated intent to search Afghanistan-related reports posted on Wikileaks to uncover possible government informants, following the

"The Taliban utilize its own network of informants in attempts to identify and eliminate suspected spies for the Afghan government and ISAF."

failure of the Wikileaks organization to remove identifying information about informants such as their names, home villages, and family members.⁴⁸ Although the U.S. military later concluded that no intelligence sources had been compromised by the leaked documents,⁴⁹ numerous tribal elders in southern Afghanistan reportedly received death threats within days of the Wikileaks release.⁵⁰

The Site Institute has also reported that the Taliban appear to have attempted to gather information via Twitter, noting that the group's account was following the Twitter feeds of several U.S. military personnel as of early 2011.⁵¹ One of the individuals followed by the Taliban's Twitter account was a U.S. Air Force logistics officer, whose Twitter account linked to a personal blog containing discussions of military passenger screening at airports and Afghan

military personnel's unwillingness to wear the trauma plate inserts in their body armor, as well as photos of his base and Afghan National Army counterparts.⁵² In addition to social media, Richard Barrett, the coordinator for the Al Qaida Taliban Monitoring Team at the United Nations, has noted that the Taliban monitor the foreign news media and NGO publications, citing as examples the Taliban's prompt responses to a UN report on civilian casualties, and articles in *Time* and the *Sunday Telegraph*.⁵³ An International Crisis Group report in 2008 indicated that the Taliban monitor Afghan media and engage in retribution against journalists deemed unsympathetic to its cause;⁵⁴ the Taliban's prompt disavowal of a bloody suicide attack in Jalalabad in February 2011 following the airing of CCTV footage of the attack on Tolo TV indicates that the group continues to monitor Afghan media closely.⁵⁵

As illustrated above, the Taliban utilize its own network of informants in attempts to identify and eliminate suspected spies for the Afghan government and ISAF,⁵⁶ and has also occasionally forced cell phone service providers to shut down their networks in southern Afghanistan either after dark or altogether due to the group's concerns about ISAF informants equipped with cell phones.⁵⁷ This phenomenon recently occurred in Helmand, where the Taliban induced private Afghan cellular networks to shut down for two weeks in March-April 2011, affecting nearly a million cell phone users.⁵⁸ In addition, the

group has made efforts to improve its communication security (COMSEC) regime over the years to deny ISAF access to signals intelligence; Taliban COMSEC tactics now include the use of radio codes, throwaway phones, and shorter range radio communications.⁵⁹ Some reports have claimed that the Taliban use Skype for secure communications, although it is unclear how widely this is used.⁶⁰ Couriers are also used to avoid U.S. and ISAF signals intelligence efforts,⁶¹ along with use of local business owners to pass along messages.⁶²

Looking Forward

The U.S. troop surge and increased counterinsurgency operations under Generals Stanley McCrystal and David Petraeus have had a disproportionate effect on lower and mid-ranking Taliban leadership, degrading their ability to communicate, and possibly to share intelligence in a timely manner.⁶³ In addition, it remains possible that the defection or desertion of a reported 1,000 Taliban members in recent months may have degraded the Taliban's intelligence network in specific locations, as well as providing intelligence to U.S., ISAF, and Afghan forces.⁶⁴ Should Afghan citizens begin to perceive that the Taliban are in retreat and that their ability to monitor and punish transgressions has diminished, the Taliban's intelligence collection and early warning capability could be affected further.⁶⁵ At the same

Helmand Province raises questions regarding the level of success achieved by such operations.

59 Rowan Scarborough, "Taliban Outwits U.S. Eavesdroppers," *Human Events*, February 16, 2009. In his article, Scarborough quotes a "senior intelligence source" as stating that Iranian agents have advised the Taliban on how to secure its communications.

60 Antony Savvas, "Taliban Use Skype VoIP Bug to Evade Capture," *Computer Weekly*, September 15, 2008.

61 Afsar et al.

62 Peters.

63 Carlotta Gall, "Losses in Pakistani Haven Strain Afghan Taliban," *New York Times*, April 1, 2011.

64 "50 Taliban Surrender to Kandahar Government," Associated Press, April 13, 2011; Deb Riechmann, "900 Afghan Militants Join Reintegration Program," Associated Press, February 7, 2010; Yousafzai and Moreau, "How the Taliban Lost its Swagger."

65 It is difficult to assess at present whether the Taliban's intelligence networks have been degraded significantly at the village level, although recent high-profile attacks have illustrated the group's continuing ability to develop and exploit intelligence on hard targets such as the Af-

47 Seth Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010).

48 Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai, "Taliban Seeks Vengeance in Wake of Wikileaks," *Newsweek*, August 2, 2010; Robert Mackey, "Taliban Study WikiLeaks to Hunt Informants," *New York Times*, July 30, 2010.

49 Robert Burns, "Wikileaks: US Says Limited Damage from Leak of Afghan War Logs," Associated Press, October 15, 2010.

50 Moreau and Yousafzai, "Taliban Seeks Vengeance in Wake of Wikileaks."

51 "Social Jihad Network: Taliban Twitter," Site Institute, February 21, 2011.

52 Ibid.

53 Richard Barrett, "What the Taliban Reads," *wwwword*, 2009.

54 "Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?" International Crisis Group, July 24, 2008.

55 Habib Khan Totakhil and Matthew Rosenberg, "Taliban in PR Scramble After Attacks," *Wall Street Journal*, February 26, 2011.

56 The Taliban have promulgated rules designed to create a system of due process for the punishment of suspected spies; it is unclear how widely this system is followed, however. See Christopher Dickey, "The Taliban's Book of Rules," *Newsweek*, December 12, 2006.

57 Night being when U.S. and ISAF forces conduct raids against suspected Taliban members.

58 Rahim Faiez and Patrick Quinn, "Taliban Turn Cell Phones Back on in Afghanistan," Associated Press, April 5, 2011. The Taliban's ability to enforce such a decree despite intensive counterinsurgency operations in

time, Afghan citizens emboldened by the Taliban's weakened capabilities and the establishment of the Afghan Local Police program⁶⁶ could provide additional intelligence to government forces, a process which ISAF claims is currently underway.⁶⁷ Lastly, attempts by NATO to vet army and police recruits,⁶⁸ as well as train counterintelligence agents, may help stanch the Taliban's efforts to infiltrate Afghan security forces.⁶⁹

Although the trends described above provide some grounds for optimism, it is worth noting that the reportedly 1,000 Taliban members who have defected or deserted represent a relatively small fraction of the group's strength. Furthermore, the majority of these personnel are from Afghanistan's northern, central, and western regions, which have historically displayed greater antipathy to the Taliban's cause.⁷⁰ Pakistani intelligence has reportedly used the presence of many Taliban commanders' families in Pakistan to ensure loyalty, while the ability of ISAF and Afghan forces to protect reintegrated Taliban members from reprisal attacks remains uncertain.⁷¹ The issue of the planned withdrawal of U.S. and ISAF forces⁷² and subsequent

handover of security responsibilities to the Afghan government is an additional source of uncertainty for Afghans as well, many of whom doubt their government's ability to provide effective security without significant foreign assistance,⁷³ and they may hedge their allegiances accordingly.

Given the aforementioned questions regarding the government's ability to reconcile Taliban members and protect civilians from reprisals, the effort to degrade the Taliban's intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities may prove to be a difficult and protracted endeavor.

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ghan Defense Ministry.

⁶⁶ The ALP program serves as an armed community watch designed to maintain security at the village level. There are indications that the program has been beset by logistical problems, as well as concerns that armed ALP members may prove to be an additional source of instability. See, for example, Rob Taylor, "Afghan Local Police Stoke Fears of New-Generation Militia," Reuters, April 25, 2011. At the same time, at least some reports indicate that the ALP program is a source of concern to the Taliban leadership. For details, see "Afghanistan: Glimmers of Hope," *Economist*, May 12, 2011.

⁶⁷ Matt Millham, "Coalition, Afghan Forces Continue to Seize Insurgent Weapons," ISAF HQ Public Affairs, March 10, 2011.

⁶⁸ Rahim Faeiz and Heidi Vogt, "Taliban Militant Kills 2 Inside Defense Ministry," Associated Press, April 18, 2011.

⁶⁹ Mohammed Abbas, "West Trains Spies to Hunt Taliban in Afghan Forces," Reuters, April 12, 2011.

⁷⁰ Riechmann.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² The recent death of Usama bin Ladin has further aggravated some Afghans' fears that the United States will seek to withdraw forces from Afghanistan without establishing stable governance first. See Alissa J. Rubin, "Afghans Fear West May See Death as the End," *New York Times*, May 2, 2011.

⁷³ "NATO Pressuring Harper's 2014 Afghan Withdrawal," CTV, November 19, 2010. Should the U.S. and Afghan governments reach an accord on establishing permanent bases in Afghanistan after 2014, it may or may not serve to address such concerns.

Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity

April 1, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A mob attacked a UN compound in Mazar-i-Sharif, killing seven UN employees. The demonstrators were angry over the burning of a Qur'an by a Florida pastor in March. – *Washington Post*, April 2

April 2, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Violent protests spread through the city of Kandahar, leaving at least nine people dead. The demonstrators were angry over the burning of a Qur'an by a Florida pastor in March. – *Washington Post*, April 2

April 2, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Three suicide bombers attacked the Camp Phoenix NATO base in Kabul, but there were no reported casualties other than the deaths of the assailants. – *CNN*, April 2

April 3, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Two suicide bombers attacked the prominent Sakhi Sarkar Sufi shrine in the Dera Ghazi Khan district of Punjab Province, killing at least 50 people. – *AFP*, April 3

April 4, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): The Afghan Taliban relaxed an order to cell phone companies to shut down networks in Helmand Province, and mobile service will now be available from 9 AM to 3 PM. All mobile telephone networks were shut off in Helmand on March 23 in response to Taliban demands. The Taliban argue that NATO-led forces can track them through phone signals. – *Reuters*, April 4

April 4, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber attacked a bus station in Lower Dir District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing at least seven people. According to the BBC, "A member of a government-backed peace committee... was reported to have been killed in the blast." – *BBC*, April 4

April 6, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Top Afghan official Mohammad Massoom Stanekzai confirmed that Kabul has been in peace talks with the Taliban. According to the *New York Times*, Stanekzai's remarks "were the most public confirmation by a senior Afghan official that talks with the Taliban were under way." – *New York Times*, April 6

April 7, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A group of Taliban gunmen and suicide bombers attacked a police complex on the outskirts of Kandahar city, killing at least six members of the Afghan security forces. - *Los Angeles Times*, April 7; *New York Times*, April 7

April 7, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle killed a police constable in Quetta, Baluchistan Province. The attack targeted the house of a senior investigations officer, who was injured in the blast. - *AFP*, April 6; *Dawn*, April 8

April 7, 2011 (LIBYA): U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that it was highly unlikely that al-Qa`ida could "hijack" the uprising in Libya. According to Gates, "I think that the future government of Libya is going to be worked out among the principal tribes. So I think that for some outside group or some element of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to be able to hijack this thing at this point looks very unlikely to me." - *AFP*, April 6

April 8, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A 14-year-old boy arrested in Pakistan told the media that 350-400 "would-be suicide bombers are getting training in Mir Ali in North Waziristan...I was trained for two months and saw many boys being trained there." According to Agence France-Presse, "He made the remarks in an interview aired Friday from his hospital bedside, where he is being treated after detonating a hand grenade in the April 3 attack that killed 50 people at a 13th-century Sufi shrine." The boy said, "A man called Ayyaz gave us the suicide jackets on April 3 (the day of the attack). At 4 or 5 pm we visited the Sakhi Sarwar shrine and he told us each where to carry out our attacks." - *AFP*, April 8

April 10, 2011 (CANADA): A Canadian official told the media that approximately 20 Canadians traveled to Somalia to join the al-Shabab terrorist and insurgent group. Of the 20, three may have been killed in the country. - *National Post*, April 10

April 11, 2011 (UNITED STATES): Farooque Ahmed, a 35-year-old man of Pakistani descent living in Ashburn, Virginia, was sentenced to 23 years in prison after pleading guilty to charges stemming from his role in plotting to

bomb metro stations in the Washington, D.C. area. According to one media report, "Ahmed, who has lived in the United States since 1993, was under FBI surveillance from last April until his arrest in October. According to a federal indictment, he repeatedly collected information, including video images, of train stations around Washington and gave it to people he believed were part of al-Qaida and were planning multiple bombings." - *National Journal*, April 11

April 11, 2011 (YEMEN): Yemeni security forces killed 11 suspected al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula militants in Abyan Province. Authorities said that at least two of the killed militants were foreigners. - *Reuters*, April 11

April 13, 2011 (FRANCE): Contributors to Islamist militant web forums called for attacks on France due to that country's ban of the Muslim full face veil. - *Reuters*, April 13

April 13, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber killed at least 10 people in Kunar Province in an attack that targeted tribal elders. Among the dead was the prominent pro-government tribal elder Haji Malik Zarin, who was a close ally of President Hamid Karzai. According to the district police chief, who spoke to Agence France-Presse, "The suicide attacker approached them, hugged Malik Zarin and then detonated the explosives strapped to his body." - *BBC*, April 13

April 14, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri appeared in a new video calling on Arab armies to intervene in Libya to help remove Mu`ammar Qadhafi from power. He also called on Muslims to attack NATO and U.S. forces should they be deployed on the ground in Libya. - *ABC News*, April 14; *Reuters*, April 15

April 14, 2011 (UNITED STATES): According to senior FBI official Mark F. Giuliano, "While core AQ remains a serious threat, I believe the most serious threat to the homeland today emanates from members of AQAP [al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula]." AQAP realizes "the importance and value of reaching English-speaking audiences and are using the group's marketing skills to inspire individuals to attack within the homeland." - *Bloomberg*, April 14

April 14, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Multiple suicide bombers attacked a police training center in Aryub Jaji in Paktia Province, killing three police officers. - *Los Angeles Times*, April 14

April 14, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber attacked a government office south of Kabul, detonating a car bomb that injured three police officers and one civilian. - *Los Angeles Times*, April 14

April 14, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani officials announced that two alleged Islamist extremists from France were arrested in Lahore in late January. One of the men is of Pakistani origin, while the other is a convert to Islam. The Frenchmen were caught meeting with an individual who is suspected of having ties to al-Qa`ida. - *AP*, April 14

April 14, 2011 (TURKEY): Turkey's foreign minister confirmed that the Afghan Taliban will be allowed to open a political office in Turkey to help reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan. - *AFP*, April 12; *Voice of America*, April 14; *Reuters*, April 15

April 15, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber wearing a police uniform killed Kandahar provincial police chief Khan Mohammad Mujahid. His bodyguard was also killed. The slain police chief had survived three previous assassination attempts. - *Los Angeles Times*, April 16

April 15, 2011 (GAZA STRIP): Vittorio Arrigoni, an Italian pacifist who had lived in the Gaza Strip for three years, was hanged by a Salafi-jihadi group in Gaza. Arrigoni was kidnapped on April 14, and his captors demanded that in exchange for his release, Hamas had to free their leader, Hesham al-Sa'eedni, from a Hamas-run prison. Hamas was given 30 hours to release al-Sa'eedni, but failed to comply to the demand. The Salafi-jihadi group, which calls itself the Brigade of the Gallant Companion of the Prophet Muhammad bin Muslima, was previously unknown, but it is believed to be a front for a larger extremist organization, al-Jihad wal-Tawhid. On April 19, Hamas said one of the men responsible for the hanging, Abdel Rahman al-Brizar, "shot himself dead" upon being confronted by Hamas security forces. - *Telegraph*, April 15; *Reuters*, April 14; *Bloomberg*, April 19

April 15, 2011 (JORDAN): Islamist protesters attacked police in Zarqa, wounding 51 officers. The demonstrators were armed with swords, daggers and clubs. The protesters, described as Salafists, were demanding the release of 90 Islamist prisoners. - *AFP, April 15*

April 15, 2011 (JORDAN): Jordanian security forces arrested Ayman al-Balawi, the brother of triple agent Humam al-Balawi, who blew himself up at a CIA outpost in Afghanistan in December 2009. According to a Jordanian security official, Ayman al-Balawi was arrested with 102 other Salafists in the wake of violent protests in Zarqa. - *AP, April 19*

April 15, 2011 (INDONESIA): A suicide bomber targeted a mosque—situated in a police compound—during Friday prayers in Cirebon, located in West Java. At least 26 people, including police officers, were wounded by the blast. It was not immediately clear who was responsible for the attack, but authorities believe that the bomber may have been a local resident. - *Voice of America, April 15; Bloomberg, April 17*

April 16, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber wearing an Afghan army uniform detonated explosives inside a military base in Laghman Province, killing five NATO soldiers, four Afghan soldiers and an interpreter. The Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, and said that the bomber was a sleeper agent who joined the army a month ago. - *AP, April 17*

April 16, 2011 (YEMEN): Suspected al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula militants shot and wounded a Yemeni army officer in Abyan Province. The two gunmen, who were on a motorcycle, opened fire on the officer's vehicle. - *AFP, April 16*

April 16, 2011 (ALGERIA): Islamist militants killed at least 13 Algerian soldiers at an army post in Kabyle, located 80 miles east of Algiers. Two militants died in the assault. Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb later claimed credit for the operation. - *International Business Times, April 16; AFP, April 21*

April 18, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A gunman wearing an Afghan army uniform opened fire inside Kabul's Defense Ministry, killing two soldiers. The gunman was shot to death, and

authorities subsequently found that he was wearing an undetonated suicide vest. Militants claimed that the high-profile attack was aimed at France's visiting defense minister, Gerard Longuet. - *AFP, April 18*

April 21, 2011 (PAKISTAN): According to Reuters, the United States will provide Pakistan with 85 "Raven" drone aircraft. The "Raven" is a non-lethal, short-range surveillance aircraft. - *Reuters, April 21*

April 21, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Militants beheaded a sympathizer of an anti-Taliban *Jashkar* (tribal militia) and dumped his body on the road in the Peshawar suburbs. - *Dawn, April 22*

April 22, 2011 (RUSSIA): Russian federal officials announced the death of Khaled Yusef Mukhammed al-Emirat, identified as al-Qa`ida's top emissary to the Islamist insurgency in Russia's North Caucasus region. According to Reuters, "known by his code name Moganned, al-Emirat had been in the North Caucasus since 1999 and was shot and killed by law enforcement agencies in Chechnya." - *Reuters, April 22*

April 22, 2011 (KENYA): Kenyan police spokesman Eric Kiraithe warned that Somalia's al-Shabab terrorist and insurgent group threatened to execute attacks on Kenyan government buildings, bus terminals and places of worship over the Easter weekend. - *Bloomberg, April 22*

April 23, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A gunman assassinated Abdul Zahir, the deputy of Helmand Province's peace council, in Lashkar Gah. - *AP, April 24*

April 23, 2011 (NORTH AFRICA): Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb militants who are holding four French hostages want France to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in exchange for their release. - *AFP, April 23*

April 23, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber assassinated Malik Manasib Khan, the chief of the Salarzai tribe, in Bajaur Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Khan was the leader of an anti-Taliban militia. Four others died in the blast. - *AFP, April 23*

April 24, 2011 (IRAQ): According to Agence France-Presse, insurgents in Iraq have "stepped up deadly gun attacks against senior officials and military

leaders in a bid to undermine public trust in the security forces, officers and analysts said...The apparent trend is a major shift from the spectacular car bombs and suicide attacks that Al-Qaeda, which have been blamed for a recent spate of targeted killings in Baghdad, appeared to focus on in 2009 and much of 2010." - *AFP, April 21*

April 24, 2011 (LIBYA): U.S. Senator John McCain said that the United States should escalate its involvement in NATO airstrikes in Libya, warning that a stalemate would likely bring al-Qa`ida into the conflict. McCain said, "...nothing would bring Al-Qaeda in more rapidly and more dangerously than a stalemate." - *AFP, April 24*

April 25, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): More than 450 prisoners escaped from a jail by crawling through a 1,180-foot tunnel dug by the Taliban in Kandahar Province. - *Reuters, April 25; Christian Science Monitor, April 25*

April 26, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Taliban fighters attacked two buses carrying naval officials in Karachi, killing four people and wounding 56. - *Reuters, April 26*

April 27, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A veteran Afghan military pilot opened fire on trainers at a military compound near Kabul International Airport, killing eight U.S. soldiers and an American contractor. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, "The pilot opened fire about 10 a.m. after an argument with a foreign colleague at a meeting in the operations room of the Afghan air force building...The pilot, identified as Ahmad Gul Sahebi, 48, was from the Tarakhail district of Kabul province and had served in the Afghan army for decades, according to a man who claimed to be his brother." - *Los Angeles Times, April 28*

April 28, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber attacked a Shi'a mosque in Balad Ruz, north of Baghdad, killing eight people. - *Denver Post, April 29*

April 28, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A roadside bomb destroyed a bus carrying Pakistani navy personnel in Karachi, killing five people. - *Voice of America, April 28*

April 28, 2011 (MOROCCO): A remotely-detonated bomb ripped through a crowded tourist café in Marrakech, killing 16 people. Among the dead were 14 foreigners, at least half of whom were French. Morocco's interior minister said that the bomb had the hallmarks of al-Qa`ida. There was no immediate claim of responsibility. - *AP, April 29; New York Times, April 29*

April 29, 2011 (GERMANY): German police arrested three suspected al-Qa`ida members, and claimed to have averted "a concrete and imminent danger." All three suspects were young men of Moroccan origin, and they were arrested in Düsseldorf and Bochum. Police reportedly seized large quantities of explosives during the raids. A U.S. official told reporters that at least one of the men had been trained by al-Qa`ida. According to NBC News, "The [U.S.] official added that the men had already put together 'precursor chemicals' for a terror attack and were planning a 'test run' on Friday morning. Although the test was postponed, German authorities decided to move in and arrest them." - *Reuters, April 29; NBC News, April 29*

April 30, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): The Taliban said they will launch a spring offensive against U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, and that the operation will begin on May 1. - *Voice of America, April 30*

April 30, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber detonated explosives at an Iraqi Army checkpoint next to a market in Mosul, Ninawa Province, killing eight people. Five of the dead were Iraqi soldiers. - *al-Jazeera, April 30; New York Times, April 30*

May 1, 2011 (GLOBAL): U.S. Special Operations forces killed Usama bin Ladin, the founder and head of al-Qa`ida, in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Documents recovered from Bin Ladin's compound show that he remained actively involved in organizing plots for the al-Qa`ida organization. According to the Associated Press, Bin Ladin's "personal, handwritten journal and his massive collection of computer files show he helped plan every recent major al-Qaida threat the U.S. is aware of, including plots in Europe last year that had travelers and embassies on high alert, two [U.S.] officials said...bin Laden descended chilling advice to the leaders of al-Qaida groups from Yemen

to London: Hit Los Angeles, not just New York, he wrote. Target trains as well as planes. If possible, strike on significant dates, such as the Fourth of July and the upcoming 10th anniversary of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Above all, he urged, kill more Americans in a single attack, to drive them from the Arab world." - *New York Times, May 4; AP, May 13*

May 1, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber, who was reportedly a 12-year-old boy, killed four people in Paktika Province. The bomber detonated his explosives in a bazaar filled with civilians. The attack killed the head of a district council for the Shakeen area. - *Voice of America, May 1*

May 2, 2011 (GLOBAL): U.S. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers told reporters that at least a dozen senior al-Qa`ida leaders are likely in Pakistan. According to Rogers, "Of the 20 senior leaders in al Qaeda, at least a dozen of them we believe to be traveling around Pakistan someplace." - *Reuters, May 2*

May 2, 2011 (INDONESIA): Abu Bakar Bashir, who is accused of involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings, commented on the death of Usama bin Ladin from his jail cell in Indonesia. Bashir said that if the news of Bin Ladin's death is true, "then it will not put al-Qa`ida to death. Osama's death will not make al-Qa`ida dead...[the] jihad will keep on going because [the] jihad movement it's not political, but Shari`a (religious law)." - *AFP, May 2*

May 3, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida confirmed the death of Usama bin Ladin and vowed to avenge his death by retaliating against the United States "soon." - *Los Angeles Times, May 7*

May 4, 2011 (FRANCE): Loic Garnier, the head of intelligence gathering at the French Interior Ministry, said that Usama bin Ladin's death reduces the risk of a terrorist attack against France. "France has moved to the background as a target for 'core' al Qaeda, but it remains a top priority for AQIM," he said. - *Reuters, May 5*

May 4, 2011 (INDONESIA): Indonesian police found six unexploded pipe bombs in a river in Cirebon city. The explosives were similar to the device detonated by a suicide bomber inside a mosque in Cirebon on April 15. The latest explosives were discovered just days before leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) are to arrive in Jakarta to attend a regional meeting. According to a police spokesman, "They [militants] planned to use the six pipe bombs for another terror attack like the one which was carried out" on April 15. - *AFP, May 4*

May 5, 2011 (UNITED STATES): According to Voice of America, "U.S. officials say an initial review of documents seized from Osama bin Laden's compound shows al-Qaida considered carrying out a terrorist plot against the United States on the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks... The document says al-Qaida thought about tampering with rail tracks so a train would fall off the tracks in a valley or over bridge." - *Voice of America, May 5*

May 5, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle at a police training center in the mainly Shi`a city of Hilla, south of Baghdad. Twenty-five people were killed by the blast. The Islamic State of Iraq later claimed responsibility. - *Los Angeles Times, May 6; New York Times, May 5; AFP, May 9*

May 5, 2011 (YEMEN): A U.S. aerial drone killed two suspected al-Qa`ida operatives in Shabwa Province. Various media reports suggested that the strike also targeted Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi, but he survived the attack. According to press reports citing U.S. officials, the incident was the first time since 2002 that the United States used a drone to attack a target in Yemen. - *Los Angeles Times, May 5; Reuters, May 6*

May 5, 2011 (SAUDI ARABIA): Saudi Arabia announced that Khalid Hatha al-Qahtani, a senior member of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, surrendered to Saudi authorities earlier in the week. - *Guardian, May 5*

May 6, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. drone strike killed 13 suspected militants in North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, "The strike involved eight missiles fired at suspected militants in a car, a restaurant and a local seminary in the Datta Khel area." - *Los Angeles Times, May 7*

May 7, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): The Afghan Taliban launched a series of coordinated attacks in Kandahar city, killing at least two people. Taliban militants attacked the Kandahar governor's compound, as

well as an intelligence service building, a foreign special forces base, and multiple Afghan police checkpoints. Fighting continued into May 8. - *Voice of America, May 7; Christian Science Monitor, May 8*

May 7, 2011 (SOMALIA): Somalia's al-Shabab terrorist and insurgent group vowed to avenge the killing of Usama bin Ladin. - *Voice of America, May 7*

May 8, 2011 (IRAQ): Abu Huzaifa al-Batawi, the head of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), managed to overpower a guard inside Baghdad's Interior Ministry—where he was imprisoned—arming himself and freeing a number of al-Qa`ida-affiliated detainees. The militants proceeded to kill a number of police officers, including Brigadier Muaid Mohammed Saleh, the chief of a department responsible for combating terrorism and organized crime in eastern Baghdad. Al-Batawi was shot to death as he tried to escape the Interior Ministry compound in a vehicle. - *al-Jazeera, May 8; Los Angeles Times, May 8*

May 9, 2011 (GERMANY): A German court sentenced a German-Syrian man, only known as "Rami M.," to four years and nine months in prison for being a member of al-Qa`ida. The man confessed to a Frankfurt court that he traveled to Pakistan's tribal regions and trained with al-Qa`ida between 2009 and 2010. He also said that he engaged in attacks on the Pakistani military during that time by transporting rockets, among other duties. - *Reuters, May 9*

May 9, 2011 (IRAQ): The Islamic State of Iraq pledged its support to Ayman al-Zawahiri in the wake of Usama bin Ladin's death in Pakistan. Al-Qa`ida has not yet named Bin Ladin's successor. - *AP, May 9*

May 10, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Hundreds of Taliban fighters attacked police checkpoints in Nuristan Province. The insurgents failed to overrun government positions, however. The operation was part of the Taliban's recently announced spring offensive. - *AP, May 10*

May 11, 2011 (YEMEN): Nasir al-Wihayshi, the leader of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), warned that the United States faces more attacks in the wake of Usama bin Ladin's death. He said that "what is coming is greater and worse" and that the "ember of jihad is

glowing brighter." - *Voice of America, May 11*

May 13, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Two suicide bombers killed 98 people in Charsadda District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. The bombers targeted paramilitary recruits. The Pakistani Taliban later claimed responsibility for the attack, and the group said it was to avenge the killing of Usama bin Ladin. - *Christian Science Monitor, May 13; AFP, May 16*

May 13, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. drone killed four suspected militants in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. - *CNN, May 13*

May 14, 2011 (UNITED STATES): The FBI arrested three Pakistani-Americans on charges of providing financial and other material support to the Pakistani Taliban. According to the *New York Times*, "Arrested in the United States were Hafiz Muhammed Sher Ali Khan, 76, of Miami; and two of his sons, Izhar Khan, 24, of Miami; and Irfan Khan, 37, of North Lauderdale. Hafiz Khan is the imam at the Miami Mosque, also known as the Flagler Mosque. Izhar Khan is an imam at the Jamaat Al-Mu'mineen Mosque in Margate, Fla. Hafiz and Izhar Khan were arrested Saturday in South Florida, while Irfan Khan was arrested in Los Angeles. All three are originally from Pakistan." - *New York Times, May 14*

May 16, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S. Lieutenant General David Rodriguez told reporters, "We still think that there are just less than a hundred al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan...But what they do is a cadre-type organization that helps out to bring both resources as well as technical skills to the rest of the Taliban fighting here." - *Reuters, May 16*

May 16, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Militants shot to death a Saudi diplomat in the Khayaban-i-Shahbaz neighborhood of Karachi. The Taliban claimed responsibility. - *Dawn, May 17*

May 17, 2011 (GLOBAL): Noman Benotman, a former associate of Usama bin Ladin who now lives in London, claimed that Sayf al-Adl was acting as al-Qa`ida's interim operational leader in the wake of Bin Ladin's death. Benotman's statement, however, could not be confirmed. - *MSNBC, May 18*

May 17, 2011 (KAZAKHSTAN): A suicide bomber detonated explosives outside the headquarters of the security service in Aktobe, wounding three people. According to Agence France-Presse, "The mysterious bombing was a rare event in Kazakhstan, a majority Muslim country that prides itself on being the most stable nation in Central Asia and a hub for Western investment." - *AFP, May 17*

May 18, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle attacked a minibus carrying police cadets in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province, killing 13 people. - *Reuters, May 18*

May 18, 2011 (IRAQ): Iraqi security forces apprehended four senior al-Qa`ida in Iraq militants in Samarra. According to Reuters, "The four men included Mikhliif Mohammed Hussein al-Azzawi, known as Abu Radhwan, suspected of leading the local group's military operations, and Qassim Mohammed Taher, accused of orchestrating a March attack on a provincial building that killed more than 50 people." - *Reuters, May 18*

May 19, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida released a posthumous audio recording of Usama bin Ladin, where the deceased al-Qa`ida leader praised the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. Bin Ladin reportedly failed to mention the uprisings in Libya, Syria and Yemen. - *Christian Science Monitor, May 19*

May 20, 2011 (UNITED STATES): The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security issued an alert to law enforcement and the energy industry that al-Qa`ida considered attacking tanker ships and other marine infrastructure in the summer of 2010. The alert was issued after U.S. authorities reviewed documents seized from Usama bin Ladin's compound in Pakistan. - *Los Angeles Times, May 21*

May 20, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A Taliban car bomb struck an armored vehicle carrying U.S. government employees to the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar. Two Americans were injured, while a Pakistani civilian was killed. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility and said that it was to avenge the killing of Usama bin Ladin. - *AP, May 20*

May 21, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber detonated explosives at a military hospital in Kabul, killing six people. The

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility.
- *CNN, May 21*

May 22, 2011 (GLOBAL): A new audio message from al-Qa`ida's Ayman al-Zawahiri appeared on Islamist web forums. The message, which was recorded before the death of Usama bin Ladin, supported the revolutions sweeping the Arab world. He called on North African Muslims to join the fight against the Libyan regime, and told Egyptians to implement Shari`a. Al-Zawahiri also addressed Syrians, telling them to continue their uprising against the regime in Damascus. - *AFP, May 22*

May 22, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Militants attacked the PNS Mehran naval aviation base in Karachi, killing 10 government security personnel. The militants managed to gain entrance to the base, and it took about 16 hours for Pakistani security forces to kill the fighters and secure the facility. According to Bloomberg, "The insurgents in Karachi damaged or destroyed U.S.-made surveillance planes in the biggest strike against a leading Pakistani military installation since a raid on the army's Rawalpindi headquarters in October 2009." As few as six militants may have been involved in the operation. - *Bloomberg, May 23; BBC, May 23; Reuters, May 24*

May 24, 2011 (KAZAKHSTAN): A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle outside the headquarters of the security services in Astana, causing a number of casualties. - *AFP, May 23*

May 25, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber drove an explosives-laden vehicle into Pakistan's Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Peshawar, killing seven police commandos and one army soldier. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility. - *The News International, May 26; NPR, May 25*

May 26, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistan agreed to allow a CIA forensics team to examine the compound where Usama bin Ladin was killed. - *Washington Post, May 26*

May 26, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber in a pickup truck detonated explosives near government offices in Peshawar, killing at least 32 people. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility. - *AP, May 26*

May 28, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber targeted a security gathering inside the governor's compound in Takhar Province. The blast killed two NATO soldiers from Germany, in addition to four other people. Among the dead was Afghan General Daud Daud, one of the country's most experienced anti-Taliban military commanders. The bomb also injured a provincial governor as well as the German commander of NATO troops in the region, General Markus Kneip. The assailant was wearing an Afghan army uniform. - *Los Angeles Times, May 29; McClatchy Newspapers, May 28*

May 29, 2011 (YEMEN): Yemen's government claimed that militants from al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula overran Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan Province. - *Los Angeles Times, May 30*

May 30, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle targeted the gates of an Italian military base in Herat, wounding five Italian soldiers. - *RFE/RL, May 30*

May 30, 2011 (SOMALIA): A suicide bomber and other militants attacked a peacekeeping base in Mogadishu, killing two African Union soldiers. Al-Shabab said that the suicide bomber was a Somali-American. - *New York Times, May 30; AP, June 2*

May 31, 2011 (UNITED STATES): U.S. federal officials announced that two Iraqi men living in Kentucky have been taken into custody and arraigned on a number of terrorism charges for helping al-Qa`ida in Iraq conduct operations against U.S. troops. - *CNN, May 31*

May 31, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad was found murdered near the town of Mandi Bahauddin, about 75 miles southeast of Islamabad. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, "Shahzad, the Pakistan bureau chief for the Asia Times Online news website, had recently written an article saying that Al Qaeda had infiltrated the ranks of the navy. The piece also asserted that a 17-hour siege on a naval base in Karachi that was carried out by militants was meant as retaliation for the military's refusal to release a group of naval officials suspected of having militant links." - *Los Angeles Times, June 1*

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Derived From : ~~FBI NSISCG-20080301~~
Declassify On: ~~20360706~~

Reference:

(U)
(X)
(U)
(U)

(S)

b1
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b7E

Administrative: ~~(S)~~

(S)

b1
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b7E
b6
b7C

Details: ~~(S//NF)~~

(S)

~~SECRET//FGL//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

(X)

From:

07/06/2011

×

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(S)

b1
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b7C

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~

(S)

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b7E

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~

b1
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(S)

To:

Re:

(U)

From:

07/06/2011

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(S)

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~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~


(S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
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b7E

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (X) [redacted] 07/06/2011



(S) b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

[redacted]

From:

[redacted]

07/06/2011

XQ

[redacted]

(S)

b1
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~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~

(S)

To:

Re:

(X)

From:

07/06/2011

b1
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b1
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b7C

(S)

X

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~

(S)

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b7E

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

To:

[redacted]

From:

[redacted]

Re:

(S)

[redacted]

07/06/2011

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(S)

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~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/06/2011

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U//~~FOUO~~) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//FGI//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-07-2019

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2011 10:44 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: [REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Thanks [REDACTED]
I will submit those particular contacts to our [REDACTED] to run with and see what they find. If we find those connects we'll send your way.

b6
b7C
b7E

Best,

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 9:08 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

Subject: RE: [REDACTED] --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

IA [REDACTED]
FBI Counterterrorism Division

Desk: [REDACTED]

NSTS: [REDACTED]

Cell: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, July 07, 2011 2:19 PM

To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (FBI)

Subject: RE: [redacted] -- UNCLASSIFIED

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Thanks [redacted]

Any word on the matter as per attached?

b6
b7C

b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, July 07, 2011 2:16 PM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted] -- UNCLASSIFIED

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

(S) b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Thanks [redacted]

IA [redacted]

FBI Counterterrorism Division

Desk: [redacted]

NSTS: [redacted]

Cell: [redacted]

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-22-2019

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 5:52 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1
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b6
b7C

Subject: RE: Another SAMIR [REDACTED] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S) (S)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360608
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

b1
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b7C

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 5:08 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Another SAMIR [REDACTED] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b1
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b7E
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b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S) (S)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360608
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

(S) b1
b3
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b7C

IA [REDACTED]
FBI Counterterrorism Division

Desk: [REDACTED]
NSTS: [REDACTED]
Cell: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 3:13 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Another SAMI [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S) (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360608
Derived From: FBI NSISC
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b1
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Let me know your thoughts.

Thanks [redacted]
[redacted]

(S) b1
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From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 3:03 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

b1
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b7E
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b7C

Subject: RE: Another SAMIR [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S) (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360608
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

b6
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As I recall the [redacted] did not run those.

IA [redacted]
FBI Counterterrorism Division

Desk: [redacted]
NSTS: [redacted]
Cell: [redacted]

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 3:02 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Subject: RE: Another SAMIR [redacted] - ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S) (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360608
Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2011 5:12 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Another SAMIR [redacted] - ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S) (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360608
Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

Thanks-

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 3:10 PM

To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Another SAMIR [redacted] - ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S) (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360608
Derived From: FBI NSISC

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

b1
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b7C

IA [Redacted]
FBI Counterterrorism Division

[Redacted]

Desk: [Redacted]
NSTS: [Redacted]
Cell: [Redacted]

From: [Redacted] (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 11:39 AM

To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]

b1
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b7E
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b7C

Subject: RE: Another SAMI [Redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S) (S)

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassify On: 20360608
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[Redacted]

b1
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From: [Redacted] (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 11:22 AM

To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]

b1
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b7C

Subject: RE: Another SAMI [Redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S) (S)

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassify On: 20360608
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[Redacted]

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IA [Redacted]
FBI Counterterrorism Division

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Desk: [redacted]

NSTS: [redacted]

Cell: [redacted]

b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 11:13 AM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: FW: Another SAMIR [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360608

Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

[redacted] please see the below email traffic. In my email to [redacted] I reference an 8/2010 EC from [redacted] that is [redacted]

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Thanks!

From: [redacted] (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 11:08 AM

To: [redacted] (FBI)

Subject: RE: Another SAMIR [redacted] ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360608

Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

(S)

As always, great work!

Thanks-

From: [redacted] (FBI)

Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 4:33 PM

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b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: Another SAMIR [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD 415~~

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b7C

[redacted]
~~(S//NF/OC)~~

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b6
b7C

[redacted]
Special Agent [redacted]
FBI [redacted]
[redacted] Desk
[redacted] BB

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFY ON: 20360607
SECRET

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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BY COURIER

Date: 06/21/2011

To:

[redacted]

(S)

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Attention: Office of Counsel
Room 3341

From:

Director, FBI

[redacted]

b6
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Subject:

[redacted]

(S)

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[redacted]

X

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted]

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[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted]

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(S)

Background

(S)

~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] In late 2006, Samir Khan (born in 1985) came to the attention of the FBI for his role in administering a fundamentalist Islamic, pro-jihad, online blog from his parents' home in Charlotte, NC. On this online blog, as well as on several other online blogs, forums, and web sites with similar content, Khan expressed a radical Islamic worldview. Khan's popular online blog, which he operated from 2005 until 2009, gained him international attention in 2007. From early 2007 until late 2009, investigation of Khan revealed that this self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi became increasingly religious and radical over time. Major discoveries of the investigation include [redacted]

b1
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(S)

[redacted] Khan became a radicalizing influence on others, possibly motivating/recruiting them for jihad; individuals close to Khan expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr, and he himself indicated an interest in becoming a martyr; Khan created the first US-based, English language, pro-jihad magazine, known as "Jihad Recollections," which published four issues online and received significant international attention; and in October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra.

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted]


(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~



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(S)

(U) Although not charged with a crime at this time, Khan is represented by an attorney.

The attorney is



of



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~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~



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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~



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(U//~~FOUO~~) Questions regarding this matter may be addressed to FBI  SSA
 (desk).

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~



(S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/20/2011

To: Charlotte [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

b6
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From: [redacted]

Contact: IOA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

b3
b7E

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] (Pending) [redacted]

(U) Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] (S) [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20090615
Declassify On: 20360720

(U) [redacted]

b7E

Reference: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

b3
b7E

Details: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

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(U) [redacted] Lead 2 in [redacted] is considered covered by [redacted]

b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]
Re: (S//NF) [REDACTED] 07/20/2011

b3
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Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: [REDACTED] (S)
ITU: [REDACTED]
Claimed By: [REDACTED]
SSN: [REDACTED]
Name: [REDACTED]
Squad: [REDACTED]

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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U)

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]
Re: (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED] 07/20/2011

b3
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U)

(~~S~~/~~NF~~) For information.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BACK OF PAGE

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1
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b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 07/27/2011

To: Laboratory

Attn: [REDACTED]

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b7E

FE [REDACTED]

Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte [REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

(U)

(Pending)

b1
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Title: (S) [REDACTED]

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S) [REDACTED]

(S)

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(U) LATENT PRINTS

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

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~~Derived From : FBI NSISGC, 20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 07/27/2036~~

Administrative: (S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

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To: Laboratory From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/27/2011

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[redacted] ~~(S)~~ [redacted] (S)

(U) As per telcal between writer and FE [redacted]
on 07/26/2011, the FBI Laboratory [redacted]
[redacted] however, it was requested that an EC be
provided from FBI Charlotte documenting this request

b6
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(U) [redacted]

b7E

Details:

BACKGROUND ON SAMIR KHAN

(S) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] In late 2006, Samir Khan (born in 1985)
came to the attention of the FBI for his role in administering a
fundamentalist Islamic, pro-jihad, online blog from his parents'
home in Charlotte, NC. On this online blog, as well as on several
other online blogs, forums, and web sites with similar content,
Khan expressed a radical Islamic worldview. Khan's popular online
blog, which he operated from 2005 until 2009, gained him
international attention in 2007. From early 2007 until late 2009,
investigation of Khan revealed that this self-proclaimed
Salafi-Jihadi became increasingly religious and radical over
time. Major discoveries of the investigation include: [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

[redacted] Khan became a radicalizing influence on
others, possibly motivating/recruiting them for jihad;
individuals close to Khan expressed concern that Khan may become
a martyr, and he himself indicated an interest in becoming a
martyr; Khan created the first US-based, English language,
pro-jihad magazine, known as "Jihad Recollections," which
published four issues online and received significant
international attention; and in October 2009, Khan traveled to
Yemen, apparently to make hijra.

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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To: Laboratory From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/27/2011

~~(S//NF/OC)~~

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(S)

(U) ~~(S)~~ For further case information, please visit the
case sharepoint (on FBI Intranet) at:

b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

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To: Laboratory From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/27/2011

REQUEST

(S)

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(U) The continued assistance of the FBI Laboratory in this matter is greatly appreciated.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

(S)

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b7E

To: Laboratory From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/27/2011

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

LABORATORY

AT QUANTICO, VA

[REDACTED]

(S)
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b7C

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) For information.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED]

(U) For information.

(S)

(S)

b1
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♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

(S)

b1
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~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/27/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

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Charlotte

From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

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Title:

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SAMIR KHAN

(S)

Synopsis:

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Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301

Declassify On: 20360727

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Details:

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

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(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

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Push-Button Publishing

inshALLAHshaheed

Gender: Male

Astrological Sign: Capricorn

Industry: Student

Occupation: Tutor

Location: Charlotte : North Carolina : United States

About Me

Humanity is in need of a Just Social Order; a way of life that protects men and women from the deceptions that this world can trap one into. In order to truly bring about this 'Renaissance' within the fixed area of man's existance, we must turn to the root of the different philosophies that man offered to the world; from there do we then choose the revolution which will bring about this great change. For this reason, I am in complete agreement with the Islamic Revolution brought about by Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). With his revolution, was the human changed not only externally, but also internally; it was the absolute greatest internal revolution which led to the spreading of Islam, not by the sword, but by the hearts! Conquering a land is easy, but conquering a heart... well, you will need one heck of a philosophy! I humbly welcome you to my blog.

Your pajamas have duckies on them. Why did you switch from choo-choos?

What color is patch?

Interests

Achieving toto revolution of human being Computers

Volunteering at The Mosque Dhikr halaqas Islamic

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[Naas](#) [MSA](#) [Qur'an](#) [Dr. Israr Ahmad](#) [Shaykh Omar Baloch](#)
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[The Message](#) [The Last Samurai](#) [Braveheart](#) [Lion of the](#)
[Desert](#)

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[Qur'an and Nasheed](#)

Favorite Books

[The Holy Qur'an](#) [Ghazali & The Poetics of Imagination](#)
[Jerusalem in the Qur'an](#) [Forcing God's Hand](#) and
[Obligations Muslims owe to the Qur'an](#)

My Blogs

Team Members

[Human Liberation - an Islamic](#)
[Renaissance](#)

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Human Liberation - an Islamic Renaissance

MANKIND IS UNDER THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT
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WORLD WHILE TOTALLY NEGLECTING THE TRUE
SPIRITUALITY WHICH CAN ONLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY
A PEOPLE WHO WILL WORK TO RE-ESTABLISH THE
COMPLETE REVOLUTION BROUGHT ABOUT BY PROPHET
MUHAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM)!

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 01, 2004


no more xanga!

Assalam Alaikum Wa Rahmatullahi Wa Barakatuhu

I've decided to stop updating my Xanga since I screwed up terribly on the
Javascript so much so, I couldn't even edit it no more lol.

So I'll start posting here inshAllah.

Take Care,
Samir

POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 3:03 PM | 3
COMMENTS 

PREVIOUS POSTS

Who is Dr. Israr Ahmad?

Who is Sayyid Qutb?

Liberal movements within

January 2005

September 2005


October 2005

ABOUT ME



INSHALIAHSHAHEED
CHARLOTTE, NORTH
CAROLINA, UNITED
STATES

Humanity is in need of a Just Social Order; a way of life that protects men and women from the deceptions that this world can trap one into. In order to truly bring about this 'Renaissance' within the fixed area of man's existence, we must turn to the root of the different philosophies that man offered to the world; from there do we then choose the revolution which will bring about this great change. For this reason, I am in complete agreement with the Islamic Revolution brought about by Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). With his revolution, was the human changed not only externally, but also internally; it was the absolute greatest internal revolution which led to the spreading of Islam, not by the sword, but by the hearts! Conquering a land



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PROPHET MUHAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM)!

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2005

Next 10-15 on Sociology

I'm going to dedicate the next 10-15 posts on Sociology for my Introduction to Sociology class that I'm taking at College. It will consist of my thoughts and reactions in regards to different subjects within Sociology. I think everyone will find this very interesting.

Take Care,
Samir

POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 5:04 PM | 0
COMMENTS 

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2005

Intellectual discussion & article on US banning alcohol

Assalam Alaikum,

I decided to continue this blog because people are actually reading it to my surprise. So, once in a while, I will throw out

7/27/2011

b7E

my thoughts, and most of the time, I will put some [intelligent] articles here. My more active blog is my xanga: www.xanga.com/inshALLAHshaheed

The US cannot ban alcohol without purifying the nation

by Samir Khan

The US tried banning alcohol in its own Country a while ago. It was a million dollar project. The people rebelled, which resulted in violence, and the increase in alcohol consumption. **Why did the US fail in their ban of alcohol when Muhammad succeeded in banning alcohol?**

1. The Sahabas were spiritually and mentally prepared. When the ban on alcohol commenced, they didn't need to use any money to enforce the law because the people were willing to accept it. Before its commencement, the Sahabas drank alcohol; it wasn't forbidden until later after the hijrah.
2. Aisha (ra) said that if the first verse of the Qur'an were to be on the ban of alcohol, the people would have rejected it. If the first verse of the Qur'an were to be on the ban of zina, the people would have rejected it. Why? Because they were not spiritual molded into obedient slaves of the Creator at the very beginning. The first ayaat were from Surah al-'Alaq which advised man on the Glory-ness of Allah and to appreciate His status; this opened the eyes of those who accepted. If the first ayaat were on the prohibition of a certain act, there would have been a different response in society.
3. When the ayah on the banning of alcohol arrived, the word spread and the Sahaba threw away their alcohol, spat it

out, and even forced themselves to vomit all the alcohol out. The streets of Medina were flowing of alcohol that day.

4. The Sahaba didn't need a police force to stop the consumption of alcohol, unlike the US. The Sahaba were ready to face any law which might be seen as a hardship in the eyes of those who were not as prepared as the Sahaba.


5. The first thing the Sahaba were taught was not the ban of alcohol or the commands of the Qur'an, but they were taught about the reality of this life as well as paradise and hellfire. This would instill into their hearts the accurate way to view this life; they lived, and preached these truths. So when the ban of alcohol came, it was trouble-free to apply.

6. The outlawing of alcohol came gradually. There were minor bans such as the command to not pray salah while intoxicated. Note that this was not an absolute ban on alcohol. This is one of the realistic methods of achievable morality which led to their implementation of the law to not drink alcohol.

So what does the US have to do in order to ban alcohol?

1. The US has to instill into the minds and hearts of the Americans the purpose of life, paradise, and hellfire. All effective means should be exhausted in order to emphasize the ideology whether it is through media, magazines, books, libraries, movies, public rallies for a moral society, internet, videogames, other laws, and so on.

2. Since we are not at the level to challenge the US on alcohol, the Islamic movements today should work tirelessly in purifying the people of this nation. That is, giving the




nation the paramount way of thinking and viewing the life of this world. They should exhaust all the means of propagating this message as well as living this message. This is part of the bottom-up approach to establishing the Kingdom of Allah on earth. There is a good chance that this might lead to the polarization of society where for example: one will be embarrassed to drink alcohol in public.

3. The members of the various Islamic movements have to be Sahaba-like. This is not an option otherwise this propagation will be useless as the society will question the groups claim to understanding salvation and practicing its pre-requisites. Islamic movements cannot be battling the dominant culture whilst simultaneously accepting it; a counter-culture is not a subculture.

4. After the US government recognizes what the Islamic movement's methods and motives are, the government should support them. The least they can do is provide financial assistance.

5. There were no incentives for the Americans in forbidding themselves from drinking alcohol. When there is no concept of ultimate reward and ultimate punishment, then the people will do as they wish and chaos will be prevalent in the land. This is why a lot of Americans ridicule those Countries that have lesser freedoms. The issue is not about having the most freedom, but the main concern is about controlling society from going out of control. So the American government has to produce an incentive for the public in order to come to reason with the souls of the inhabitants. The underlying motivational factor for the Sahaba was belief in Paradise and Hellfire. They worried that if they sinned, there would then be a chance that the punishment of Allah would be upon them. At the same time, they knew that if

they kept up their righteous acts, there would be a chance that they would be rewarded with the eternal prize. They lived a life where they accepted a trade with Allah in that if they sold themselves for His sake wholly and solely, then He would grant them Paradise in return (9:111). This is what made the Sahaba's known as Sahaba's.

POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 10:30 PM | 15
COMMENTS 

Human Liberation - an Islamic Renaissance

MANKIND IS UNDER THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT SECULAR MEANS WILL BRING ABOUT PEACE IN THE WORLD WHILE TOTALLY NEGLECTING THE TRUE SPIRITUALITY WHICH CAN ONLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY A PEOPLE WHO WILL WORK TO RE-ESTABLISH THE COMPLETE REVOLUTION BROUGHT ABOUT BY PROPHET MUHAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM)!

MONDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2005

Who is Dr. Israr Ahmad?



Dr. Israr Ahmad

(Lecture at Khilafah Conference 1994, Wembley Hall, London)

The Founder of Tanzeem-e-Islami Dr. Israr Ahmad is a well-known figure in Pakistan, the Middle East, and North America for his efforts in drawing the attention of Muslims in general and their educated classes in particular towards the teachings and wisdom of the Holy Qur'an. As

against the detached, cool, and sterile academicism of many contemporary Muslim scholars, Dr. Israr Ahmad firmly believes in the methodology of "reflection-through-action" which he thinks is amply supported by a verse of the Holy Qur'an:

As for those who strive in Us, We surely guide them to Our paths (Al-Ankabut 29:69)

Dr. Israr Ahmad, was born on April 26, 1932 in Hisar (a district of East Punjab, now a part of Haryana State) in India. He graduated from King Edward Medical College (Lahore) in 1954 and later received his masters in Islamic Studies from the University of Karachi in 1965. He came under the influence of Allama Iqbal and Maulana Maududi as a young student, worked briefly for Muslim Student's Federation in the Independence Movement and, following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, for the Islami Jami'yat-e-Talaba and then for the Jama'at-e-Islami. Dr. Israr Ahmad resigned from the Jama'at in April 1957 because of its involvement in the electoral politics, which he believed was irreconcilable with the revolutionary methodology adopted by the Jama'at in the pre-1947 period.




While still a student and an activist of the Islami Jami'yat-e-Talaba, Dr. Israr Ahmad gained considerable fame and eminence as a Mudarris (or teacher) of the Holy Qur'an. Even after resigning from the Jama'at, he continued to give Qur'anic lectures in different cities of Pakistan, and especially after 1965 he has, according to his own disclosure, invested the better part of his physical and intellectual

abilities in the learning and teaching of the Qur'anic wisdom. Dr. Israr Ahmad wrote an extremely significant tract in 1967 in which he explained his basic thought that an Islamic Renaissance is possible only by revitalizing the Iman (true faith and certitude) among the Muslims, particularly their intelligentsia. The revitalization of Iman, in turn, is possible only by the propagation of the Qur'anic teachings and presenting the everlasting wisdom of the Book of Allah (SWT) in contemporary idiom and at the highest level of scholarship. This undertaking is essential in order to remove the existing dichotomy between modern physical and social sciences on the one hand and the knowledge revealed by Almighty Allah (SWT) on the other. This tract is available in English as *Islamic Renaissance: The Real Task Ahead*. Dr. Israr Ahmad gave up his thriving medical practice in 1971 in order to launch a full-fledged and vigorous movement for the revival of Islam. As a result of his efforts, the Markazi Anjuman Khuddam-ul-Qur'an Lahore was established in 1972, Tanzeem-e-Islami was founded in 1975, and Tahreek-e-Khilafat Pakistan was launched in 1991.



Dr. Israr Ahmad first appeared on Pakistan Television in 1978 in a program called *Al-Kitab*; this was followed by other programs, known as *Alif Lam Meem*, *Rasool-e-Kamil*, *Umm-ul-Kitab* and the most popular of all religious programs in the history of Pakistan Television, the *Al-Huda*, which made



him a household name throughout the country. Although he did not like to receive it personally, Dr. Israr Ahmad was awarded Sitara-e-Imtiaz in 1981. He has to his credit over 60 Urdu books on topics related to Islam and Pakistan, 9 of which have been translated into English.

In the context of Qur'anic exegesis and understanding, Dr. Israr Ahmad is a firm traditionalist of the genre of Maulana Mehmood Hassan Deobandi and Allama Shabeer Ahmad Usmani; yet he presents Qur'anic teachings in a scientific and enlightened way, being also a disciple of Allama Iqbal and Dr. Muhammad Rafiuddin, and also because of his own background in science and medicine. Concerning the internal coherence of and the principles of deep reflection in the Qur'an, he has essentially followed the thinking of Maulana Hameed Uddin Farahi and Maulana Ameen Ahsan Islahi, though even here he has further developed their line of argument. Dr. Israr Ahmad believes in a dynamic and revolutionary conception of Islam, and in this regard he is a disciple of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Maulana Sayyid Abul A`la Maududi.


For the last forty years or so, Dr. Israr Ahmad has been actively engaged not only in reviving the Qur'an-centered Islamic perennial philosophy and world-view but also reforming the society in a practical way with the ultimate objective of establishing a true Islamic State, or the System of Khilafah. He has widely traveled abroad and the audio and video tapes of his Qur'anic discourses in Urdu and English languages have circulated in thousands throughout the world.

A master's thesis, entitled Dr. Israr Ahmad's Political Thought and Activities, was written by Ms. Shagufta Ahmad in the Islamic Studies department of Canada's Mac Gill University. This thesis is available from Markazi Anjuman Khuddam-ul-Qur'an Lahore.



POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 9:28 PM | 16
COMMENTS

Who is Sayyid Qutb?



Sayyid Qutb (9 October 1906 in Musha – executed on 29 August 1966) was an important theoretician of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Alternative spellings of his "first" and "last" names include *Syed*, *Koteb* (rather common), *Qutub*, etc. Arabic: سيد قطب

He first received a religious education; in 1920, he moved to Cairo, where he received a Western education between 1929 and 1933, before starting his career as a teacher in the Ministry of Public Instruction. During his early career, Qutb devoted himself to literature as an author and critic, writing such novels as *Ashwak* (*Thorns*) and even elevating Egyptian novelist Naguib Mahfouz from obscurity. In 1939, he became a functionary in Egypt's Ministry of Education (*wizarat al-ma'arif*); from 1948 to 1950, he went to the United States on a scholarship to study the educational system, receiving a master's degree from the Colorado State College of Education (now the University of Northern Colorado). Qutb's first major theoretical work of

religious social criticism, *Al-'adala al-Ijtima'iyya fi-l-Islam (Social Justice in Islam)*, was published in 1949, during his time overseas.

The perceived racism, materialism, and 'loose' sexual conduct that he saw in the United States is believed by some to have been the impetus for his rejection of Western values and his move towards radicalism upon returning to Egypt. Resigning from the civil service he became perhaps the most persuasive publicist of the Muslim Brotherhood. The school of thought he inspired has become known as Qutbism.

The Muslim Brotherhood, and Qutb in particular, enjoyed a close relationship with the Free Officers Movement in the time leading up to and following the coup of June 1952. But their early cooperation soon soured over such issues as the Free Officers' refusal to hold elections, to ban alcohol, or to take a hard line against the British presence in Egypt.

After the attempted assassination of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, imprisoning Qutb along with many others. While in prison, Qutb wrote his two most important works: a commentary of the Qur'an *Fi zilal al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Quran)*, and a manifesto of political Islam called *Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones)*.

His commentary on the Qur'an has been extremely influential; some see him as the central theorist of twentieth-century Islamism. There is anecdotal evidence that Sayyid Qutb and Shaykh Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani founder of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, influenced each other. According to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, "In a century in which some of the most important writing came out of prisons, Qutb, for better or for worse, is the Islamic world's answer to Solzhenitsyn, Sartre, and Havel, and he easily ranks with all of them in influence. It was Sayyid Qutb who fused together the core elements of modern Islamism.... Qutb concluded that the unity of God and His sovereignty meant that human rule – government legislates its own behavior – is illegitimate.

Muslims must answer to God alone." [Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America* (New York: Random House, 2002) p. 62] ISBN 0812969847. This point is central to most modern Islamists, in their assertion that all forms of governance over Muslims are illegitimate except the Islamic state Khilafah.

One of Qutb's main ideas was applying the term Jahiliyya, which originally referred to humanity's state of ignorance before the revelation of Islam, to modern-day Muslim societies. In his view, turning away from Islamic law and Islamic values under the influence of European imperialism had left the Muslim world in a condition of debased ignorance, similar to that of the pre-Islamic era (or Jahiliyya).

The conditions he experienced in prison, it has been argued, pushed Qutb to the conclusion that the Egyptian state was totally illegitimate. Violence against the inmates was commonplace. Sometimes this took the form of torture, but it once climaxed in the murder of 23 Muslim Brothers and the wounding of 46 after a protest in which they refused to perform hard labor. This incident, according to some, transformed Qutb's view of the Nasser government, which he considered to be unparalleled in its cruelty. His radicalization culminated in a little book published in 1964 which was based on the ideas he had written in notes and letters during his time in prison. This is the famous *Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq*.

Qutb was let out of prison at the end of 1964 at the behest of the then Prime Minister of Iraq, Abdul Salam Arif, for only 8 months before being rearrested in August 1965. He was accused of plotting to overthrow the state and subjected to what some consider a show trial which culminated in a death sentence for him and six other members of the Muslim Brotherhood. On 29 August 1966, Sayyid Qutb was executed by hanging.

His brother, Muhammad Qutb, moved to Saudi Arabia where he

became a Professor of Islamic Studies. One of Muhammad Qutb's students and ardent followers was Ayman Zawahiri, who was to become the mentor of Osama bin Laden.

Literary works:

- *Mahammad ash-Sha'ir fi-l-hayat wa-shi'r al-jil al-hadir*, 1933
- *ash-Shati al-majhul*, 1935
- *al-Taswir al-Fanni fi-l-Qur'an* (Artistic Representation in the Qur'an), 1944/45
- *Tifl min al-qarya* (A Child from the Village -- an autobiographical work), 1946

Theoretical works:

- *Al-'adala al-Ijtima'iyya fi-l-Islam* (Social Justice in Islam), 1949, his first theoretical work
- *Fi zilal al-Qur'an* (In the Shade of the Qur'an), 1954, commentary of the Qur'an in 30 volumes, his most important theoretical work. In 1960, a revised edition started to appear which was to remain uncompleted; the last volume appeared in 1964. The commentary is interesting in so far as it is rather innovative in its methodical approach, borrowing heavily from the method of literary interpretation developed by Amin al-Khuli, while retaining some structural features of classical commentaries (for example, the principle of progressing from the first sura to the last).
- *Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq* (Signposts on the Road, or Milestones), 1964, Qutb's best known work, regarded by some as "in many ways mark the beginnings of modern political Islam"

SEE ALSO

- Egyptian Islamic Jihad
- Hasan al-Banna
- Yusuf al-Qaradawi
- Islamism
- Qur'an
- Shari'a
- Hadith
- Jahiliyyah
- Jamaat-e-Islami
- Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
- Khurshid Ahmad
- Note on Salafi vs. Wahabi vs. Qutubi at Salafi


REFERENCES

- Shepard, William E., *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism. A Translation and Critical Analysis of "Social Justice in Islam"*, Leiden 1996
- Haddad, Yvonne Y., "Sayyid Qutb: ideologue of Islamic revival", in Esposito, J. (ed.), *Voices of the Islamic Revolution*, New York 1983

EXTERNAL LINKS

- Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*
(http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/milestones/index_2.asp).
- Paul Berman, The Philosopher of Islamic Terror
(<http://members.cox.net/slsturgi3/PhilosopherOfIslamicTerror.htm>)
New York Times Magazine (March 23, 2003).
- Robert Irwin, Is this the man who inspired Bin Laden?
(<http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,584478,00.html>)
The Guardian (November 1, 2001).
- Sayyid Qutb's America
(<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1253796>) from NPR's *All Things Considered* (May 6, 2003).

POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 9:22 PM | 5

COMMENTS 

Liberal movements within Islam

REFORM, NOT SCHISM

It should be noted that these are movements *within* Islam, rather than an attempt at schism. As such, they believe in the basic tenets of Islam, such as the Six Elements of Belief and the Five Pillars of Islam. They consider their views to be fully compatible with the teachings of Islam. Their main difference with more conservative Islamic opinion is in differences of *interpretation* of how to apply the core Islamic values to modern life.

It should be further noted that the liberal Muslim's focus on individual interpretation and ethics, rather than on the literal word of scripture, may have an antecedent in the Sufi tradition of Islamic mysticism.

CONTEMPORARY AND CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

Over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, in accordance with their increasingly modern societies and outlooks, liberal Muslims have tended to reinterpret many aspects of their religion. This is particularly true of Muslims who now find themselves living in non-Muslim countries. Such people may describe themselves variously as liberal, progressive or reformist; but rather than implying a specific agenda, these terms tend to incorporate a broad spectrum of views which contest medievalist and traditional interpretations of Islam in many different ways.

Although there is no full consensus amongst liberal Muslims on their views, they tend to agree on some or all of the following beliefs:

- Most liberal Muslims consider Islam's notion of absolute equality of all humanity to be one of its central concepts. Human rights is thus a major concern for most liberals. Many Muslim majority countries have signed international human rights treaties, but the impact of these largely remains to be seen in local legal systems. The Qur'anic story of Adam is sometimes interpreted to support human rights.
- Feminism is likewise a major issue. For this reason, liberal Muslims are often critical of traditional Islamic laws which allow polygamy for men but not women. It is also accepted by most liberal Muslims that a woman may lead the state, and that women should not be segregated from men in society or in mosques. Many liberal Muslims accept that a woman may lead group prayers, despite the custom for women to pray behind or in a balcony, able to see men but not be seen themselves. However, this issue remains controversial; see Women as imams. Some Muslim feminists are also opposed to the traditional requirements of the veil (commonly called hijab), claiming that any modest clothing is sufficiently Islamic for both men and women.
- Many liberal Muslims favor the idea of modern democracy

with separation of church and state, and thus support secular governments. The existence or applicability of Islamic law is thus questioned by liberals. Their argument often involves variants of the Mu'tazili theory that the Qur'an is created by God for the particular circumstances of the early Muslim community, and reason must be used to apply it to new contexts.

- This means that liberal Muslims often drop traditional interpretations of the Qur'an which they find too conservative, preferring instead readings which are more adaptable to modern society. Most liberal Muslims reject derivation of Islamic laws from literal readings of single Qur'anic verses. They generally claim that a holistic view which takes into account the 7th century Arabian cultural context negates such literal interpretations. For example, some liberals may tolerate homosexuality even though conservatives forbid it. However, this topic remains highly controversial even amongst Muslim liberals; see Islamic views of homosexuality.
- The reliability and applicability of Hadith literature is questioned by liberals, as much of traditional Islamic law derives from it.
- Most liberal Muslims consequently do not believe in the authority of traditional scholars to issue a fatwa, since they generally favour the individual's ability to interpret Islamic sacred texts on their own.
- Tolerance is another major issue. Liberal Muslims are generally open to interfaith dialogue and differences, particularly in the case of the Ahmadi and other controversies with Jews, Christians, Hindus, etc.
- Liberal Muslims also tend to oppose the idea of jihad as armed struggle, and tend to prefer ideals such as non-violence. The Qur'anic figure of Abel seems to support the idea that anyone who dies as a result of refusing to commit violence is forgiven of their sins.
- Liberal Muslims tend to be skeptical about the validity of Islamization of knowledge (including Islamic economics, Islamic science and Islamic philosophy) as separate from mainstream fields of enquiry. This is usually due to the often secular outlook of Muslim liberals, which makes them more disposed to trust mainstream secular scholarship. They may also regard the propagation of these fields as merely a propaganda move by Muslim conservatives.
- Liberals are also less likely to treat Qur'anic narratives of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Jesus and other prophets of Islam as historical fact. Instead some liberals view these as moral stories meant to reinforce the ethical message of Islam. Such liberals tend to accept scientific ideas such as evolution and secular history, and are generally opposed to the idea of

Islamic history.

IN NORTH AMERICA

The launch of the Progressive Muslim Union of North America (<http://www.pmuna.org/>) (PMUNA) in October 2004 exposed fissures within the liberal and progressive movements. On the one hand, PMUNA has come under fire from Muslims on the left; they tended to believe the organization failed to sufficiently distance itself from a U.S.-centric and neoconservative-inspired imperialist agenda, which seeks to define an "acceptable" Muslim as a liberal, pro-American and uncritical of Israel. On the other progressive Muslims with more traditional leanings criticize links between PMUNA and the controversial Muslim Wake Up! (<http://www.muslimwakeup.com/>) website, which supported the French hijab ban and carries articles hostile to the conservative Muslim perspective.

These differences came to head in March 2005, when PMUNA/MWU sponsored a mixed-gender Jummah led by a woman, Professor Amina Wadud of Victoria Commonwealth University. Opponents of this heavily publicised event argue that reform should be restricted to social matters, and that matters of worship (ibadah) are not open to reform.

ISLAM AND ANARCHISM.

In the last few years, there has been talk knocking about on the idea of Islamic Anarchism, primarily from the US-based punk Muslim Michael Knight (http://www.muslimwakeup.com/events/archives/2005/02/mike_knight_on.php). But there has been sparse evidence of any coherent online presence of Muslim Anarchists, until June 20th, 2005, when Yakoub Islam, a British-based Muslim, published his online Muslim Anarchist Charter (<http://www.bayyinah.org.uk/manarchist.htm>).

The charter asserted a set of basic principles for Anarchist thought and action founded on a Muslim perspective. These reaffirm some

of the core principles of Islam, including a belief in God, the Prophecy of Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the human soul, but assert the possibility that a Muslim's spiritual path might be achieved by refusing to compromise with institutional power in any form, be it judicial, religious, social, corporate or political. Muslims are thus challenged to establish a society where spiritual growth is "uninhibited by tyranny, poverty and ignorance". It is in the fervent assertion of the principle of no compromise, driven by a utopian vision of humanity living in peace and co-operation, that the faith of Islam and the politics of Anarchism are said to meet.

Yakoub, formerly Julian Anderson, originally discovered Anarchism in the 1980s through the works of the punk band CRASS, but distanced himself from the anti-religious, drug-enfeebled British punk Muslim scene in the late 1980s to explore academic learning, eventually converting to Islam in 1991. A lack of commitment and understanding saw him retreat from religious practice during 1990s, returning to Islam only at the turn of the Millennium when he began working with Muslim children in inner city schools. Over the last 18 months, Yakoub has become an increasingly visible cyber activist at the same time as caring for his 12 year old son, who is profoundly autistic.

Almost from the beginning of his journey into the Muslim faith, Yakoub was disturbed by the authoritarianism dogging much Islamic thought and practice. After discovering the writings of the radical progressive Muslim Farid Esack (<http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/>), Yakoub began to explore anti-authoritarian interpretations of Islam, and consequently initiated an online project based on Carolyn Ellis's (<http://sobek.colorado.edu/SOC/SI/si-ellis.htm>) concept of autoethnography called TGP (<http://www.bayyinat.org.uk/tgpex.htm>).

Yakoub is cautious in describing himself as a Muslim Anarchist (or an Anarchist Muslim), rather than talking about Islamic

Anarchism, because the evidence from social research points to a considerable diversity within the Muslim community or ummah, with some anthropologists reluctant to talk about a single 'Islam'. Neither is there, of course, a single 'Anarchism', and the publication of the Muslim Anarchist charter marks the beginning of an intellectual and political discussion, rather than the creation of a new political or religious ideology, insha Allah.

SEE ALSO

- Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan
- Muhammad Ali of Egypt
- Modern Islamic philosophy
- Liberal Christianity
- Reform Judaism
- Woman imam
- 99 Precepts
- Islam SyariaatSh. Nadzir As Saghir

EXTERNAL LINKS


- International Coalition Against Political Islam (<http://www.icapi.org>)
- No to Political Islam (<http://www.ntpi.org>)
- Progressive Muslim Union (<http://pmuna.org/>) of North America
- Muslim Wake Up! (<http://muslimwakeup.com/index.php>)
Online progressive Muslim magazine
- alt.muslim (<http://www.altmuslim.com>) Progressive Muslim news forum
- LiberalIslam.net (<http://www.liberalislam.net/>) by Zeeshan Hasan
- Ijtihad.org (<http://www.ijtihad.org/>) by Muqtedar Khan
- AMILA (<http://www.amila.org/>) American Muslims Intent on Learning and Activism
- QALANDAR Islam and Interfaith Relations in South Asia (<http://www.islaminterfaith.org/>) by Yoginder Sikand
- Islamic Liberal group (<http://www.islamlib.com/en/page.php>) website from Indonesia
- Charles Kurzman's Liberal Islam links (<http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman/LiberalIslamLinks.htm>)
compiled by the author of *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* (published 1998 by Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN 0195116224).
- Muslim Refusenik (<http://www.muslim-refusenik.com>) website of Irshad Manji, author of "The Trouble with Islam."

- Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (<http://www.cis-ca.org/voices/k/sydkhn.htm>)
- Muhammad Ali of Egypt (<http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0834351.html>)
- Al-Fatiha Foundation (<http://www.al-fatiha.net>) dedicated to lesbian, gay and bisexual Muslims.
- Free Muslims Against Terrorism (<http://www.freemuslims.org>)
- Tasneem Project -TGP (<http://www.bayyinat.org.uk/index.html>) Yakoub Islam's Anarchist Muslim website.
- *Under the Cover of Islam* (<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/18/opinion/18manji.html?ex=1258520400&en=61d49ccf6bb1077f&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland>) - A New York Times op-ed by Irshad Manji about Liberal Islam in North America and Europe.
- "'I Exist' and 'In the Name of Allah': Documentaries on Gay and Lesbian Arabs and Muslims" (<http://montages.blogspot.com/2005/01/i-exist-and-in-name-of-allah.html>)

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- *Unveiling Traditions: Postcolonial Islam in a Polycentric World* by Anouar Majid
- *Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism* by Farid Esack
- *The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought*, by Mohammed Arkoun
- *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* Edited by Charles Kurzman
- *Revival and Reform in Islam* by Fazlur Rahman
- *American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom* by M. A. Muqtadar Khan. <http://www.ijtihad.org/book1.htm>

POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 9:21 PM | 0

COMMENTS 

What is Islamic Philosophy?

Islamic philosophy is the attempt to fuse the fields of philosophy with the religious teachings of Islam.

As with any fusion of religion and philosophy, the attempt is difficult because classical philosophers start with no

preconditions for which conclusions they must reach in their investigation, while classical religious believers have a set of religious principles of faith that they hold one must believe. Indeed, due to these divergent goals and views, some hold that one cannot simultaneously be a philosopher and a true adherent of Islam, which is believed to be a revealed religion by its adherents. In this view, all attempts at synthesis ultimately must fail.

Others, however, hold that a synthesis between Islam and philosophy is possible. One way to find a synthesis is to use philosophical arguments to prove that one's preset religious principles are true. This is a common technique found in the writings of many religious traditions, including Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but this is not generally accepted as true philosophy by philosophers. Another way to find a synthesis is to abstain from holding as true any religious principles of one's faith at all, unless one independently comes to those conclusions from a philosophical analysis. However, this is not generally accepted as being faithful to one's religion by adherents of that religion. A third, rarer and more difficult path is to apply analytical philosophy to one's own religion. In this case a religious person would also be a philosopher, by asking questions such as:

- What is the nature of God? How do we know that God exists?
- What is the nature of revelation? How do we know that God reveals his will to mankind?
- Which of our religious traditions must be interpreted literally?
- Which of our religious traditions must be interpreted allegorically?
- What must one actually believe to be considered a true adherent of our religion?
- How can one reconcile the findings of philosophy with religion?
- How can one reconcile the findings of science with religion?

This is the task of Islamic philosophy.

INTRODUCTION

This idea of Islamic philosophy dates from the appearance of dissenting sects in Islam. A century had hardly elapsed after the life of Muhammad (known as the *sira*) when religious schisms began to arise.

At this point readers may want to review early Muslim philosophy.

FORMATIVE INFLUENCES

Islamic philosophy as the name implies refers to Philosophical activity within the Islamic Mileau. The main sources of classical or early Islamic Philosophy are the religion of Islam itself, the Greek Philosophical heritage which the early Muslims inherited as a result of conquests when Alexandria, Syria and Jundishapur came under Muslim rule. Many of the early philosophical debates centered around reconciling religion and reason. The latter being exemplified by Greek Philosophy.

THE CLASSICAL PERIOD

Independent minds exploiting the methods of *ijtihad* sought to investigate the doctrines of the Qur'an, which until then had been accepted in blind faith on the authority of divine revelation. The first independent protest was that of the *Kadar* (Arabic: *kadara*, to have power), whose partisans affirmed the freedom of the will, in contrast with the *Jabarites* (*jabar*, force, constraint), who maintained the belief in fatalism.

In the second century of the Hegira, a schism arose in the theological schools of Basra. A pupil, Wasil ibn Atha, who was expelled from the school because his answers were contrary to then orthodox Islamic tradition, proclaimed himself leader of a new school, and systematized the radical opinions of preceding sects, particularly those of the Kadarites. This new school or sect was called *Mutazilite* or *Motazilite* (from *itazala*, to separate oneself, to dissent). Its principal dogmas were three:

1. God is an absolute unity, and no attribute can be ascribed to Him.
2. Man is a free agent. It is on account of these two principles that the Motazilites designate themselves the "Partisans of Justice and Unity".
3. All knowledge necessary for the salvation of man emanates from his reason; humans could acquire knowledge before, as well as after, Revelation, by the sole light of reason. This fact makes knowledge obligatory upon all men, at all times, and in all places.

The Motazilites, compelled to defend their principles against the orthodox Islam of their day, looked for support in philosophy, and founded a rational theology called "Ilm-al-Kalam" (Science of the Word); those professing it were called Motekallamin. This appellation, originally designating the Motazilites, soon became the common name for all seeking philosophical demonstration in confirmation of religious principles. The first Motekallamin had to combat both the orthodox and the infidel parties, between whom they occupied the middle ground; but the efforts of subsequent generations were entirely concentrated against the philosophers.

From the ninth century onward, owing to Calif al-Ma'mun and his successor, Greek philosophy was introduced among the Persians and Arabs, and the Peripatetic school began to find able representatives among them; such were Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina(Avicinna), and Ibn Rushd(Averroës), all of whose fundamental principles were considered as heresies by the Motekallamin.

During the Abbasid caliphate a number of thinkers and scientists, many of them non-Muslims or heretical Muslims, played a role in transmitting Greek, Hindu, and other pre-Islamic knowledge to the Christian West. They contributed to making Aristotle known in Christian Europe. Three speculative thinkers, the Persians, al-Farabi, and Avicenna, and Arab thinker, al-Kindi combined Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism with other ideas introduced through Islam. They were highly unorthodox and it is open to question whether they could be considered Islamic philosophers.

From Spain the Arabic philosophic literature was translated into Hebrew and Latin, contributing to the development of modern European philosophy. The Egyptian philosophers Moses Maimonides (who was Jewish) and Ibn Khaldun were also important.

Aristotle attempted to demonstrate the unity of God; but from the view which he maintained, that matter was eternal, it followed that God could not be the Creator of the world. To assert that God's knowledge extends only to the general laws of the universe, and not to individual and accidental things, is tantamount to denying prophecy. One other point shocked the faith of the Motekallamin — the theory of the intellect. The Peripatetics taught that the human soul was only an aptitude — a faculty capable of attaining every variety of passive perfection — and that through information and virtue it became qualified for union with the active intellect, which latter emanates from God. To admit this theory would be to deny the immortality of the soul.

Wherefore the Motekallamin had, before anything else, to establish a system of philosophy to demonstrate the creation of matter, and they adopted to that end the theory of atoms as enunciated by Democritus. They taught that atoms possess neither quantity nor extension. Originally atoms were created by God, and are created now as occasion seems to require. Bodies come into existence or die, through the aggregation or the sunderance of these atoms. But this theory did not remove the objections of philosophy to a creation of matter.

For, indeed, if it be supposed that God commenced His work at a certain definite time by His "will," and for a certain definite object, it must be admitted that He was imperfect before accomplishing His will, or before attaining His object. In order to obviate this difficulty, the Motekallamin extended their theory of the atoms to Time, and claimed that just as Space is constituted of atoms and vacuum, Time, likewise, is constituted of small indivisible moments. The creation of the world once established, it was an

easy matter for them to demonstrate the existence of a Creator, and that God is unique, omnipotent, and omniscient.

The oldest religio-philosophical work preserved is that of the Jewish philosopher Saadia Gaon (892-942), *Emunot ve-Deot*, "The Book of Beliefs and Opinions". In this work Saadia treats the questions that interested the Motekallamim, such as the creation of matter, the unity of God, the divine attributes, the soul, etc. Saadia criticizes other philosophers severely. For Saadia there was no problem as to creation: God created the world *ex nihilo*, just as the Bible attests; and he contests the theory of the Motekallamin in reference to atoms, which theory, he declares, is just as contrary to reason and religion as the theory of the philosophers professing the eternity of matter.

To prove the unity of God, Saadia uses the demonstrations of the Motekallamin. Only the attributes of essence (*sifat-al-datiat*) can be ascribed to God, but not the attributes of action (*sifat-al-af'aliyat*). The soul is a substance more delicate even than that of the celestial spheres. Here Saadia controverts the Motekallamin, who considered the soul an "accident" (compare "Moreh," i. 74), and employs the following one of their premises to justify his position: "Only a substance can be the substratum of an accident" (that is, of a non-essential property of things). Saadia argues: "If the soul be an accident only, it can itself have no such accidents as wisdom, joy, love," etc. Saadia was thus in every way a supporter of the Kalam; and if at times he deviated from its doctrines, it was owing to his religious views; just as the Jewish and Moslem Peripatetics stopped short in their respective Aristotelianism whenever there was danger of wounding orthodox religion.

The twelfth century saw the apotheosis of pure philosophy and the decline of the Kalam, which latter, being attacked by both the philosophers and the orthodox, perished for lack of champions. This supreme exaltation of philosophy was due, in great measure, to Ghazali (1005-1111) among the Persians, and to Judah ha-Levi

(1140) among the Jews. In fact, the attacks directed against the philosophers by Ghazali in his work, "Tuhfat al-Falasafa" (The Destruction of the Philosophers), not only produced, by reaction, a current favorable to philosophy, but induced the philosophers themselves to profit by his criticism, they thereafter making their theories clearer and their logic closer. The influence of this reaction brought forth the two greatest philosophers that the Islamic Peripatetic school ever produced, namely, Ibn Baja (Aven Pace) and Ibn Roshd (Averroes), both of whom undertook the defense of philosophy.

Since no idea and no literary or philosophical movement ever germinated on Persian or Arabian soil without leaving its impress on the Jews, the Persian Ghazali found an imitator in the person of Judah ha-Levi. This poet took upon himself to free his religion from what he saw as the shackles of speculative philosophy, and to this end wrote the "Kuzari," in which he sought to discredit all schools of philosophy alike. He passes severe censure upon the Motekallamin for seeking to support religion by philosophy. He says, "I consider him to have attained the highest degree of perfection who is convinced of religious truths without having scrutinized them and reasoned over them" ("Kuzari," v.). Then he reduced the chief propositions of the Motekallamin, to prove the unity of God, to ten in number, describing them at length, and concluding in these terms: "Does the Kalam give us more information concerning God and His attributes than the prophet did?" (Ib. iii. and iv.) Aristotelianism finds no favor in Judah ha-Levi's eyes, for it is no less given to details and criticism; Neoplatonism alone suited him somewhat, owing to its appeal to his poetic temperament.

Ibn Rushd (or Ibn Roshd or Averroës), the contemporary of Maimonides, closed the first great philosophical era of the Muslims. The boldness of this great commentator of Aristotle aroused the full fury of the orthodox, who, in their zeal, attacked all philosophers indiscriminately, and had all philosophical

writings committed to the flames. The theories of Ibn Roshd do not differ fundamentally from those of Ibn Baja and Ibn Tufail, who only follow the teachings of Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi. Like all Islamic Peripatetics, Ibn Roshd admits the hypothesis of the intelligence of the spheres and the hypothesis of universal emanation, through which motion is communicated from place to place to all parts of the universe as far as the supreme world—hypotheses which, in the mind of the Arabic philosophers, did away with the dualism involved in Aristotle's doctrine of pure energy and eternal matter.

But while Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and other Persian and Muslim philosophers hurried, so to speak, over subjects that trenched on religious dogmas, Ibn Roshd delighted in dwelling upon them with full particularity and stress. Thus he says, "Not only is matter eternal, but form is potentially inherent in matter; otherwise, it were a creation *ex nihilo* (Munk, "Mélanges," p. 444). According to this theory, therefore, the existence of this world is not only a possibility, as Ibn Sina declared—in order to make concessions to the orthodox—but also a necessity.

Driven from the Islamic schools, Islamic philosophy found a refuge with the Jews, to whom belongs the honor of having transmitted it to the Christian world. A series of eminent men—such as the Ibn Tibbons, Narboni, Gersonides—joined in translating the Arabic philosophical works into Hebrew and commenting upon them. The works of Ibn Roshd especially became the subject of their study, due in great measure to Maimonides, who, in a letter addressed to his pupil Joseph ibn Aknin, spoke in the highest terms of Ibn Roshd's commentary.

LATER MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY

The death of Ibn Roshd effectively marks the end of the classical or early era of Islamic philosophy. Philosophical activity declined significantly in the Islamic lands in the West namely in Spain and North Africa though it held for much longer in the Eastern lands

like Iran. The most notable luminary of the later period is Ibn Khaldun who put forward one of the first systematic philosophies of history. Mulla Sadra (1571-1637) also known as Sadr al-Din Shirazi was the most significant in terms of influence on Islamic Philosophy in Persia in the later period. Mulla Sadr synthesized the Philosophies of Ibn Sina, Sehrawardi and Ibn Arabi. The Iraninan Philosopher Hadi Ibn Mahdi Sabzawari was also deeply influenced by Mulla Sadra.

MODERN MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY

Modern Islamic philosophy seeks in some respects to renew the dialogue between Mutazilite and Asharite views about ethics in knowledge. An example is the Islamization of knowledge, and the view of khalifa of Seyyed Hossein Nasr. There is a separate article on these new trends.

SEE ALSO

- Islam
- philosophy
- Modern Islamic philosophy

POSTED BY INSHALLASHAHEED AT 9:20 PM | 7

COMMENTS 

Sociology of knowledge

The **sociology of knowledge** is the study of the social origins of ideas, and of the effects prevailing ideas have on societies.
(Compare history of ideas.)

The term first came into widespread use in the 1920s, when a number of German-speaking sociologists wrote extensively on it, notably Max Scheler, and Karl Mannheim with *Ideology and Utopia*. With the dominance of functionalism through the middle years of the 20th century, the sociology of knowledge tended to remain on the periphery of mainstream sociological thought. It was largely reinvented and applied much more closely to

everyday life in the 1960s, particularly by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in *The social construction of reality* (1966) and is still central for methods dealing with qualitative understanding of human society. Compare socially constructed reality.

Although very influential within modern sociology, the sociology of knowledge can claim its most significant impact on science more generally through its contribution to debate and understanding of the nature of science itself, most notably through the work of Thomas Kuhn on *The structure of scientific revolutions* (see also: paradigm).

SCHOOLS

Karl Mannheim

The German political philosophers Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) argued in *Die Deutsche Ideologie* (1846, *German Ideology*) and elsewhere that people's ideologies, including their social and political beliefs and opinions, are rooted in their class interests, and more generally in the social and economic circumstances in which they live: "It is men, who in developing their material inter-course, change, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life" (*Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* 1/5).

Under the influence of this doctrine, and of Phenomenology, the Hungarian-born German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) gave impetus to the growth of the sociology of knowledge with his *Ideologie und Utopie* (1929, translated and extended in 1936 as *Ideology and Utopia*), although the term had been introduced five years earlier by the co-founder of the movement, the German philosopher and social theorist Max Scheler (1874–1928), in *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens* (1924, *Attempts at a Sociology of Knowledge*). A strong interpretation claims that all knowledge and beliefs are the products of socio-political forces, but this version is self-defeating, because if it is true, then it too is

merely a product of socio-political forces and has no claim to truth and no persuasive force. Mannheim sought to escape this paradox by exempting free-floating intellectuals, whom he claimed were only loosely anchored in social traditions, relatively detached from the class system, and capable of avoiding the pitfalls of total ideologies and of forging a "dynamic synthesis" of the ideologies of other groups.

See also: epistemology, sociology.

Phenomenological sociology

to be written

Michel Foucault

A particularly important strain of the sociology of knowledge is the criticism by Michel Foucault. In *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, 1961, he argued that conceptions of madness and what was considered "reason" or "knowledge" was itself subject to major culture bias - in this respect mirroring similar criticisms by Thomas Szasz, at the time the foremost critic of psychiatry, and himself now an eminent psychiatrist. A point where Foucault and Szasz agreed was that sociological processes played the major role in defining "madness" as an "illness" and prescribing "cures".

In *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, 1963, Foucault extended his critique to all of modern scientific medicine, arguing for the central conceptual metaphor of "The Gaze", which had implications for medical education, prison design, and the carceral state as understood today. Concepts of criminal justice and its intersection with medicine were better developed in this work than in Szasz and others, who confined their critique to current psychiatric practice.

Finally, in *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, 1966, and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 1969, Foucault

introduced the abstract notions of mathesis and taxonomia. These, he claimed, had transformed 17th and 18th century studies of "general grammar" into modern "linguistics", "natural history" into modern "biology", and "analysis of wealth" into modern "economics". Not, claimed Foucault, without loss of meaning. The 19th century had transformed what knowledge was.

Perhaps Foucault's best-known and most controversial claim was that before the 18th century, "Man did not exist". The notions of humanity and of humanism were inventions or creations of this 19th century transformation. Accordingly, a cognitive bias had been introduced unwittingly into science, by over-trusting the individual doctor or scientist's ability to see and state things objectively. This study still guides the sociology of knowledge and has been claimed to have sparked single-handedly much of postmodernism.

Bruno Latour

Bruno Latour is a French sociologist of science best known for his books *We Have Never Been Modern*, *Laboratory Life*, and *Science in Action*, describing the process of scientific research from the perspective of social construction based on field observations of working scientists.

The sociology of mathematical knowledge

Studies of mathematical practice and quasi-empiricism in mathematics are also rightly part of the sociology of knowledge, since they focus on the community of those who practice mathematics and their common assumptions. Since Eugene Wigner raised the issue in 1960 and Hilary Putnam made it more rigorous in 1975, the question of why fields such as physics and mathematics should agree so well has been in question. Proposed solutions point out that the fundamental constituents of mathematical thought, space, form-structure, and number-proportion are also the fundamental constituents of physics. It is

also worthwhile to note that physics is nothing but a modeling of reality, and seeing causal relationships governing repeatable observed phenomena, and much of mathematics has been developed precisely for the goal of developing these models in a rigorous fashion. Another approach is to suggest that there is no deep problem, that the division of human scientific thinking through using words such as 'mathematics' and 'physics' is only useful in their practical everyday function to categorify and distinguish.

Fundamental contributions to the sociology of mathematical knowledge have been made by Sal Restivo and David Bloor. Restivo draws upon the work of scholars such as Oswald Spengler (The Decline of the West, 1926), Raymond L. Wilder and Lesley A. White, as well as contemporary sociologists of knowledge and science studies scholars. David Bloor draws upon Ludwig Wittgenstein and other contemporary thinkers. They both claim that mathematical knowledge is socially constructed and has irreducible contingent and historical factors woven into it. More recently Paul Ernest has proposed a social constructivist account of mathematical knowledge, drawing on the works of both of these sociologists.

An interesting artifact in the sociology of knowledge is the Erdős number (the length of the smallest path in the network of all mathematicians to Paul Erdős).

SEE ALSO

- Sociology of scientific knowledge
- Knowledge Management

POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 9:18 PM | 1
COMMENTS 

Human Liberation - an Islamic Renaissance

MANKIND IS UNDER THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT SECULAR MEANS WILL BRING ABOUT PEACE IN THE WORLD WHILE TOTALLY NEGLECTING THE TRUE SPIRITUALITY WHICH CAN ONLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY A PEOPLE WHO WILL WORK TO RE-ESTABLISH THE COMPLETE REVOLUTION BROUGHT ABOUT BY PROPHET MUHAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM)!

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19, 2005

The destiny of Israel

The following article is written by a Journalist I know of and enjoy reading. In this article, he surrounds his arguments around Shaykh Imran N. Hosein's book, "Jerusalem in the Qur'an"... This article is *REALLY* good:

The destiny of Israel

Abid Ullah Jan

http://www.icssa.org/Review_Jerusalrm.htm

We must realize that something horrible is in store for the world in which starving half a million children to death is a valid price but calling Israel an illegitimate and racist state has become the most serious crime.

Many would agree with the statement that it is highly unlikely that the Israeli oppression and unaccountability can continue for another 50 years before it faces the horrible consequences. But many would be surprised to know that it is matter of a few more years before Israel overtakes the US as a Ruling State, just as the US replaced England as a Ruling State at the end of World War 1.

Those of us who find this observation strange may not realize that we are passing through very strange times. Indications of the coming times are right before our eyes, for

example in finding one set of people not allowed to simply cover their head for it undermines secular values. Whereas another people are free to occupy land, subjugate native people, indiscriminately kill and expel those who do not share the same race, and engage in ethnic cleansing on the grounds of their distorted scriptures.

Another indication is helplessness of the whole world before the Israeli aggression, defiance, WMD and state terrorism. The question arises: Why has Israel been granted this special status and special support despite the world looking at its undeniable crimes with wide open eyes? Why other countries are punished with decades of genocidal sanctions, wars and occupations for far minor crimes than the Israeli government?

One can find answer to these and many similar questions in Jerusalem in the Qur'an by Imran N. Hosein. It is an amazing book, explaining not only the destiny of Jerusalem but also of Jews and Muslims and the rest of the world in an extremely broad perspective. We fail to find answers to such questions because we are lost in the distorted realities that revolve around ongoing events alone.

Jerusalem in the Qur'an shows us the future in a broader historical, religious perspective. The author proves his bold conclusions, such as that the Israel is close to replacing the US as a Ruling State, in a mathematical way. The book also brings forward many hidden aspects of the Qur'an that answers questions lurking in the minds of many Americans who truly love their country and many Muslims who are looking but at just part of the Divine knowledge. Extracting argument from the Qur'an and sayings of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the author proves that it is just a matter of time before the US taste the fruits of the American-Israeli obsession with the Holy Land. It is exactly same way in which England at its peak was strangely obsessed with the Holy Land. "The British people were themselves incapable of explaining this strange obsession," argues the author.

Jerusalem in the Qur'an explains the roots and consequences of this strange Euro-American obsession with the Holy Land. Using references from the Qur'an about behavior of the Jews, destiny of Jerusalem, and related prophecies, the author clearly shows how Israel — armed with enough WMD and supported by Euro-Jewish financiers and bankers — has it within its power to assume financial control of the world through the simple maneuver of causing the collapse of the US dollar. "When the US dollar goes down

This may be planned to synchronize with a spectacular Euro-Israeli display of military power in an attack on the Palestinians as well as neighboring Arab States." The author goes on: "Israel will then successfully defy the rest of the world in holding on to the fruits of its war and, in so doing, establish itself as the ruling power in the world. When that occurs it would most certainly appear to the Israeli-Jews (i.e., Banū Isrāīl) that they would be experiencing the return of the golden age, i.e., the age when Solomon's Israel ruled the world."

Author's open challenge to all

The story of the rise and fall of Jews and Muslims and the coming events is told in such an interesting and logical manner that one cannot help but sit and finish the whole book in a single go. Interestingly, the book throws an open challenge to both Muslims and non-Muslims. The challenge to Muslims is to "declare either that the Qur'an does not explain the return of the Jews to the Holy Land and the restoration of the State of Israel, or that there is a different explanation other than the one given in this book."


To non-Muslims the challenge is that if they "declare that they possess the Truth," they should "use that Truth to explain this subject." That appears to be the greatest importance of this book. It validates the Islamic claim to Truth! Let us take an example from the book.

According to the author, the strangest, most mysterious and most inexplicable events ever to have occurred in the religious history of mankind is the return of the Jews to the Holy Land to reclaim it as their own some 2000 years after they had been expelled by Allah.

At the very heart of the Qur'anic view in this regard is the declaration that when the final count-down in the Last Age arrives Jews would be gathered from the Diaspora in which they were broken up and dispersed, and to which they had been consigned, and would be brought back to the Holy Land as a 'mingled crowd' (Qur'an, 17:104). That Divine promise has already been fulfilled.

But before Banū Israel's final divine punishment takes place, there is great drama which is yet to unfold in the Holy Land and, indeed, in the world -- such as the establishment of the greater Israel, which the author calls the Ruling State. The Transfer of power from the US, in author's view, has already

Iraq and Afghanistan.



Furthermore, "Muslims have precise information of the moment in time when Jesus (sallallahu 'alaihi wa sallam), the Messiah, will return" and when "the Zionist-Jews will finally reach the supreme moment in their over-all strategy to get the Arabs to submit to Jewish rule in the Holy Land . "It will be when the water in the Sea in Galilee has almost dried up, or has dried up...That submission would imply their worship of the False Messiah rather than the worship of Allah Most High. They would be required to submit to Israel in order to get water from the desalinization plants that Israel would build. The Arabs would be too poor to be able to afford to buy water."

The book gives substantial references from the Qur'an and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad to prove this point along with the scientific reports which show that water in the Sea in Galilee is really drying up faster than expected. Furthermore, the author has made a commendable effort to present in the simple possible language the link between anti-Christ and Riba and between Gog and Magog in the light of Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) sayings.

It makes the book a great effort in the sense that it gathered scattered and often disregarded information for focusing on a specific subject with full force. It is highly unlikely that anyone who reads this book would have any doubt about the author's clarification of some very complex issues such as that of anti-Christ and what is in store for the world.

Zionist's reality

There is much talk about hidden power of the Zionists but no one has so far explained the historical and religious aspect of their actions and respective implication as Imran N. Hosein has done through an impartial analysis of all relevant religious and historical sources.

Even most of the Muslims have started making concessions to the Israeli claim that it has Biblical claims to the Holy Land. The author argues that the so-called defenders of Israel are the Zionists who "have essentially abandoned the ethical heart of the religion of Abraham (sallallahu 'alaihi wa sallam)." The author effectively proves that the Zionists amended Torah and declared many permissible as prohibited and vice versa. And finally they have imposed an "impostor Israel" instead of "real Israel".

The author asks whether the Zionists right to inherit the

Holy Land is unconditional. Would it still be valid if they establish a secular state and "their progeny were to abandon the religion of Abraham and the laws of Allah? ""We should note that the God of Abraham (‘alaihi al-Salām) prohibited the borrowing and lending of money on interest (Ribā). [1] The Jews changed the Torah to legalize the lending of money on interest to those who were not Jews. Not only is Ribā legal in the Holy Land today, but so are also many other things that were prohibited by Allah, Most High."

Before and after the formation of the State of Israel, Zionists have been engaged in injustice, oppression, tyranny and repression, while Abraham was clearly told that Allah's covenant of promise will not reach those of Abraham's offspring who commit acts of Dhulum (i.e., injustice, oppression, tyranny, repression, suppression) — Al-Qur'an, 2:124.

This is exactly how the Zionist-secular state of Israel is established and it continues to display the same behavior. And according to the Qur'an: "And We declared in the Zabur (i.e., the Psalms) which followed (Our declaration in) the Zikr (i.e., the Torah) that it is (only) those servants of Mine who are righteous in their conduct who would inherit the (Holy) Land." (Al-Qur'an, 21:105). The author thus proves that the Qur'an not only reaffirmed 'righteousness' as the condition for such inheritance (Sūrah al-Anbiyāh , 21:105), but went on to direct attention to the historical evidence that violation of that condition always resulted in Divine expulsion from the (Holy) Land.

The book gives numerous examples from the Israeli press to show that it is a godless and oppressive system which has nothing to do with the re-establishment of ancient Israel and the law of Abraham. One of the example from the horse's mouth is an editorial in the Jerusalem Post which has this to say: For too many Israelis, Jewishness has become an archaic, primitive, and irrelevant system that competes for power and funding, and even a source of embarrassment for an intellectually-oriented modern society (Jerusalem Post, September 12, 2000).

Zionist Strategy

The author distinguishes between the key roles of the Israelite or Sephardic Jews (descendents of Prophet Isaac), and the Jews of European origin. It is the Zionists from Europe who distorted scriptures from the Torah and Bible to justify their crimes and to motivate the Jews to establish a State of Israel that extends from the Nile to the Euphrates

with Jerusalem as its capital.

According to the author the Zionists exploited "every single lie that was put into the Bible by embellishing those lies with a mountain of more lies." They worked with the corrupt ruling Arab elites to make their client states recognize Israel and then abandon them at an appropriate time. "This Jewish-Arab (elite) strategy has today reached an advanced stage of implementation. ... Indeed the strategy of abandoning that Arab elite has already begun."

Here the author also proves that well according to the prayers of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) the strategy did not work out in Syria and Yemen. [2]

The book is actually partly written in response to the Zionists lies promoted by spokespersons, such as Daniel Pipes, who in his July 21, 2000 article in LA Times attempted to dismiss any Islamic claim to Jerusalem by declaring of Jerusalem, among other things, that: "It is not once mentioned in the Qur'ān or in the liturgy". The way Imran N. Hosein collected different pieces of history and linked them like beads through the message of the Qur'an with respect to Jerusalem is enough to leave Pipes speechless.

The reason Zionists ignore even those portions of the Qur'an which mention that Holy Land was given to Jews (5:24-6; Again it amazes me that Jewish and Zionist scholarship should so studiously have avoided quoting these plain statements in which the Qur'ān declared that the Holy Land was given to the Jews (5:24-6; 17:103-104 and 7:137) is because the Qur'an also "offers an explanation for that strange behavior. The explanation resides in their reluctance to reveal the corruption of the divine conditions in the Torah which Allah Most High had ordained for inheritance of the Holy Land . The fraud in the rewritten Torah is exposed in the Qur'ān."

So the Zionist dream of liberating the Holy Land from Gentiles and restoring the State of Israel is well on the way to realization. The author predicts that the Temple would be reconstructed for the Jewish worship. Even as we are writing this review, the news arrived that a Zionist in the US has donated \$10 million and Israeli government is on the way to dig another tunnel under Masjid al-Aqsa — a step in the direction of fulfilling the long awaited dream to demolishing the Masjid and reconstructing the Temple (Masjid) of Solomon (alaihi al-Salām).

Since the Zionists will achieve all these apparent successes in the most inhuman manner, the author digs out references

from the Qur'an that after expelling the rebellious Jews out of the Holy Land for the second time, Allah declared His intention to keep on punishing them "if they kept on desecrating the Holy Land with violations of the condition of faith and righteous conduct. '....but if ye revert (to your violation of the condition imposed for inheritance of the Holy Land) We shall revert (to Our punishments. i.e., you will be expelled again and again)....' (Qur'an, Banū Israīl , 17:8)."

Keeping the apartheid and ethnic cleansing based racist policies of the Israeli state in mind, the author concludes that the destiny of "Jerusalem is plainly written in the above warning and firm declaration in the Qur'an. This remains so regardless of any...agreements negotiated in Camp David... resolution of the US Senate...[or] resolutions of the UN..."

Appearance vs. reality

Another beauty of the book is the author's skillful separation of appearances from the reality in the light of the Qur'an. It greatly assists readers in understanding the issues in which many Jews disagree. This work is a proof how the complex riddles of present day politics and international relation can never be understood without referring to the Qur'an which clearly states: "Verily the Qur'an explains to the Israelites most of the matters in which they disagree. And it certainly is a Guide and a Mercy to those who believe" (Al-Qur'an, 27:76-7). And Middle East is at the centre of a never ending problem.

Apparently most Jews have embraced Israel as the fulfillment of their greatest dream of returning to the Holy Land. It will soon become a Ruling State as no one can challenge it in any way. In the author's view, "The fact that they have been so utterly and completely deceived by the Impostor State of Israel is indicative of their continuing spiritual blindness."

The 'reality' from the Islamic point of view is that the Antichrist has deceived the Jews into believing that divine grace has brought them this close to the complete fulfillment of their greatest dream. The 'reality' is that their spiritual blindness has led them into a divine trap from which there is now no escape." The much dreaded and oft-repeated 'destruction of Israel' is its destiny.

Confirmation of the reality

Another beauty of this book is the seeming repetition at

some places. It, in fact, represented the extreme inter-connectedness and inescapable reality of history, scriptures and current affairs. The author hammers the nails of his argument from different directions until he conclusively proves his point of view.

In support of the above mentioned reality, the author brings forward a verse from the Holy Qur'an: "Allah has promised to those among you who believe (in Islām) and are righteous in conduct that He will surely cause them to inherit the land (i.e., the Holy Land), as He granted it to those before them (i.e., the Jews); that He will establish their religion (i.e., Islām) in authority (in the Holy Land), the (religion) which He has chosen for them (see Qur'ān, al-Maidah, 5:3); and that He will change (their state) after the fear in which they (lived) to one of security and peace: 'They will worship Me (alone) and not associate aught with Me.' If any do reject faith after this they are rebellious and wicked." (Qur'ān, al-Nūr , 24:55)

For explaining "the state of fear" in the above mentioned verse, the author refers to the "fear in which the believers [Muslims] live" and declares that "it must surely include the present awesome Israeli oppression in the Holy Land ."

Conclusion

In a world in which one cannot afford to call Israel a racist state, where one cannot survive without recognizing its "legitimacy", where anyone calling for Israel's destruction is branded as a terrorist who deserves to be thrown into the concentration camp at Guantanamo Bay, presenting an undeniable thesis of its destruction needs a lot of courage.

To convincingly present his thesis, the author proves authenticity of quotes from religious scriptures with references to history and current affairs. At the same time, he effectively explains historical and current events in the light of religious scriptures. He also quotes many verses from the Holy Qur'an and sayings of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) which many of the co-opting Muslims try to avoid. Such shying away on the part of Muslims leaves many of the Westerners — particularly the Americans who love their country and don't want to see it bleeding at the cost of propping Israel — ignorant of the Truth and unaware of the hard facts.

The reason Imran N. Hosein could say it all in his book Jerusalem in the Qur'an is simply that he is neither head of a client state nor a hand picked sheikh of Al-Azhar. He is not afraid of losing any title of fake Islamic scholarship. This

makes his in depth research into the divine scriptures, history and current affairs a valuable lesson for every human being on the face of earth.

Notes

[1] "Thou shalt not lend on interest to thy brother (Jew); whether it be lending money on interest, or lending commodities on interest (because commodities were sometimes used as money) or lending on interest anything which is lent on interest (i.e., anything which functions as money). Unto a stranger (i.e., one who is not a Jew) you may lend on interest..." (Deuteronomy , 23:19-20)

Their crimes also included: "This is why the wisdom of God said: I will send them Prophets and Messengers. Some they will kill and some they will persecute. It was that the blood of all the Prophets shed from the foundation of the world might be charged upon this generation (of Jews), from the blood of Abel down to the blood of Zakariah , who was slain between the altar and the House of God - yes, I tell you, it will all be charged upon this generation...." (Luke, 11:49-51)

[2] "Narrated by Ibn Umar : The Prophet (sallallahu 'alaihi wa sallam) said: O Allah! Bestow Your Blessings on our Sham (Syria) and our Yemen . People said: Our Najd (Najd is that part of Saudi Arabia from which the Saudi rulers have originated). The Prophet again said: O Allah! Bestow Your Blessings on our Sham and Yemen. They said again: Our Najd as well. On that the Prophet said: There will appear earthquakes and afflictions, and from there (i.e., Najd) will come out the side of the head of Satan ." (Sahih, Bukhari)

Abid Ullah Jan's latest book, The End of Democracy, has just been released in Canada.

POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 9:35 AM | 2
COMMENTS 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 2005

The Philosophy of a true Islamic Revolution

Assalam Alaikum Wa Rahmatullahi Wa Barakatuhu,

I hope all is well with you and your family.

My thoughts are now in the process of forcing my fingers to work. Unfortunately, I have to be very brief because I am extremely tired.

What is the Philosophy of most revolutions? I mean like deep down, their root, their motivating cause or source, their ideal?

99% of the time, the answer will be a reward awaiting in the life of this world. For Revolutions, the goal is to achieve domination, and for some, world domination. It is to have more power, more authority, more rights, more money and so on. If it is a group that has a political agenda or economist agenda, that will be their very ideal; to achieve that end.

What makes up the philosophy of a true Islamic Revolution? Is it to acquire more wealth? A higher status? More control?

The answer, interestingly, does not lie within the life of this world; rather, it lies within the life of the next world, the Hereafter. The Philosophy of a true Islamic Revolution would be to attain the ultimate pleasure of Allah (The Most High) by fulfilling the given priorities in their proper order; the ideal is *not* achieving Paradise or being saved from the Hellfire, rather, the ideal is *Allah* (The Most High) purely.

What are those priorities?

1. Iman (Spiritual Purification of the heart)
2. Ibadah (Total willingness to submit to the will of Allah [The Most High])
3. Shahadah 'Alan Naas (Bearing witness unto humanity this gift of Islam)
4. Iqamat ud Deen (Establishing this gift given to humanity, Islam)

These priorities, when put into action, completely revolutionize the individual. No longer will the being be distracted by the worldly temptations that Allah (The Most High) tests him or her with.

What happens when you fall for the temptations of this world?

Let's analyze a few examples, starting with alcohol:

1. It is a sweet drink, and is put in many foods.
2. However, the harm is greater than the benefit.
3. How? At least from a purely scientific point of view, alcohol can damage the brain and if one were to take it too

far, can make one drunk; and we know what all happens to one who gets drunk.

Adultery or Dating:

1. It is very tempting and feels good when fulfilled.
2. Former Pres. Clinton prophesized that this country will one day have the majority of its children born out of wedlock; and this is slowly occuring! This is why Bush is saying "Marriage! Marriage! Marriage!"
3. But aside from that, what is wrong with it? It is, in actuality, a very *evil* way of **using** someone; there is no guarantee that you will even marry that individual! So let's us say that Sally and Rob are dating. Few months later, they break up. Then Sally gets married to John. John finds out that Sally had an Ex-boyfriend and therefore, she had been *used*. From the perspective of a man, you would feel weird as hell when marrying a girl that already committed adultery with some dude you don't even know...
4. It can lead to rape; those are the words of your statistics, not me; 'Date Rape'.

There are actually a million examples, but like I said earlier, I am really tired. So I'll end this with a quote from the Qur'an:

And if you could see when the angels take away the souls of those who disbelieve (at death), they smite their faces and their backs, (saying): "*Taste the punishment of the blazing Fire!*" (8:50)

Indeed Allah (The Most High) Speaks the Truth!
take care,
Samir

POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 9:30 PM | 0
COMMENTS 

The Tsunami

Without a doubt, was the Tsunami a form of Allah (The Most High) communicating to the world, His unmatched power. Many people are grappling on how to view the recent Tsunami from a religious perspective, even within the Muslim community. I'll share with you one view, which is a dominant view amongst the Muslim Scholars of today. The

following article is written by a scholar I personally know of, so I can trust his words :)

Oh and by the way, if you are a non-Muslim and are about to read this, you might feel a bit weird because he is addressing religious Muslims here... Also, I don't necessarily agree with all of his views, but that's a very minor issue; I agree with mostly everything he says.

On a final note, you will notice he keeps referring back to his book, "Jerusalem in the Qur'an." If you are interested in reading this, you can ask me for it. Have fun :)

Samir

Ten Major Signs of the Last Day HAS ONE JUST OCCURRED?

Shaykh Imran N. Hosein
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• LAST DAY MEANS LAST AGE

The term 'Last Day' in Islam really stands for the 'Last Age', or the age which would culminate with the end of history -- when the true Messiah, Jesus, the son of Mary (not son of God), would return to rule the world from Jerusalem with justice and 'eternal' rule. It would be 'eternal' in the sense that history would end with that event. Life on earth beyond that event, and after Jesus (s) dies a human death and is buried next to Prophet Muhammad (s) in Madina, would not qualify as history. This would be so since the modern secular rope would have reached its predictable end in total godlessness and with such a consequent collapse of morals, and of moral consciousness, that people would forget their human status and "would engage in sexual intercourse in public like donkeys". Already it is quite clear (particularly at the time of Trinidad Carnival) that we are quite close to the fulfillment of that prophecy made by Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him and upon all other prophets). So much so, then, for the spurious claims of the one-eyed modern white western civilization and its colored 'house slaves' around the world, that mankind is witnessing unprecedented progress, that the present is the best of all ages, that the world keeps on growing better and better, and that modern white western civilization has rendered all previous civilizations, including Islam, moribund and obsolete.

Prophet Muhammad (s) prophesied many more signs of the Last Day other than public roadside 'donkey sex'. Most of these signs are known as the 'minor' signs. Let us describe some of them (randomly selected) before we turn to the ten 'major' signs in which we venture to include the recent major underwater earthquake and resultant Tsunami in South East Asia.

• MINOR SIGNS

Prophet Muhammad (s) prophesied of the Last Age that:

q "People would follow a way of life other than mine and give guidance other than mine". . . . "I fear for my people only the leaders who lead men astray". . . . "Before the Last Hour there will be great liars, so beware of them". . . . "When the most wicked member of a tribe becomes its ruler, and the most worthless member of a community becomes its leader, and a man is respected through fear of the evil he may do, and leadership is given to people who are unworthy of it, expect the Last Hour", - all of these warnings have already been dramatically and ominously fulfilled in the world, as well as in the community of Muslims, even here in Trinidad!

q Women would arrange their hair to look like the hump of a camel, - and that has already occurred;

q Women would dress like men, - and we already see them today with trousers, jacket and, perhaps, a tie;

q Men would dress like women, - and already no one can tell that 'she' is really a man;

q Homosexuality (and lesbianism) would become commonplace, - and that is now happening before our very eyes; indeed those who hold fast to the divine prohibition of such sexual perversion are now demonized as a people who suffer from a disease called homophobia;

q Children born outside of marriage would become commonplace, - in fact marriage itself now seems destined to become obsolete;

q Fornication and adultery would become commonplace, - that, also, appears to have already been fulfilled in a modern world in which virginity and marital fidelity are becoming old-fashioned;

q Disproportion in balance of men and women to such an extent that one man would have to maintain (not marry) fifty women, - that is yet to occur but could be linked to the impact on male sperm production of such things as environmental pollution and genetically modified food;

q Universal consumption of alcoholic beverages, - that has already become a veritable plague,

q Religious knowledge disappears, - since the rightly-guided scholars of Islam are demonized, marginalized, banned, or declared to be great security risks. Only those scholars who can skillfully skip and dance to the tunes of those who control power in the world are allowed the unfettered freedom to travel and to preach a sanitized cosmetic version of Islam acceptable to the unholy triple alliance of Britain ('a day like a year'), America ('a day like a month') and Israel ('a day like a week'), and their equally unholy clients in Islamabad, Cairo, Riyadh, etc.;

q Time would move swiftly - a year passing like a month - a month like a week - a week like a day etc., - and already the perception of swiftly moving time is a universal experience;

q Such prevalence of random killing, murder and violence that a killer would not know why he is killing and the one who is killed would not know why he is being killed, and every age is followed by one which is worse, - already around the world senseless random killing has already arrived and is constantly escalating;

q Nothing would remain of Islam but the name, and nothing would remain of the Qur'an but the traces (of its writing) (i.e., the Qur'an would not be studied, no one would follow its guidance, it would be recited mechanically etc.); the Masajid (mosques) would be grand structures but would be devoid of guidance; and the ulama (religious scholars of Islam who represent such people) would be the worst people beneath the sky. From them would emerge Fitnah (trials) and they would be the centers of Fitnah (since they betray Islam); - there are many distinguished scholars of Islam who declare that this sign has today found fulfillment.

q Prevalence of Riba (i.e, money lent on interest, and transactions which 'rip off' people through deception in business, etc.) Around the world today Riba in modern banking and insurance has already taken total control over the market and over economic life.

There are some minor signs which have been couched in enigmatic language such as,

q 'A slave woman would give birth to her mistress', - made possible through a combination of Riba and the modern feminist revolution, and

q 'Naked barefooted shepherds would vie with one another in the construction of high-rise buildings', - made possible when vast unearned wealth suddenly descends upon a hitherto poor (Arab?) people who now hanker for visible symbols of their status in a modern world which recognizes the rich as a 'somebody' and the poor as a 'nobody' (see story of the rich man and the poor man in Surah al-Kahf of the Qur'an).

And then there are minor signs which have not as yet occurred such as:

Ø "The Last Hour would not come until there issues from the land of the Hejaz (which is in Saudi Arabia) a fire which will illuminate the backs of the camels in Busra", - and this, perhaps, anticipates a nuclear attack on a Saudi Air Force base in Tabuk, perhaps, which would formally launch Israel into the club of nuclear powers.

So many of these minor Signs of the Last Day, and so many more not here mentioned, have already occurred, that we can now turn to the major Signs with a clear recognition that we are already living in that last age.

• MAJOR SIGNS

Hudhayfah ibn Usayd Ghifari, the companion of the Prophet, said, "Allah's Messenger came to us all of a sudden as we were (busy in a discussion). He asked: What are you discussing? (The Companions) replied: We are discussing (the subject of) the Last Hour. Thereupon he said: It will not come until you see ten signs, and (in this connection) he made a mention of the Smoke, Dajjal, the Beast, the Rising of the Sun from the West, the Descent of Jesus son of Mary, Gog and Magog, Earthquakes in three places, one in the East, one in the West and one in Arabia at the end of which Fire would burn forth from Yemen, and would drive people to the place of their assembly (i.e., the place where mankind will be assembled for judgment)." Sahih Muslim

Here, then, are the ten major Signs of the Last Day as prophesied by Prophet Muhammad (s):

1. DAJJAL – THE FALSE MESSIAH OR ANTICHRIST,
2. GOG AND MAGOG,
3. SMOKE,
4. THE BEAST OF THE EARTH (or Land),
5. THE SUN WOULD RISE FROM THE WEST,
6. THREE (BIG) EARTHQUAKES – ONE IN THE EAST,
7. ONE IN THE WEST, AND
8. ONE IN ARABIA,
9. A FIRE WOULD COME OUT OF YEMEN AND WOULD DRIVE PEOPLE TO THEIR PLACE OF ASSEMBLY (i.e., to the plain of Arafat where mankind would be assembled for judgment),
10. THE DESCENT OF THE SON OF MARY.

Although these signs were not given by the blessed Prophet (s) in their chronological order of occurrence I have made an effort to put them in that order, with the ones that have not as yet occurred at the bottom of the list. How did I arrive at the above order? Well, we know from the prophecies of the blessed Prophet that the third major earthquake, i.e., the one that would occur in Arabia, would swallow an army that would be heading south to Makkah to attack Imam al-Mahdi, the descendent of Prophet Muhammad who, it was prophesied, would restore the Islamic Caliphate (or Islamic model of a State) in the Arabian peninsular. It is after that sign has occurred (i.e., the third major earthquake) that the son of Mary would descend from the sky with his hands resting on the wings of two angels, and would kill Dajjal the False Messiah or Anti-Christ. And since the Qur'an itself has described Jesus (i.e., the return of Jesus) as the 'ilm (which here means the very heart and seal of the subject) of the Last Hour (Qur'an, Zukhruf, 43:61), it follows that his return must come chronologically at the end of the list. We also know that the 'fire' from Yemen would follow the third earthquake. And so now that it appears that the major earthquake in the East has occurred, we await four more major signs that still remain to occur, i.e. the major earthquake in the West, the major earthquake in Arabia, the fire that would come out of Yemen, and the return of the Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary. The major earthquakes are therefore meant to herald that momentous event of all events when the Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, would return. When did the first six 'major' signs occur?

Ø DAJJAL

I have argued in my book, 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an – An Islamic View of the Destiny of Jerusalem' that Dajjal the

False Messiah or Antichrist was released into the world in the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad (s). He has already completed the first stage of his mission that lasted for 'a day like a year', and is about to complete the second stage that lasts for 'a day like a month'. The third and last stage of his mission (of impersonation of the true Messiah) that would last for just 'a day like a week' would commence when Israel replaces USA as the Ruling State of the world. And that would occur when Israel wages her big war that would result in the dramatic territorial expansion of the State 'from the river of Egypt to the river Euphrates'. Israel would then seize control of the Suez Canal and all the oil of the Arabian Gulf. By the end of that third stage the Antichrist would have been born into the world of Jewish parents, would have risen to become ruler of Israel and, hence, would have completed his mission to rule the world from Jerusalem. And Allah Knows best! An entire chapter of the book is devoted to explaining the subject of Dajjal.

Ø GOG AND MAGOG

I have also argued in my book that Gog and Magog were released into the world in the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad (s). The Qur'an itself has made mention (Qur'an, the Prophets, 21:94-5) of a 'town' which was destroyed by Allah Most High, and the people of the town expelled, and then banned from returning to reclaim their town until Gog and Magog were not only released but, also, had spread out in all directions. I located that 'town' to be Jerusalem. And since the Jews have already returned to Jerusalem to reclaim it as their own, it follows that Gog and Magog, like Dajjal, are also close to the end of their mission. And Allah Knows best! Another entire chapter of the book is devoted to explaining the subject of Gog and Magog.

Ø SMOKE

This appears to be the environmental pollution that is already wreaking havoc on the earth itself and is bringing about global warming with the consequent impact on earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding etc. The modern industrial economy appears to be the greatest culprit of environmental pollution in the world today. In other words we, mankind, are ourselves the creators of the Smoke which spawns massive earthquakes, tsunamis, etc., and eventually brings about the death of the earth. And Allah Knows best!

However, it is important that we note that there are several Ahadith in Sahih Bukhari which declare that the sign of 'Smoke' already appeared in the lifetime of the blessed Prophet.

Ø THE BEAST OF THE EARTH

I have argued in 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an' that the word 'earth' is sometimes used in the scriptures as synonymous with the word 'land', and the term 'land', when used in the context of the signs of the last age, stands almost invariably for 'Holy Land'. In consequence of this I have argued in my book that the 'Beast of the Earth' is, in fact, the imposter State of Israel that now occupies the Holy Land. The learned Shaikh, Safar al-Hawali, holds the view that the 'Beast' is the Zionist Movement. And Allah Knows best!

Ø THE SUN WOULD RISE FROM THE WEST

Those who interpret this sign literally assume that the order of nature would be reversed despite the Qur'anic declaration that there can be no change in Allah's creation (of that natural order) (Qur'an, Rum, 30:30), and despite the specific declaration of Prophet Abraham (s) that his Lord-God causes the sun to rise from the East. Abraham then proceeded to challenge the King to cause the sun to rise from the West if he possessed power greater than Allah's. (Qur'an, al-Baqarah, 2:258) And so they await that western sunrise as an event that would literally occur, while ignoring the basic rule that no Hadith can contradict the Qur'an. But this sign has provoked numerous other non-literal interpretations, all of which agree that it has already occurred. Our view is that the rising of the sun from the West symbolizes an upside-down world in which mankind is led by their noses to a way of life which would be the very opposite of that natural way ordained by Allah. That upside-down unnatural way of life has already embraced most of mankind. In this sense, therefore, the sun is already rising from the West. And Allah Knows best!

THREE EARTHQUAKES

Prophet Muhammad (s) has prophesied three major earthquakes that would herald the return of the Messiah, the son of Mary, and Messenger of Allah Most High. One would occur in the East, the second in the West, and the third in

Arabia. When the third one takes place, the world of Islam would suddenly and dazzlingly reenter the affairs of the Arabian peninsular, as well as of the world, in the same revolutionary way that it did in the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad (s). This appears to be the meaning of the last of the major signs (prior to the return of Jesus) mentioned by the Prophet (s), i.e., that a fire would come out of Yemen and drive people to their place of assembly.

Ø THE EARTHQUAKE IN THE EAST

I believe that the recent massive earthquake and resultant tsunami in SE Asia which has claimed many more than 100,000 lives, is the earthquake of the East mentioned by Prophet Muhammad (s) in the ten major Signs of the Last Day, and thus the first of three such earthquakes heralding the return of Jesus (s). I came to this conclusion because of the following reasons:

Firstly, the prophecy of the blessed Prophet is that a 'khasf' would occur in the East, i.e., the earth sinks down or caves in. A 'Tsunami' is defined as a sea wave of local or distant origin that results from large-scale seafloor displacements associated with large earthquakes, major submarine slides, or exploding volcanic islands. Since this recent displacement of the earth occurred under the sea, and consequently resulted in the massive Tsunamis, it ensured that those who have maliciously concealed the Truth time and again in history could not conceal this major Sign of the Last Day. The magnitude of the event, i.e., the severity of the earthquake (9 on the Richter scale) and, more importantly, the massive damage already done and still unfolding, makes it absolutely unique for mankind today.

Secondly, I am impressed by the location of the event, - it occurred in that East which is clearly East of Madina.

Thirdly, I would like to direct attention to the time that it occurred, i.e., after the liberation of the Holy Land (1917), and return of the Jews to reclaim the Holy Land as their own (1918-1948), the restoration of a State of Israel in the Holy Land (1948), the growth of Israel to become a superpower in the world (i.e., the present), and at precisely that time when Israel is about to wage her big war of massive territorial expansion after which Israel would replace USA as the Ruling State in the world. It has also occurred at that time when the prophecy of the Prophet concerning the abandonment of the Hajj is about to be fulfilled - since the

Hajj would henceforth pose a gigantic security threat to the present Saudi ruling elite whenever Israel wages that big war and assumes the rule over the world. And it has occurred at just that time when the US dollar has begun its irreversible decline that is to culminate in its collapse. That would then bring down all the paper-money in the world and electronic money controlled by the Jewish-controlled banking system would then control all the money in the money-system of the world.

This momentous Sign in the East that has just occurred appears, therefore, to be a sign to mankind warning that monstrously dangerous change in the world is about to occur. But it also appears to be the first of the three major earthquakes heralding the return of the Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, the Messenger of Allah Most High

Ø THE SECOND EARTHQUAKE IN THE WEST

When a second massive earthquake (with a sinking down, caving in, or displacement of the earth) eventually occurs in the West, after the recent one in the East, that would further confirm the analysis presented in this essay. All that would then remain to occur for Jesus to descend from the clouds would be the third earthquake in Arabia that would swallow an entire army, and the fire that would come out of Yemen. We are so close to that event that we can already feel the heat of that fire. My book, 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an', explains the subject.

Although what appears to be the first of the three major earthquakes occurred underwater and resulted in the massive tsunamis in South East Asia, it is not necessary that the second, that would occur in the West, would be similar. After all, we know that the third and last major earthquake would have its epicenter on land just north of Makkah in Arabia. And so the West must remain in a state of agonizing suspense.

Ø THE THIRD EARTHQUAKE IN ARABIA

Narrated Aisha: Allah's Apostle said, "An army will invade the Ka'ba and when the invaders reach Al-Baida', all the ground will sink and swallow the whole army." I said, "O Allah's Apostle! How will they sink into the ground while amongst them will be their markets (the people who worked in business and not invaders) and the people not belonging to them?" The Prophet replied, "all of those people will sink but they will be resurrected and judged according to their intentions."

(Sahih al-Bukhari)

"Narrated Umm Salamah, Ummul Mu'minin: The Prophet said: Disagreement will occur at the death of a caliph and a man of the people of Madina will come flying forth to Makkah. Some of the people of Makkah will come to him, bring him out against his will and swear allegiance to him between the Corner and the Maqam. An expeditionary force will then be sent against him from Syria but will be swallowed up in the desert between Makkah and Madina . . ."

(Sunan Abu Daud)

It is quite clear from the above prophecy of Prophet Muhammad (s) that the third earthquake would take place at the time of the advent of Imam al-Mahdi. But the Imam cannot emerge to liberate the Arabian heartland of Islam from Anglo-American-Israeli hegemony, and to restore Dar al-Islam, or the authentic Islamic model of a public order, until Dajjal the False Messiah or Anti-Christ has successfully completed his mission of impersonating the true Messiah, and hence until Israel has become the Ruling State in the world and has ruled the world for 'a day like a week'. And so there is quite some time left (maybe as much as 40-50 years) before that third earthquake takes place and the moment finally arrives for the last of the signs of the Last Day to occur, i.e., the descent of the true Messiah, Jesus, the son of Mary. And Allah knows best!

Ø THE RETURN OF JESUS


Prophet Muhammad (s) has spoken extensively and in minute details about the event of the return of Jesus (s). But that event is so rich and complex that it lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, my book, 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an' has dealt with the subject in some detail, and it is to that book that I now refer the gentle reader.

Ø ONE FINAL WORD

The destiny of Jerusalem is such as to give to Muslims the greatest confidence and hope that Truth will triumph over falsehood and oppression. 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an' was written for precisely this purpose -- to explain to Muslims the strange world in which we live today. It is a world in which the cause of Islam appears to be a lost cause. But having read the book the reader would know, if he or she had not already known it, that the reality is quite different. When they know for certain that it is the destiny of Jerusalem to give a spectacular validation of Islam's claim to truth,

Muslims should be able to summon the strength to resist the present war on Islam in which the godless world is making the greatest possible effort to destroy their faith in Allah Most High.

POSTED BY INSHALLAHSHAHEED AT 10:10 AM | 4

COMMENTS 

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: DEADLINE 07/15/2011

Date: 07/27/2011

To: Records Management
Counterterrorism
Charlotte

Attn: [REDACTED]
Attn: [REDACTED]
A/SSA [REDACTED]
IA [REDACTED]
Attn: [REDACTED]
SSA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

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b7E

From: [REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]
Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED] (S)
(X) [REDACTED]
(U) [REDACTED]

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Title: (U) [REDACTED] (S)
(U) (X) [REDACTED] (S)
(X) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

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Synopsis: (U) To submit response to the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and set appropriate leads.

~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSTSCG-20080301
~~Declassify On:~~ 20360729

(U) [REDACTED]

b7E

Reference: (U) [REDACTED]

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Enclosure(s): (U) For Records Management Division, one LHM
dated 7/27/2011. For [REDACTED] one LHM dated 7/27/2011.

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Details: (X) [REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: [REDACTED]
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/27/2011

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[REDACTED]

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(U/~~FOUO~~) In consideration of the preceding paragraph
writer has facilitated/maintained/coordinated with appropriate
[REDACTED] personnel.

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(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED], an openly self-avowed Islamic
Extremist, member of Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
and contributor of several articles to Inspire Magazine that
openly advocates for the conduct of terrorist attacks against the
United States, its citizenry and interests, globally.

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[REDACTED]

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(U) In summary and in consideration of the facts
described herein, writer and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and her

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To: Records Management From: [REDACTED]
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/27/2011

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staff, have maintained a cooperative dialogue for coordination purposes.

(U)

[REDACTED] considers the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] lead covered in full.

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To: Records Management From: [REDACTED]
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 07/27/2011

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Distribute enclosed LHM to the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/01/2011

To: Charlotte

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

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b7E

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (U) [redacted]

(S)

(Pending)
(Pending)

(S)

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Title: (S) [redacted]

(S)

(S)

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(U)

(S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

(S)

(S)

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Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615
Declassify On: 20360517

(U) [redacted]

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Administrative: [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/01/2011

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Details: (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/04/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (X)
(U)

(Pending) (S)
(Pending)

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Title: (X)

[REDACTED] (S)

(U)

(S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

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(U)

~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSISCG-20090615
~~Declassify On:~~ 08/04/2036

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Administrative: (X)

[REDACTED]
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X

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [REDACTED] 08/04/2011

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Details:

(U) CASE BACKGROUND

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(U) SUBJECT BACKGROUND

(S)

(S//NF) [REDACTED] In late 2006, Samir Khan (born in 1985) came to the attention of the FBI for his role in administering a fundamentalist Islamic, pro-jihad, online blog from his parents' home in Charlotte, NC. On this online blog, as well as on several other online blogs, forums, and web sites with similar content, Khan expressed a radical Islamic worldview. Khan's popular online blog, which he operated from 2005 until 2009, gained him international attention in 2007. From early 2007 until late 2009, investigation of Khan revealed that this self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi became increasingly religious and radical over time. Major discoveries of the investigation include: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Khan became a radicalizing influence on others, possibly motivating/recruiting them for jihad; individuals close to Khan expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr, and he himself indicated an interest in becoming a martyr; Khan created the first US-based, English language, pro-jihad magazine, known as "Jihad Recollections," which published four issues online and received significant international attention; and in October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra.

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 08/04/2011

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/04/2011

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [redacted] 08/04/2011

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [redacted] 08/04/2011

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/04/2011

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [REDACTED] 08/04/2011

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [REDACTED] 08/04/2011

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/04/2011

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-01-2019

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[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 4:40 PM
To: [REDACTED]

Subject:

RE: [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~ (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Upon removal of attachment(s), this document is ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360803
Derived From: FBI NSISC
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All -

We'll keep you posted.

Best,

SA [REDACTED]
FBI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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From: [Redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:17 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]

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(S) Subject: RE: [Redacted] -- ~~SECRET~~

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~~Classified By: [Redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20360803~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC~~

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[Redacted]

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Thanks again-

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:14 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]

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(S) Subject: RE: [Redacted] -- ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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~~Classified By: [Redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20360803~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC~~

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We have no issues one way or the other. Your call.

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~~SECRET~~

SSA [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Desk
[redacted] NSTS

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From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:08 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

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(S) Subject: RE: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360803
Derived From: FBI NSISC
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[redacted]
[redacted]

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From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 2:01 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

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(S) Subject: RE: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Upon removal of attachment(s), this document is ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360803
Derived From: FBI NSISC
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SSA [redacted]

[redacted] Desk

[redacted] NSTS

From: [redacted] (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 1:36 PM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

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(S) Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360803


Derived From: FBI NSISC

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SA [redacted]
FBI [redacted]
[redacted]

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-01-2019

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[REDACTED] (FBI)

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From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 12:00 PM
To: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Smair Khan --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By:~~ [REDACTED]
~~Declassify On:~~ 20360803
~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSISC
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[REDACTED]

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SA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Office: [REDACTED]
Cell: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 8:37 AM
To: [REDACTED]

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Subject: Smair Khan --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By:~~ [REDACTED]
~~Declassify On:~~ 20360803
~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSISC
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[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] out of [Redacted] is the Khan case agent and can give you more specifics if you need them.

Let me know if there are any questions.

SSA [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] Desk
[Redacted] NSTS

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-01-2019

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[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 12:09 PM
To: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Smair Khan --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360803
Derived From: FBI NSISC
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SSA [redacted]
[redacted]
desk: [redacted]
NSTS [redacted]
cell: [redacted]

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 12:00 PM
To: [redacted]

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Subject: RE: Smair Khan --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360803
Derived From: FBI NSISC
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[redacted]

SECRET

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SA [redacted]

Office: [redacted]

Cell: [redacted]

From: [redacted] (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 8:37 AM

To: [redacted]

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Subject: Smair Khan --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360803

Derived From: FBI NSISC

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[redacted] out of [redacted] is the Khan case agent and can give you more specifics if you need them.

Let me know if there are any questions.

SSA [redacted]

[redacted] Desk

[redacted] NSTS

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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EMPOWERING LOCAL
PARTNERS TO PREVENT
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
IN THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 2011



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


Sadly, the threat of violent extremism in America is nothing new. Throughout our history, misguided groups – including international and domestic terrorist organizations, neo-Nazis and anti-Semitic hate groups – have engaged in horrific violence to kill our citizens and threaten our way of life. Most recently, al-Qa'ida and its affiliates have attempted to recruit and radicalize people to terrorism here in the United States, as we have seen in several plots and attacks, including the deadly attack two years ago on our service members at Fort Hood.

As a government, we are working to prevent all types of extremism that leads to violence, regardless of who inspires it. At the same time, countering al-Qa'ida's violent ideology is one part of our comprehensive strategy to defeat al-Qa'ida. Over the past 2 1/2 years, more key al-Qa'ida leaders – including Usama bin Laden – have been eliminated in rapid succession than at any time since the September 11 attacks. We have strengthened homeland security and improved information sharing. Thanks to coordinated intelligence and law enforcement, numerous terrorist plots have been thwarted, saving many American lives.

Protecting American communities from al-Qa'ida's hateful ideology is not the work of government alone. Communities – especially Muslim American communities whose children, families and neighbors are being targeted for recruitment by al-Qa'ida – are often best positioned to take the lead because they know their communities best. Indeed, Muslim American communities have categorically condemned terrorism, worked with law enforcement to help prevent terrorist attacks, and forged creative programs to protect their sons and daughters from al-Qa'ida's murderous ideology.

The strategy that follows outlines how the Federal Government will support and help empower American communities and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism. This strategy commits the Federal Government to improving support to communities, including sharing more information about the threat of radicalization; strengthening cooperation with local law enforcement, who work with these communities every day; and helping communities to better understand and protect themselves against violent extremist propaganda, especially online.

Most of all, this strategy reaffirms the fundamental American principles that guide our efforts. As we approach the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, we remember that al-Qa'ida tried to spark a conflict between faiths and divide us as Americans. But they failed. As this strategy makes clear, we will not waver in defense of our country or our communities. We will defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. We will uphold the civil rights and civil liberties of every American. And we will go forward together, as Americans, knowing that our rich diversity of backgrounds and faiths makes us stronger and is a key to our national security.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Barack Obama", written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned at the bottom right of the page, below the main body of text.

Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States

“Several recent incidences of violent extremists in the United States who are committed to fighting here and abroad have underscored the threat to the United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home. Our best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions. The Federal Government will invest in intelligence to understand this threat and expand community engagement and development programs to empower local communities. And the Federal Government, drawing on the expertise and resources from all relevant agencies, will clearly communicate our policies and intentions, listening to local concerns, tailoring policies to address regional concerns, and making clear that our diversity is part of our strength—not a source of division or insecurity.”

—*National Security Strategy, May 2010*

A. THE CHALLENGE

The seal of the United States of America is inscribed with the Latin dictum *E Pluribus Unum*—out of many, one. It is our great strength that the American social fabric continues to weave together waves of immigrants to the United States and people from all backgrounds and walks of life as part of an indivisible community. We are a pluralistic Nation and a society that does not just accept diversity; we embrace it, and we are stronger as a result. We surmount the many challenges that we face by remaining committed to the American ideals of freedom, equality, and democracy, which transcend differences of religion, ethnicity, and place of birth. Since America’s founding, our country and our ideals have been assailed by forces of hate and division, yet we remain strong, unified, and resilient.

Throughout history, violent extremists—individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals—have promoted messages of divisiveness and justified the killing of innocents. The United States Constitution recognizes freedom of expression, even for individuals who espouse unpopular or even hateful views. But when individuals or groups choose to further their grievances or ideologies through violence, by engaging in violence themselves or by recruiting and encouraging others to do so, it becomes the collective responsibility of the U.S. Government and the American people to take a stand. In recent history, our country has faced plots by neo-Nazis and other anti-Semitic hate groups, racial supremacists, and international and domestic terrorist groups; and since the September 11 attacks, we have faced an expanded range of plots and attacks in the United States inspired or directed by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents as well as other violent extremists. Supporters of these groups and their associated ideologies come from different socioeconomic backgrounds, ethnic and religious communities, and areas of the country, making it difficult to predict where violent extremist narratives will resonate. And as history has shown, the prevalence of particular violent extremist ideologies changes over time, and new threats will undoubtedly arise in the future.

We rely on our local, state, and Federal law enforcement to deter individuals from using violence and to protect communities from harm. But we also must ensure that the right tools are applied at the right time to the right situation. Countering radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by engaging and empowering individuals and groups at the local level to build resilience against violent extremism. Law enforcement plays an essential role in keeping us safe, but so too does engagement and partnership with communities.

While we can and must prioritize our efforts, our approach should be enduring and flexible enough to address a variety of current and possible future threats. Individuals from a broad array of communities and walks of life in the United States have been radicalized to support or commit acts of ideologically-inspired violence. Any solution that focuses on a single, current form of violent extremism, without regard to other threats, will fail to secure our country and communities. Our threat environment is constantly evolving, which is why we must consistently revisit our priorities and ensure our domestic approach can address multiple types of violent extremism.

Today, as detailed in the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents represent the preeminent terrorist threat to our country. We know that these groups are actively seeking to recruit or inspire Americans to carry out attacks against the United States, particularly as they are facing greater pressure in their safe-havens abroad. The past several years have seen increased numbers of American citizens or residents inspired by al-Qa'ida's ideology and involved in terrorism. Some have traveled overseas to train or fight, while others have been involved in supporting, financing, or plotting attacks in the homeland. The number of individuals remains limited, but the fact that al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents are openly and specifically inciting Americans to support or commit acts of violence—through videos, magazines, and online forums—poses an ongoing and real threat.

This type of violent extremism is a complicated challenge for the United States, not only because of the threat of attacks, but also because of its potential to divide us. Groups and individuals supporting al-Qa'ida's vision are attempting to lure Americans to terrorism in order to create support networks and facilitate attack planning, but this also has potential to create a backlash against Muslim Americans. Such a backlash would feed al-Qa'ida's propaganda that our country is anti-Muslim and at war against Islam, handing our enemies a strategic victory by turning our communities against one another; eroding our shared sense of identity as Americans; feeding terrorist recruitment abroad; and threatening our fundamental values of religious freedom and pluralism. Violent extremists prey on the disenchantment and alienation that discrimination creates, and they have a vested interest in anti-Muslim sentiment. It is for this reason that our security—preventing radicalization that leads to violence—is inextricably linked to our values: the protection of civil rights and civil liberties and the promotion of an inclusive society.

B. A COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH

The United States relies on a broad range of tools and capabilities that are essential to prevent violent extremism in the United States, emphasizing, in particular, the strength of communities as central to our approach. The best defenses against violent extremist ideologies are well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and local institutions. Their awareness of the threat and willingness to

work with one another and government is part of our long history of community-based initiatives and partnerships dealing with a range of public safety challenges. Communities are best placed to recognize and confront the threat because violent extremists are targeting their children, families, and neighbors. Rather than blame particular communities, it is essential that we find ways to help them protect themselves. To do so, we must continue to ensure that all Americans understand that they are an essential part of our civic life and partners in our efforts to combat violent extremist ideologies and organizations that seek to weaken our society.

We are fortunate that our experience with community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and community-oriented policing provides a basis for addressing violent extremism as part of a broader mandate of community safety. We therefore are building our efforts to counter radicalization that leads to violence in the United States from existing structures, while creating capacity to fill gaps as we implement programs and initiatives. Rather than creating a new architecture of institutions and funding, we are utilizing successful models, increasing their scope and scale where appropriate.

While communities must often lead this effort, the Federal Government has a significant responsibility. Our research and consultations with local stakeholders, communities, and foreign partners have underscored that the Federal Government's most effective role in strengthening community partnerships and preventing violent extremism is as a facilitator, convener, and source of information. The Federal Government will often be ill-suited to intervene in the niches of society where radicalization to violence takes place, but it can foster partnerships to support communities through its connections to local government, law enforcement, Mayor's offices, the private sector, local service providers, academia, and many others who can help prevent violent extremism. Federal departments and agencies have begun expanding support to local stakeholders and practitioners who are on the ground and positioned to develop grassroots partnerships with the communities they serve.

C. GOAL AND AREAS OF PRIORITY ACTION

Our central goal in this effort is to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence. The U.S. Government will work tirelessly to counter support for violent extremism and to ensure that, as new violent groups and ideologies emerge, they fail to gain a foothold in our country. Achieving this aim requires that we all work together—government, communities, the private sector, the general public, and others—to develop effective programs and initiatives.

"As extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities, with the respect for the rule of law, and with the conviction that Muslim Americans are part of our American family."

—President Barack Obama,
State of the Union, January 2011

To support a community-based approach, the Federal Government is working to strengthen partnerships and networks among local stakeholders. There is no single issue or grievance that pushes individuals toward supporting or committing violence, and the path to violent extremism can vary considerably. As a result, it is essential that we empower local partners, who can more readily identify problems as they emerge and customize responses so that they are appropriate and effective for

Leveraging Existing Models

The United States has rich experience in supporting locally-based initiatives that connect communities and government to address community challenges through collaboration and the development of stakeholder networks. While recognizing that different challenges require the involvement of different stakeholders, we view community-based problem solving as an effective model of organizing communities and government to counter violent extremism in the homeland. The following provides three examples of this model in practice.

Example One: Comprehensive Gang Model

The Department of Justice's *Comprehensive Gang Model* is a flexible framework that communities can use to reduce or prevent gang activity, involving strategies of community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities for educational and vocational advancements, and organizational change. Local community organizations and government offices responsible for addressing gangs—police, schools, probation officers, youth agencies, grassroots organizations, government, and others—help identify causes, recommend appropriate responses, and select activities for local implementation, supported by integrated Federal, state, and local resources to incorporate state-of-the-art practices in gang prevention, intervention, and suppression. This multi-dimensional, community-led response to gangs—driven by local stakeholders and supported by the Federal Government—has reduced serious gang-related crimes in affected locations across the country.

Example Two: Building Communities of Trust Initiative

The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security established the *Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) Initiative* to improve trust among police, fusion centers, and the communities they serve in order to address the challenges of crime and terrorism prevention. In support of BCOT, a National Planning Team comprised of representatives from Federal, state, and local governments; community organizations; and privacy and civil liberties groups convened and, in select locations, conducted roundtables to explore how to build and maintain relationships of trust. Lessons learned from these roundtables have resulted in official guidance highlighting the importance of meaningful information sharing, responding to community concerns, and distinguishing between innocent cultural behaviors and conduct that may legitimately reflect criminal activity or terrorism precursors.

Example Three: Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative

Responding to a series of lethal school shootings in the late 1990's, which culminated with the tragedy at Columbine High School, the Departments of Education, Justice, and Health and Human Services launched the *Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Initiative* to create broader, more comprehensive local programs to prevent violence and substance abuse among our Nation's youth, schools, and communities. In order to receive an SS/HS grant, school districts must partner with local mental health experts, juvenile justice officials, and law enforcement. Proposals must include programs that address violence and substance abuse prevention; social, emotional, and behavioral development; school and community-based mental health services; and early childhood development. According to an ongoing evaluation, the Initiative has resulted in fewer students experiencing or witnessing violence, increased school safety, and an overall decrease in violence in communities where the program is active.

particular individuals, groups, and locations. To that end, we have prioritized three broad areas of action where we believe the Federal Government can provide value to supporting partnerships at the local level and countering violent extremism. Our work will evolve over time as we enhance partnerships and further our understanding of what tools and methods are most effective.

1. Enhancing Federal Engagement with and Support to Local Communities that May be Targeted by Violent Extremists

Communication and meaningful engagement with the American public is an essential part of the Federal Government's work. Our open system of governance requires that we respond to inquiries; educate and share information on our programs, policies, and initiatives; and provide a platform for communities to air grievances and contribute their views on policy and government. We do this consistently in a variety of ways: we convene forums, develop brochures, respond to correspondence, post information on websites, and we make available for comment proposed regulations in the *Federal Register*. We also reach out to communities directly to answer questions and provide information and guidance, offering opportunities for communities to provide valuable suggestions about how government can be more effective and responsive in addressing their concerns. As such, engagement with local communities provides an opportunity for us to reexamine and improve how we perform our functions. For these reasons, we view effective community engagement as an essential part of good governance and an important end in itself.

The vast majority of our engagement work relates to issues outside the national security arena, such as jobs, education, health, and civil rights. We must ensure that in our efforts to support community-based partnerships to counter violent extremism, we remain engaged in the full range of community concerns and interests, and do not narrowly build relationships around national security issues alone. Where appropriate, we are relying on preexisting Federal Government engagement efforts to discuss violent extremism, ensuring that these forums continue to focus on a wide variety of issues. There are instances when the government needs to build new relationships to address security issues, but these must be predicated upon multifaceted engagement. Indeed, we refuse to limit our engagement to what we are against, because we need to support active engagement in civic and democratic life and help forge partnerships that advance what we are for, including opportunity and equal treatment for all.

Engagement is essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent violent extremism because it allows government and communities to share information, concerns, and potential solutions. Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent extremism are to (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the threat of radicalization to violence with a wide range of community groups and organizations, particularly those involved in public safety issues; (2) respond to community concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions.

In addition to engaging communities on a wide range of issues, the Federal Government is using its convening power to help build a network of individuals, groups, civil society organizations, and private sector actors to support community-based efforts to counter violent extremism. Myriad groups with tools and capabilities to counter radicalization to violence often operate in separate spheres of activity and therefore do not know one another. The Federal Government, with its connections to diverse

networks across the country, has a unique ability to draw together the constellation of previously unconnected efforts and programs to form a more cohesive enterprise against violent extremism.

2. Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise for Preventing Violent Extremism

Although we have learned a great deal about radicalization that leads to violence, we can never assume that the dynamics will remain the same. We must be vigilant in identifying, predicting, and preempting new developments. This necessitates ongoing research and analysis, as well as exchanges with individuals, communities, and government officials who work on the frontlines to counter the threats we all face. In addition, we will continue to hold meetings with foreign partners to share experiences and best practices, recognizing that while not all lessons are transferable to the American context, this sharing can help us improve our approach and avoid common pitfalls.

Government and law enforcement at the local level have well-established relationships with communities, developed through years of consistent engagement, and therefore can effectively build partnerships and take action on the ground. To help facilitate local partnerships to prevent violent extremism, the Federal Government is building a robust training program with rigorous curriculum standards to ensure that the training that communities; local, state, and tribal governments; prison officials; and law enforcement receive is based on intelligence, research, and accurate information about how people are radicalized to accept violence, and what has worked to prevent violent extremism. Misinformation about the threat and dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm our security by sending local stakeholders in the wrong direction and unnecessarily creating tensions with potential community partners. We also are working to support and expand community-oriented policing efforts by our state, local, and tribal partners, and to assist them in enhancing cultural proficiency and other foundations for effective community engagement.

3. Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda While Promoting Our Ideals

Radicalization that leads to violent extremism includes the diffusion of ideologies and narratives that feed on grievances, assign blame, and legitimize the use of violence against those deemed responsible. We must actively and aggressively counter the range of ideologies violent extremists employ to radicalize and recruit individuals by challenging justifications for violence and by actively promoting the unifying and inclusive vision of our American ideals.

Toward this end, we will continue to closely monitor the important role the internet and social networking sites play in advancing violent extremist narratives. We protect our communities from a variety of online threats, such as sexual predators, by educating them about safety on the internet, and we are using a similar approach to thwart violent extremists. We will work to empower families and communities to counter online violent extremist propaganda, which is increasingly in English and targeted at American audiences.

For example, in the case of our current priority, we must counter al-Qa'ida's propaganda that the United States is somehow at war with Islam. There is no single profile of an al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorist, but extensive investigations and research show that they all believe: (1) the United States is out to destroy Islam; and (2) this justifies violence against Americans. Al-Qa'ida and its supporters spread messages of

hate, twist facts, and distort religious principles to weave together a false narrative that Muslims must attack Americans everywhere because the United States is waging a global war against Islam. While al-Qa'ida claims to be the vanguard of Islam, the overwhelming majority of its victims are Muslim.

We will challenge this propaganda through our words and deeds, defined by the very ideals of who we are as Americans. As the President has stated repeatedly, the United States is not, and never will be, at war with Islam. Islam is part of America, a country that cherishes the active participation of all its citizens, regardless of background and belief. We live what al-Qa'ida violently rejects—religious freedom and pluralism. We have emphasized a paradigm of engagement with Muslim communities around the world, based on mutual respect and interest manifest in our new partnerships and programming to promote entrepreneurship, health, science and technology, educational exchanges, and opportunities for women.

But we must remember that just as our words and deeds can either fuel or counter violent ideologies abroad, so too can they here at home. Actions and statements that cast suspicion toward entire communities, promote hatred and division, and send messages to certain Americans that they are somehow less American because of their faith or how they look, reinforce violent extremist propaganda and feed the sense of disenchantment and disenfranchisement that may spur violent extremist radicalization. The Federal Government will work to communicate clearly about al-Qa'ida's destructive and bankrupt ideology, while dispelling myths and misperceptions that blame communities for the actions of a small number of violent extremists.

D. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

How we define and discuss the challenge of radicalization to violence matters. Violent extremism, while of paramount importance given the potential for harm, is only one among a number of threats our Nation is facing. Communities face an array of challenges to their safety, including gang violence, school shootings, drugs, hate crimes, and many others. Just as we respond to community safety issues through partnerships and networks of government officials, Mayor's offices, law enforcement, community organizations, and private sector actors, so must we address radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment through similar relationships and by leveraging some of the same tools and solutions. In doing so, we are guided by the following principles:

We must continually enhance our understanding of the threat posed by violent extremism and the ways in which individuals or groups seek to radicalize Americans, adapting our approach as needed. As al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents increasingly aim to inspire people within the United States to commit acts of terrorism, we must closely monitor and understand their tactics, both online and offline, remaining nimble in our response, increasing our understanding of the factors that lead individuals to turn to violence, and calibrating our efforts.

We must do everything in our power to protect the American people from violent extremism while protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of every American. Protecting our fundamental rights and liberties is an important end in itself, and also helps counter violent extremism by ensuring nonviolent means for addressing policy concerns; safeguarding equal and fair treatment; and making it more difficult for violent extremists to divide our communities.

EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

As the President said at the National Archives in May 2009, "We uphold our fundamental principles and values not just because we choose to, but because we swear to. Not because they feel good, but because they help keep us safe. They keep us true to who we are . . . So as Americans, we reject the false choice between our security and our ideals. We can and we must and we will protect both."

We must build partnerships and provide support to communities based on mutual trust, respect, and understanding. We must have honest dialogue between communities and government that is transparent and promotes community-based problem solving.

We must use a wide range of good governance programs—including those that promote immigrant integration and civic engagement, protect civil rights, and provide social services—that may help prevent radicalization that leads to violence. This necessitates a whole-of-government approach, based on the expertise of our traditional national security departments and agencies, as well as other parts of the government, including those with experience in addressing community safety issues.

We must support local capabilities and programs to address problems of national concern. While the demographics of communities and the priorities of local government, communities, and law enforcement vary, our efforts to prevent radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment must harness the knowledge, expertise, and relationships of local actors, both in and out of government.

Government officials and the American public should not stigmatize or blame communities because of the actions of a handful of individuals. We must instead support communities as partners, recognizing that a particular ethnic, religious, or national background does not necessarily equate to special knowledge or expertise in addressing violent extremism. Where communities have been active in condemning terrorism and confronting violent extremism, we must recognize their efforts; help them build upon their work; and connect them with other communities and stakeholders in order to share best practices.

Strong religious beliefs should never be confused with violent extremism. Freedom of religion is a fundamental American right and one of our most strongly held values. Since our founding, people of diverse and strongly held religious faiths have thrived in America.

Though we will not tolerate illegal activities, opposition to government policy is neither illegal nor unpatriotic and does not make someone a violent extremist. It is a basic tenet of our democracy that citizens of good conscience can respectfully disagree with one another and resolve their differences through peaceful means. Our Nation is built upon the principles of debate, dialogue, and cooperation.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

To:

[Redacted]

From:

[Redacted]

Re:

(U)

[Redacted]

08/03/2011

[Large Redacted Block]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted] (S)
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/03/2011

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[redacted] (S)

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE

[redacted] (S)

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

Set Lead 4: (Info)

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (X) [redacted] 08/03/2011

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

[redacted]

Set Lead 9: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-25-2019

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

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b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2011 11:37 AM
To: [REDACTED]

Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

[REDACTED] (S)

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~~Derived From: FBI NSISC~~
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(S)

[REDACTED]

b1
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SA [REDACTED]
FBI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] (FBI)

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2011 9:02 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted] - UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

FYI

[redacted]
Special Agent
Charlotte [redacted]
[redacted] Office
[redacted] Mobile

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2011 7:35 AM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted] --- UNCLASSIFIED

b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Maybe [redacted] did have an effect.

b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

[redacted]

b6
b7C

An ec detailing the above action will follow.

[redacted]
Supervisor
New Agents Training Unit
[redacted]

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

b3
b7E
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b7C

[redacted]

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-06-2019

b1
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[REDACTED] (FBI)

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From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2011 11:02 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

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b7C

[REDACTED] (S)
b1
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b7E
b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2011 10:56 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

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
b6
b7C

(S)

[REDACTED]
b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

b1
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b6
b7C



Best,

SA [redacted]
FBI [redacted]
[redacted]

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-29-2019

b6
b7C

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/17/2011

On [REDACTED]
Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] conducted an interview of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DOB: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] DOB: [REDACTED] at
their residence located at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The couple invited the investigators into their residence
after being told the nature of their visit.

b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] jointly stated that they were
[REDACTED] They stated that [REDACTED] was
currently [REDACTED] They said that [REDACTED] was a
[REDACTED] They provided
a cellular phone for [REDACTED] as [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

Investigation on 08/16/2011 at Charlotte, NC

(S)

File [REDACTED] dictated NA
Special Agent [REDACTED]
by [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

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~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-29-2019b6
b7CALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/18/2011

[REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] social
security account number (SSAN) [REDACTED] residing at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] cellular telephone number [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed at his place of employment, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] is a
[REDACTED] was advised
of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the
interview. [REDACTED] provided the following information:

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

[REDACTED] will contact agents if he thinks of any further
information.

b6
b7C(S) Investigation on 04/16/2011 at [REDACTED]

File # [REDACTED]

Date dictated [REDACTED]

by SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S) Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 08/16/2011, Page 2

***Interview notes will be maintained in attached FD340
1A envelope.

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

b6
b7C

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/18/2011

On [REDACTED]
Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] conducted an interview of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (hereafter [REDACTED] DOB: [REDACTED] at FBI Charlotte Division
located at 7915 Microsoft Way, Charlotte, NC. After being shown
the identities of the investigators and provided the purpose of the
interview, [REDACTED] provided the following:

b6
b7C
b7E

ISSUE SURROUNDING THE DUAL USE OF [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b6
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He
told investigators that he was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] said he just returned [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

08/18/2011 Charlotte, NC

Investigation on

at

File #

dictated NA

by

Special Agent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1
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b7E
(S) b6
b7C

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b3
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REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-06-2019

b6
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

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From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2011 5:56 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

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From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2011 9:37 AM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

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From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2011 9:20 AM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

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I'm interested to know your thoughts.

[redacted]
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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 1193607-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 193

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Page 277 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 278 ~ b1; b3; b7D; b7E;
Page 279 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 280 ~ b1; b3; b7E;
Page 281 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 297 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 298 ~ b1; b3; b7E;
Page 299 ~ b1; b3; b7E;

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X Deleted Page(s) X
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X For this Page X
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~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-23-2019

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2011 7:39 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE (S)

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Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

=====

[REDACTED] (S)

b1
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b7C

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2011 5:33 PM
To: [REDACTED]

b1
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b6
b7C

Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

=====

[REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
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b6
b7C

[REDACTED]
Management and Program Analyst

(S) [REDACTED]

(desk)

(blackberry)

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/30/2011

To: Charlotte

Attn: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

Attn: [REDACTED]

From: General Counsel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

Contact: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(U)

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] Pending [REDACTED]

(U)

Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~

~~Declassify On: 08/09/2036~~

(U)

Classification Authority Reference: (S) FBI NSISCG 20090615

Enclosure(s): (S) Charlotte [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
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b7C

(S)

Details: (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

X

X

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte

From: General Counsel

(U) Re: (S) [REDACTED] 08/30/2011

b3
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) READ AND CLEAR

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
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b7C

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1
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b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/31/2011

To: [REDACTED]

Attn: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

From: Charlotte [REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]
(U) ✓ [REDACTED]

b3
b7E
b7A

(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: (U) TO REQUEST A CASE/TARGET REORGANIZATION

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 08/31/2036

Details: (U) The purpose of this EC is to request that a Case and/or Target re-organization be re-established for the above referenced case in [REDACTED]

b7E

[REDACTED]

b1
(S) b3
b7E

(U) (S) Previously, in March 2010, writer requested that all past case classifications of [REDACTED] be combined into the latest case classification at the time, [REDACTED]

b3
b7E

(U) (S) As of 08/31/2011, the case classification of captioned investigation has changed from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]

(U) (S) Writer requests that the current case classification of [REDACTED] be combined/changed into [REDACTED]

(U) (S) For questions, please contact writer at [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

SECRET//NOFORN [redacted]

To: [redacted] From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/31/2011

b1
b3
b7E
b7A

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted] requests that [redacted] change/combine the
current case classification of [redacted] into [redacted]
within [redacted]

b3
b7E

♦♦

SECRET//NOFORN [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE b1
b3
b7E**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/31/2011

To: Charlotte

From: Charlotte

[REDACTED]
Contact: [REDACTED]b6
b7C
b7E

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED] Pending)
(U) [REDACTED] Pending)
(U) [REDACTED] Pending)b7A
b3
b7E(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

(U) STATS

(U) LIAISON

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To document stats/liaison contacts from July 2011 to August 2011 in captioned case (all in fourth quarter).~~(S)~~ Derived From : G-1
Declassify On: 08/31/2036(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ This report documents all statistics, and liaison contacts, earned from 6/21/11 to present (8/31/11) in captioned case (note for record-keeping purposes that none of statistics reported below occurred within the third quarter of 2011). Many of these stats were a team effort and thus, all team members will receive credit for many of the below-listed stats. Due to high workload, substantial details of the below statistics are not included in this EC. See case file or [REDACTED]

b7E

for further details.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)b1
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b7E
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b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted], 08/31/2011

CASE STATS (21 total)

(U) (S) [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

b7E

(U) (S) [redacted] (3):
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

b7E

[redacted]

b1
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b7E
b7D

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)


b1
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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/31/2011

LIAISON STATS (24 total)



(S)
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/31/2011

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 4

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Number: 10

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

Number: 1

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted] (S)

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

b1
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b7E
b6
b7C

Number: 1

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted] (S)

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

Number: 1

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/31/2011

Number: 1

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Number: 1

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted] (S)

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Number: 2

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted] (S)

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

Number: 25

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Number: 10

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

Number: 1

Type: [redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

Claimed By: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Squad: [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/31/2011

Number: 2

Type: [redacted]
ITU: [redacted] (S)

b1
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b6
b7C

Claimed By:
SSN: [redacted]
Name:
Squad: [redacted]

Number: 10

Type: [redacted]
ITU: [redacted]
ITU: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Claimed By:
SSN: [redacted]
Name:
Squad: [redacted]

Number: 1

Type: [redacted]
ITU: [redacted]

Claimed By:
SSN: [redacted]
Name:
Squad: [redacted]

Number: 2

Type: [redacted]
ITU: [redacted] (S)

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b7C

Claimed By:
SSN: [redacted]
Name:
Squad: [redacted]

Number: 10

Type: [redacted]
ITU: [redacted]
ITU: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Claimed By:
SSN: [redacted]
Name:
Squad: [redacted]

Number: 1

Type: [redacted]
[redacted]

ITU: [redacted]

Claimed By:
SSN: [redacted]
Name:
Squad: [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/31/2011

Number: 1

Type: [redacted]
ITU: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Claimed By:

SSN: [redacted]
Name: [redacted]
Squad: [redacted]

Number: 2

Type: [redacted] (S)
ITU: [redacted]

b1
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Claimed By:

SSN: [redacted]
Name: [redacted]
Squad: [redacted]

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/31/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

Attn:

b6
b7C
b7E

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

(Pending)

b3
b7E

Title: CHANGED

(S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: (S//NF) To update case classification and change title for captioned case.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 20360831~~

Previous Title: (S) Title marked "Changed" to reflect case classification change reflecting subject's association with AQAP. Title previously carried as "SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN; CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED."

(U)

Details: (S//NF) In late 2006, Samir Khan (born in 1985) came to the attention of the FBI for his role in administering a fundamentalist Islamic, pro-jihad, online blog from his parents' home in Charlotte, NC. On this online blog, as well as on several other online blogs, forums, and web sites with similar content, Khan expressed a radical Islamic worldview. Khan's popular online blog, which he operated from 2005 until 2009, gained him international attention in 2007. From early 2007 until late 2009, investigation of Khan revealed that this self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi became increasingly religious and radical over time. Major discoveries of the investigation include:

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

Please reclassify
case from [redacted] to [redacted]
Thanks - [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/31/2011

and outside of the US; Khan became a radicalizing influence on others, possibly motivating/recruiting them for jihad; individuals close to Khan expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr, and he himself indicated an interest in becoming a martyr; Khan created the first US-based, English language, pro-jihad magazine, known as "Jihad Recollections," which published four issues online and received significant international attention; and in October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra.

(S) b1
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(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Based on knowledge of Khan's skills, network, and mindset, FBI Charlotte concludes that Khan's roles in AQAP are that of a propagandist, recruiter, operational planner, and potential martyr.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/31/2011

(U) ~~(S)~~ Based on Khan's current association with AQAP, [redacted]
recommends that this case be administratively updated in ACS to
reflect the case classification of [redacted]
[redacted] rather than [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted], 08/31/2011

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) For information of CITU.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For information of APFC.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/29/2011

To: Charlotte

Attn: TFO

Attn: SA

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b7E

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

(U)
(U)

(S)

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b7E

(U) Title: (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - Global Extremist Inspired

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1
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b7C

Synopsis: (S)

(S)

Derived From : FBI NSISGC, 20080301
Declassify On: 08/29/2036

(U)

Details: (S)

(S)

b7E

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~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/29/2011


b3
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(U) The below results have been determined to be of interest/pertinent and are being memorialized for future action as deemed appropriate by [REDACTED] case agents:

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(S)

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~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/29/2011

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(S)

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~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: .(U) [redacted] 08/29/2011

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(S)

X

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X

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~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/29/2011

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b7E

Set Lead 1: (Info)

b7E

[redacted]
[redacted]
AT [redacted]

(U) For information.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/10/2011

To: Charlotte

Attn:

SSA
SA
SA

Attn:

SSA

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From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

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(U)
(S)

(S)

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b7C

Title: (S)

(S)

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

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(S)

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b7C

Synopsis: (S)

(S)

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 20360910~~

(U)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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b6
b7C

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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b7E

To: Charlotte From: [redacted]
(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 09/10/2011

Details: (S) [redacted]

b1
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(S) b7E
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X

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(S)

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(S) To: Charlotte From: [redacted]
Re: (X) [redacted] 09/10/2011

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(U) End of FBI indices reporting.

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(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
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(S) To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 09/10/2011

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(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(S)

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

(S) To: Charlotte From: [redacted]
(S) Re: (U) [redacted] 09/10/2011

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

August 19, 2011

TO:



(S)

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Attention: Office of Counsel, Room 3341

FROM:

Director, FBI


By: Special Agent in Charge Brenda L. Heck

SUBJECT:



(S)

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(S)

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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FILE COPY

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(S)
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(U//~~FOUO~~) Questions regarding this matter may be addressed to Special Agent [redacted]

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

b6
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/24/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

Charlotte

Attn:

Attn:

From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

Title: (S)

(U) (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

b3
b7E

Synopsis: (S)

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20360824

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b7C

Reference: (S)

Administrative: (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From:

(S)

Re: (S)

08/24/2011

(S) b1
b3
b7E

Enclosure(s): (U) TBC

Details: ~~(S//NF)~~

(S)

b1
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b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/24/2011

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/24/2011

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]
AT [redacted]

(U) For information. Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~ / ~~ORCON/NOFORN~~ (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 09/12/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA
IA

b6
b7C
b7E

Attn:

SSA
SOS

Attn:

Attn:

IA
IA

Intelligence Directorate

Charlotte

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

SA
SA

Attn:

SA

From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(S//NF)
(S//NF)
(S//NF)
(S//NF)
(S//NF)
(U) (S//NF)
(S//NF)

(S)

b1
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b7E
b6
b7C

Title:

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

(S)

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b3
b7E
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b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] 09/12/2011

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] ~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted] (S)

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615
Declassify On: 20360912

(U)

[redacted]

b7E

Reference: ~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

Administrative: ~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted] X

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] 09/12/2011

b1
b3
b7E

(S) The following information is for lead purposes only and is intended solely for the background information of the recipients. The information may not be disseminated to any other agency or used as the basis for any United States legal process; including, but not limited to: presentation to grand/petit juries or administrative bodies; incorporation into affidavits or other documents relating to subpoenas, search, electronic surveillance, or arrest warrants; and/or evidence in criminal prosecutions without the prior authorization of [redacted] and the Department of Justice/Counterterrorism Section.

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~ [redacted] ~~/OC/NF~~

(S)

Details: ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~/OC/NF~~

(S)

b1
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b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

To: Counterterrorism From:

(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~

09/12/2011

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

To: Counterterrorism From:

(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~

09/12/2011

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

To: Counterterrorism From:

(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~

09/12/2011

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]

(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] 09/12/2011

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Read and clear.

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]
(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] 09/12/2011

Set Lead 6: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/20/2011

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

b6
b7C
b7E

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (S)
(U)

b1
b3
b7E

(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - Sunni Extremism - Middle East

Synopsis: (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~Derived From : FBI NSISGC, 20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 09/20/2036~~

(U)

Details: (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) 09/20/2011

b1
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b7E
b6
b7C

(S)

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×

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 09/20/2011

b3
b7E

Set Lead 1: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

(U) For information.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 19, 2011 5:10 PM
To: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Emailing: [redacted] - ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20360919~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

Thanks [redacted] The "tall" descriptor answers that question! I appreciate you following up and closing the loop with us.
[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 19, 2011 5:05 PM
To: [redacted]

Subject: FW: Emailing: [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20360919~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

SSA [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Desk
[redacted] NSTS

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 19, 2011 5:04 PM
To: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Emailing: [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20360919~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

SSA [redacted]
FBI [redacted]

Desk: [redacted]
Secure : [redacted]
BB: [redacted]
Email [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 19, 2011 4:28 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Emailing: [redacted]

--- ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360919
Derived From: FBI NSISC~~
=====

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

SSA [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Desk
[redacted] NSTS

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 19, 2011 3:58 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: Emailing: [redacted]

--- ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360919
Derived From: FBI NSISC~~
=====

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Attached is the tearline to [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]
Staff Operations Specialist
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b3
b7E

The message is ready to be sent with the following file or link attachments:

b3
b7E

Note: To protect against computer viruses, e-mail programs may prevent sending or receiving certain types of file attachments. Check your e-mail security settings to determine how attachments are handled.

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-01-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 5:41 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: Samir Khan - associate in Chicago --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360527
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 4:35 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: Samir Khan - associate in Chicago --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360527
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[redacted] - many thanks for the emails; I got them but have not had a chance to digest them yet.
Are there any issues with these being added to my case file?

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 09, 2011 4:22 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: Samir Khan - associate in Chicago --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360527
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

Typing it out now [redacted] I will forward the emails on the green side.

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 09, 2011 3:21 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: Samir Khan - associate in Chicago --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360527
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[redacted] - one last thing - would you be able to add the Khan case number [redacted] to your report? Or if not, could you send me a file copy I can throw in my file?
[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 09, 2011 4:17 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: Samir Khan - associate in Chicago --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360527
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 09, 2011 2:59 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: Samir Khan - associate in Chicago --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360527
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[Redacted] office
[Redacted] cell

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-01-2019

b6
b7C
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 11:11 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Additional Data

Gents,

Re: our conversation last week I will forward the emails sent to me. I am deleting [REDACTED] from these messages. Thanks.

b7D
b7E

[REDACTED]
From:
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2011 10:03 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Additional Data

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-01-2019

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 1:16 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: possible contacts with Charlotte subject --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360913
Derived From: FBI NSISC~~
=====

[redacted] after talking to you on the phone, I discussed this matter with the rest of Team Khan. A couple of observations were made that may be of interest to you:

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

What are your thoughts?

Best,
[redacted] (and the rest of Team Khan)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 12:04 PM

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: possible contacts with Charlotte subject --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360913
Derived From: FBI NSISC~~
=====

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C
b7D

Finally, because this is an important development, what restrictions are there regarding the dissemination of this intelligence?

What approvals are needed to provide a summary of this [redacted]

b7E

[redacted]

case?

Many thanks,

SA [redacted]
FBI Charlotte [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 11:16 AM
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Subject: FW: possible contacts with Charlotte subject --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360913
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

b6
b7C

SSA [redacted]
[redacted] Desk
[redacted] NSTS

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 10:53 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: possible contacts with Charlotte subject --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360913
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 10:42 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: possible contacts with Charlotte subject --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360913
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[redacted]
(S) [redacted] said you may have some intel [redacted] Would you be able to provide the
information to [redacted] and myself?

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Thank you,

[Redacted]

Staff Operations Specialist

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 10:45 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: (S) RE: [REDACTED] --- SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN [REDACTED] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360607
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

[REDACTED] FYI. Let me know if this doesn't come through:

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Let me know how else we can help.

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 10:38 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

(S) Subject: RE: [REDACTED] --- SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN [REDACTED] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360607
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

Thanks,

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 10:35 AM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

(S) Subject: RE [redacted] --- ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360607

Derived From: Multiple Sources

=====

(S)

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Team Khan

From: [redacted] (FBI)

Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 5:17 PM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

(S) Subject: RE [redacted] - ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360607

Derived From: Multiple Sources

=====

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 4:31 PM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

(S) Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360607

Derived From: Multiple Sources

=====

[Large redacted block]

Thanks.

[redacted]

Intelligence Analyst

[redacted]

Open: [redacted]
Secure: [redacted]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

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b1
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b7E

~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ (S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

b1
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b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 10:17 AM
To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: (S) RE: [REDACTED] -- SECRET//NOFORN

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360607
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 9:58 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
(S) Subject: RE: [REDACTED] -- SECRET//NOFORN

b1
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b7E
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b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360607
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 9:51 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
(S) Subject: [REDACTED] -- SECRET//NOFORN

b1
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b7E
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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Declassify On: 20360607

Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====



b1
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Thanks-



*****CHANGE*****

Tele  NSTS 

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~ (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 09/12/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

SOS [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Intelligence Directorate

IA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Charlotte

From: [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (S//NF)

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

(U)

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

Title: (S//NF)

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~ (S)

b6
b7C
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~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]

(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

09/12/2011

b1
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b7C

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

~~(S//NF)~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
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b7C

Synopsis:

(S)

~~(OC/NF)~~

(S)

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615~~

~~Declassify On: 20360912~~

(U)

b7E

Administrative: ~~(S//NF)~~

(S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]

(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] 09/12/2011

(U) The following information is for lead purposes only and is intended solely for the background information of the recipients. The information may not be disseminated to any other agency or used as the basis for any United States legal process; including, but not limited to: presentation to grand/petit juries or administrative bodies; incorporation into affidavits or other documents relating to subpoenas, search, electronic surveillance, or arrest warrants; and/or evidence in criminal prosecutions without the prior authorization of [REDACTED] and the Department of Justice/Counterterrorism Section. [REDACTED]

b1
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Enclosure(s): ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] ~~/OC/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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b7C

Details: ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] ~~/OC/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~/

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]

(S) Re: (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED] 09/12/2011

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [REDACTED]

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) (~~S~~/~~NF~~) Read and clear.

~~SECRET~~/

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S//NF) [redacted] 09/12/2011

Set Lead 6: (Info)

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

(U) (S//NF) Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

(U) (S//NF) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

(U) (S//NF) [redacted] Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/26/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

TIS [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: LEGAT

ALAT [redacted]

Attn: LEGAT

Attn: SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Intelligence Directorate

Charlotte

From: Charlotte

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (S)

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

Title: (S)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/26/2011

(U) ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

~~(S)~~
~~(S)~~

[redacted] (S)

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~~(S)~~

[redacted]

Synopsis: (U) [redacted]

b7E

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20360926~~

(U) [redacted]

b7E

Administrative: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) The information provided in this report is provided for intelligence purposes only but may be used to develop potential investigative leads. No information contained in this report, nor any information derived therefrom, may be used in any proceeding (whether criminal or civil), to include any trial hearing or other proceeding before any court, department, agency regulatory body, or other authority of the United States without the advance approval of the Attorney General and/or the agency or department which originated the information contained in this report. Any reproduction, dissemination, or communication (including, but not limited to, oral briefings) of this information must be accompanied by a statement of these restrictions.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
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b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 09/26/2011

Enclosure(s): (U) (1) The electronic FD-930 (FD-930) for [redacted]
(2) The current Case Progress Report (CPR).

b7E

Details: (S) [redacted]

b1
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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/26/2011

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

[redacted] (S)

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) [redacted] Please review this EC to determine if the

[redacted]

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/26/2011

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 6: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 9: (Info)

[redacted]
AT [redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted] Read and clear.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 09/26/2011

Set Lead 10: (Info)

[redacted]

b7E

AT [redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 11: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) (S) Read and clear.

Set Lead 12: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) (S) Read and clear.

Set Lead 13: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) (S) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

b1
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b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 2:23 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: (S) RE: [REDACTED] --- ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360923
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

Thank you for the SK insight.
You points about legal issues and the greater SK Network in [REDACTED] have already been topics of discussion.

b6
b7C
b7E

SSA [REDACTED]
Charlotte Division [REDACTED]
Office [REDACTED]
Blackberry: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 2:18 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] --- ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360923
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

b1
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From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 1:14 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: (S) RE: [REDACTED] --- ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360923

Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

[redacted] (S)
Please provide me with the requested information.

SSA [redacted]
Charlotte Division [redacted]
Office: [redacted]
Blackberry: [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 12:26 PM
To: [redacted]
(S) Subject: RE: [redacted] ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360923

Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
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b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 12:08 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
(S) Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~
Importance: High

Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360923

Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

Guys,
[redacted] b1
b3
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b7D

With regards to you case, please provide me with a [redacted]

Please provide me with this information by Tuesday COB.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you,

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

SSA [Redacted]

Charlotte Division [Redacted]

Office: [Redacted]

Blackberry: [Redacted]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

b1
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[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 16, 2011 12:52 PM
To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: (~~S~~/NOFORN) [REDACTED] (S)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b3
b7E

(S) [REDACTED]

If any of you can assist, we look forward to your input.

Many thanks,

FBI Charlotte Team Khan
CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3
b7E
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

b1
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[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 4:52 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: [REDACTED] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360927
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

b1
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] concurs with [REDACTED] IA [REDACTED] earlier response to your message.

IA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
TS: [REDACTED]
~~Secret:~~ [REDACTED]
UNet: [REDACTED]

THIS EMAIL MAY BE CLASSIFIED UP TO: ~~SECRET//NOFORN/CON~~ [REDACTED] (S)

CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]
DEERIVED FROM: FBI/NSICG, DATED 20090615
DECLASSIFY ON: 2036XXXX

b3
b7E
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b7C

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

×

b1
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b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 10:22 AM

b1
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To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: [redacted]

(S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360927

Derived From: Multiple Sources

=====

[redacted]
[redacted] anything else on your end?

b1
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b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 7:57 AM

b1
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b7E
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b7C

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: [redacted]

(S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360927

Derived From: Multiple Sources

=====

[redacted] thank you! This is extremely helpful; I did submit a request to [redacted] but I can certainly cancel that lead.
I do have some follow-up questions if you don't mind:

b1
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b7C

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Thank you very much!

b1
b3
b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 6:42 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360926
Derived From: Multiple Sources~~

Sir,

b1
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b7E
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If this information was already known by [redacted] please disregard. Please let us know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

IA [redacted]
[redacted]
TS: [redacted]
~~Secret:~~ [redacted]
UNet: [redacted]

THIS EMAIL MAY BE CLASSIFIED UP TO: ~~SECRET//NOFORN/OC~~ [redacted] (S)
~~CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]~~
~~DEERIVED FROM: FBI NSISCG, DATED 20090615~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 2036XXXX~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

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[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 10:22 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360927
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

b1
b3
b7E
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b7C

[redacted] anything else on your end?

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 7:57 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Subject: RE: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360927
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

b1
b3
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b7C

[redacted] thank you! This is extremely helpful; I did submit a request to [redacted] but I can certainly cancel that lead.
I do have some follow-up questions if you don't mind:

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

b1
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b7E
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b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 9:15 AM

To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360927
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 7:57 AM

To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360927
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

[redacted] - thank you! This is extremely helpful; I did submit a request to [redacted] but I can certainly cancel that lead.
I do have some follow-up questions if you don't mind:

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

(S) [redacted]

Thank you very much!

[redacted]

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 6:42 PM

To: [redacted] (FBI)
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360926

Derived From: Multiple Sources

=====

Sir,

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

If this information was already known by [redacted] please disregard. Please let us know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

IA [redacted]

[redacted]

TS: [redacted]

~~Secret:~~ [redacted]

UNet: [redacted]

THIS EMAIL MAY BE CLASSIFIED UP TO: ~~SECRET//NOFORN/CON~~ [redacted] (S)

CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
DEERIVED FROM: FBI/NSISCC, DATED 20090615
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REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 04-30-2019

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[redacted] (FBI)

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From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 9:01 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360927
Derived From: Multiple Sources
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From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 7:57 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360927
Derived From: Multiple Sources
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[redacted] - thank you! This is extremely helpful; I did submit a request to [redacted] but I can certainly cancel that lead.
I do have some follow-up questions if you don't mind:

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Thank you very much!
[redacted]

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Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 6:42 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

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Declassify On: 20360926
Derived From: Multiple Sources
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Sir,

[redacted]

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If this information was already known by [redacted] please disregard. Please let us know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

IA [redacted]
[redacted]
TS [redacted]
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[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 6:42 PM

To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

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If this information was already known by [REDACTED] please disregard. Please let us know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

IA: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
TS: [REDACTED]
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WHO THINKS, WINS

Dr. Jarret M. Brachman
Submitted Testimony
House Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence
"Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: AQAP"
March 2, 2011 – 10:00am

Although there can be no disputing the success that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) has reaped as of late by using the Internet to inspire and mobilize online followers in the United States, the underlying reasons for that success remains poorly understood within the American counterterrorism community. This is largely due to the fact that most analytical attention is being paid to the tactical dimension of AQAP's media releases – stylistic elements, the Americans who are mentioned by name or specific threats made – while relatively little focus is given to the mechanics underlying AQAP's online mobilization strategy. It is as if the counterterrorism community has been so fixated on the latest bells and whistles of AQAP propaganda that few analysts have actually popped the hood.

My testimony today will concentrate on examining why AQAP's media products and personalities have found so much resonance with English-speaking individuals outside of the Gulf region of the Middle East, paying specific attention to the threat it poses to the U.S. homeland. From Texas to Virginia to New York and beyond, AQAP's American supporters seem to be finding self-actualization in consuming and reproducing AQAP's Internet messaging, both in the virtual world and, increasingly, in the physical world.

I argue that AQAP's strategic approach to online media has allowed the organization to deliver more than just information to its online supporters. AQAP now provides its online community with a compelling, comic book experience, one that equips individuals with the tools they need while demystifying the path they must take, to become their own al-Qaeda superhero.

AQAP provides an arena for escapist fantasy and role-playing by empowering their audience with new knowledge, skill-sets, role models and incentives for actualizing that knowledge. AQAP's role models, like any comic superhero, are portrayed as average men who discover that they have superhuman abilities. These 'ordinary guys turned superheroes' who comprise AQAP's dominant media personalities must then wield their superpowers to triumph over evil (the Crusaders) and save damsels in distress (Islam).

Just as kids in the United States trade comic books and baseball cards, Tweets and Facebook comments, American supporters of al-Qaeda now can trade AQAP media products and insights. They can play along online or try to replicate AQAP's adventures at home. AQAP is not just about an abstract fight against a faceless enemy for their American online cheerleaders. Thanks

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to its clever use of English-language media, AQAP has been able to put those American supporters on a noble quest to vanquish injustice and save the world from the invading evil.

The Al-Awlaki Effect

Shaykh Anwar Al-Awlaki, an American-born hardline Islamic cleric who now serves as a senior member of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has managed to become the most likeable terrorist among Western al-Qaeda supporters. Although al-Awlaki has been focused on quietly desensitizing his audiences to a hardline reading of Islam through his prolific Internet-based video and audio lectures for over a decade, al-Awlaki's recent shift to openly and directly calling for violence against the United States has meant new challenges for America's counterterrorism professionals.

Al-Awlaki offers AQAP something that few al-Qaeda personalities have been able to do: speak persuasively to an English-speaking audience without a deep knowledge of Islamic history or interest in complex theological arguments. To the contrary, al-Awlaki speaks as a populist about everyday challenges that Muslims face. This inclusive approach has helped to brand al-Awlaki as one of al-Qaeda's most user-friendly personalities – he has become an al-Qaeda gateway drug so to speak.

Now that he is formally aligned with AQAP, al-Awlaki has focused on using the Internet to repackage al-Qaeda's often elitist, esoteric and inhospitable message into something that more individuals in more geographical locations who hold a wider range of beliefs are able to both understand and, importantly, aspire to replicate on their own.

Al-Awlaki's accessibility is a function of his stylized persona: he is a caricature of previous generations of hard-line clerics. He has replicated all of their surface attributes: he carries himself like them, preaches like them, and addresses similar issues. But the difference between al-Awlaki and the legendary jihadist cleric, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, for example, is that al-Awlaki lacks depth, both in knowledge and expertise. Ironically, however it is his lack of religious knowledge that he trades on. In other words, al-Awlaki is a replica of the real thing that sells precisely because he is perceived as being more authentic for *not* being an al-Maqdisi.

Seeing al-Awlaki in video form allows his fans to better comprehend the difference between who they are and who they want to be—embodied in him. Thanks to the Internet, an army of young individuals who want to be the next al-Awlaki are now doing their own al-Awlaki impersonations. The more that they have seen al-Awlaki perform, and the easier that celebrities like al-Awlaki make it for anyone to act like them, speak like them, and preach like them, the more these individuals begin to identify as – and occasionally acting like – these al-Qaeda celebrities themselves. The line between their physical self that is performing and the virtual self that they have constructed in the image of their favorite caricatures begins to blur.

Inspiring Action

Perhaps no AQAP media product has been better for blurring the virtual and physical worlds than its English-language magazine, *Inspire*. Since releasing their first issue of *Inspire*, AQAP has continued to pioneer creative ways for empowering and motivating their online supporters. Although the magazine's kitschy tactical advice and slick graphical featurettes has made for compelling headlines, most public discussions about the magazine have yet to provide an adequate explanation for why *Inspire* actually matters.

Certainly the *Inspire* series has helped to make al-Qaeda's personalities and ideology more accessible to more people. But such intense focus about the magazine's engaging tone and stylistic attributes reflect the general low-level of theoretical sophistication in the counterterrorism field today. *Inspire* is far more than just another propaganda junket released by al-Qaeda: it is not just about getting kids to blindly follow *Inspire*'s recipe for building "a bomb in the kitchen of your mom."

The real reason that *Inspire* should be considered such an achievement for al-Qaeda is that it lowers the proverbial wall that has deterred most online al-Qaeda supporters from actually going operational. Until recently, most of al-Qaeda's Internet cheerleaders, or "jihobbyists" as I have referred to them previously, have confined their participation to the bounds of their online communities. It was the exception to the rule that an Internet supporter would actually log off their computers and pick up a weapon to go kill in the physical world.

Before individuals like Zachary Chesser, Nidal Hasan – both of whom were in direct contact with al-Awlaki, there had been few 'Internet supporters turned real world terrorists' because the gulf between thought and action has been too great. The incentives for bridging that gulf were not compelling enough to entice a mass migration of online jihadists to the physical world. Political scientists might refer to this as a free-rider problem, where individuals benefit off of the work being done by others without paying their share.

With the barriers so high and the incentives for martyrdom so seemingly distant – most online supporters al-Qaeda kept running into a glass ceiling. No matter what they did, their global online supporters remained, by and large, part-time jihadists, logging on to their favorite websites after work or on weekends. These armchair enthusiasts who put on their al-Qaeda costumes when it is convenient for them do not get al-Qaeda to where they want to go. *Inspire*, al-Awlaki and AQAP is trying to change all that.

Nobody understood that challenge of prodding jihadist supporters down radicalization road better than Anwar al-Awlaki. The American-Yemeni born cleric now spearheading AQAP's English-language outreach division and the *Inspire* initiative had been trying to incrementally radicalize his fan club for years. But since joining AQAP, al-Awlaki's approach shifted from sowing seeds of long-term jihadi radicalization - as he had been doing historically – to harvesting as many crops as possible.

Al-Awlaki's personal website, which went down in the aftermath of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, served as the virtual home to hundreds of al-Awlaki's devotees. Many of their web postings reflected a desire to live up to themselves - to attain in the physical world the kind of power and influence that they had earned in the virtual world.

As these individuals read *Inspire* and watch AQAP videos, as they register on al-Qaeda web forums and build avatars on social networking sites, they become increasingly "real" within al-Qaeda's virtual space. For some users, these online personas, or avatars, are close mirrors of their physical lives. Individuals may use their own images on their profile pages or openly discuss things that happen in their physical lives. Others, however, create stylized personas that differ significantly from the physical lives they lead. These personas are generally bad replicas of stylized caricatures of their heroes, such as al-Awlaki.

Individuals begin interacting within certain online environments and try to replicate identities and attributes that they find ideal. In the process of registering, programming, uploading, and interacting with others by posting, tagging, and instant messaging, they gain a sense for the behavioral norms and expectations within that context. It is this communication of the kinds of social markers--attributes, accoutrements, and vernacular--that are common and acceptable among their peers that *Inspire* has been able to offer.

Whereas al-Qaeda supporters clamor for authentic experiences, they embrace what Randall L. Rose and Stacy L. Wood refer to as the "ironic mixture of factitious and the spontaneous." In other words, al-Qaeda online users have created a world premised on aspiring to the authentic but they do so in the most inauthentic of places: the Internet. Achieving real-life authenticity online is, by definition, not authentic at all. Rather, it is a fictionalized, stylized version of authenticity that online participants can believe is authentic because it is as close as most of them will ever come to living up to their virtual selves.

Through the process of "doing" online extremism, one gains a sense for the available cast of roles to perform. In the act of performing, individuals further entrench those roles within their social context, making the roles all the more real. It is this acceptance of the stylized, faux reality that allows AQAP to flourish. Virtually everything about their propaganda, most notably the *Inspire* magazine itself, is comic-book like, cartoonish or caricatured in nature. But that disdain for authenticity in its traditional understanding is what has allowed AQAP to snatch the proverbial megaphone away from Al-Qaeda's Senior Leadership.

Implications

Since at least 2005, al-Qaeda's global movement has tried to transform itself from an elitist, exclusive, hierarchical organization into an increasingly inclusive global movement. More populist figures like Abu Yahya al-Libi helped engage much of al-Qaeda's Arab audience, but the Western, English-speaking part of the movement fell behind. Al-Qaeda's English-language

world needed a role model that it could call its own: someone who instinctively understood the challenges of being Muslim in the West.

Anwar al-Awlaki, with his charismatic demeanor and simplified approach to the issues he discusses, has strategically and systematically made painted the notion of joining al-Qaeda a natural progression next step from becoming more religious. In other words, he has lowered the expectations of what it means to be a member of al-Qaeda. Today, anyone can be an al-Qaeda propagandist, and al-Awlaki's job is to narrow the distance between non-violent propagandist and violent al-Qaeda activist. More people than ever are being called to al-Qaeda, not through the clenched fists of Ayman al-Zawahiri, but through the open arms of Anwar al-Awlaki.

Al-Awlaki has been so successful in winning the hearts and minds of Westerners because he made his path to al-Qaeda a step-by-step program that anyone could emulate. Western Muslims have listened to his audio recordings over and over. Many have heard him preach in person and some have even taken him out to lunch. His books have been read, his videos watched. When al-Awlaki joined al-Qaeda, he took the next step. Now his droves of supporters scramble to download the latest issue of *Inspire* to see how they can be al-Awlaki better.

The biggest challenge for governments given this new situation is that it means law enforcement will have a harder time distinguishing between legitimate security threats and those who may be doing legal activities in the name of al-Qaeda, such as making graphics or websites. If they over police those individuals who may not be operationally supporting al-Qaeda, governments may actually be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, where their search for terrorists is actually the catalyst for the emergence of operational terrorists, not just virtual fantasy ones.

Unfortunately, there remains no consensus about how far is too far when talking about using the Internet to advocate on behalf of al-Qaeda. Is uploading a photo of AQAP's Anwar al-Awlaki as one's Facebook avatar a cause for concern? Or is this just a way to blow off steam? Could it actually be cathartic – and therefore good for us - in that it helps individuals release the frustration and anger they hold in the real world? Or is it a slippery slope: one day uploading al-Awlaki images, the next taking up arms against the United States.

That said, the al-Qaeda organization will face its own challenges in steering and guiding this movement of wannabes. By appealing to the lowest common denominator in making al-Qaeda so open and accessible, individuals operating in the name of al-Qaeda will invariably do things that are actually counterproductive to their strategic objectives.

Al-Qaeda has taken a gamble by flattening their movement. In the short term, thanks to charismatic personalities like al-Awlaki, it has created an influx of individuals who can now see themselves jumping across a lower fence over to al-Qaeda's side. But in the long-term it may actually be a dilution of that which made al-Qaeda so exclusive, and therefore alluring in the first place.

Recommendations


The U.S. government is missing the boat on AQAP's use of the media because it continues to view the problem through typically bureaucratic lenses and relying on outmoded ideas for how to combat this threat. What has the now decade long government conversation about empowering "alternative voices" and developing "positive counter-narratives" actually achieved? More Americans today have more opportunities to support al-Qaeda in more ways than ever before.

A breath of fresh air has long been needed in this field, one that approaches al-Qaeda's pioneering efforts to recruit, radicalize, mobilize and operationalize Americans via Internet propaganda through their eyes, not ours.

The U.S. government ought to do two things immediately on the topic. First, the appropriate government agency ought to sponsor a series of out-of-government academic studies that examines the underlying mechanism of AQAP's English-language propaganda. To be effective, and depart from the conventional analysis being delivered on this topic, this series must reach into bodies of literature and subject matter experts who have not been previously engaged, most notably "gamification," social community development, online viral marketing, film and literary theory on superheroes.

Second, once developed, the insights from these studies – which must interweave its theoretical concepts and frameworks with real-world examples of AQAP's recruitment, radicalization, mobilization and operationalization in order to be effective - must be fed back into the government. An effective vehicle for doing that would be to develop a series of training modules for state intelligence fusion centers to empower those professionals on the front-lines with an updated strategic level understanding of AQAP's efforts and familiarity with the kinds of tactics they are using and marketing.

Appendix 1 - Why *Inspire* Actually Matters



The innovative ways that Al-Qaeda now uses the Internet allows supporters to mobilize online far faster and easier than they could in the real world. Some of these ways include 'gamifying' the online experience and offering more accessible role models to emulate. At some point, these al-Qaeda online supporters begin to understand that their physical world self is a far cry from the hero-like status of their online avatar. It is this cognitive dissonance that AQAP has sought to foment because it is in this feeling of instability that individuals are most susceptible to external influence.

Products like *Inspire* offer tangible, incremental and accessible ways for American supporters to resolve that dissonance. It gives them sure-fire, do-it-yourself advice. It offers them cultural insights and road maps. *Inspire* helps make the process of living up to your virtual self that are less scary than it might seem at the outset.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 09/30/2011

To: Counterterrorism

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Intelligence Directorate

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Charlotte

[redacted]

From: [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (S)

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CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST
(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ANWAR NASSER AULAQI
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

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
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
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
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Set Lead 2: (Info)

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Set Lead 4: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

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Set Lead 5: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 09/27/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

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Intelligence Directorate

Attn:

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From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

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1. **Introduction**
 2. **Background**
 3. **Methodology**
 4. **Results**
 5. **Conclusion**
 6. **References**

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~

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Journal of Internal Medicine 255: 105–112

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SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

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ANWAR NASSER AULAQI
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: (S//NF) [redacted] (OC/NF)

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
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
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INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

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(Rev. 05-01-2008)

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 09/30/2011

To: [redacted]
International Operations
[redacted]
Counterterrorism

Attn: LEGAT [redacted]
Attn: [redacted]
LEGAT [redacted]
Attn: ASAC [redacted]
Attn: [redacted]
SSA [redacted]

b7E

[redacted]
Intelligence Directorate

Attn: [redacted]
All ASCs/Unit Chiefs
[redacted]
Attn: [redacted]

From: [redacted]
[redacted]
Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

(S) Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (X)
(U)
(U)
(U)

Title: ~~(S)~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

ANWAR NASSER AULAQI
CT-SUNNI EXTREMISM/MIDDLE EAST

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT-SUNNI EXTREMISM/MIDDLE EAST

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b7E

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/30/2011

b1
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b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] (S)

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20360930

(U) [redacted]

Reference: (U) [redacted]

Administrative: (U) Per referenced serial, this EC includes
designator [redacted] (S)

Details: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/30/2011

b1
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b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

b1
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b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[redacted] (S)

Set Lead 2: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) ASAC [redacted] read and clear.

b6
b7C
b7E

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) All recipients: read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 5: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) All recipients: read and clear.

b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (X) [redacted] 09/30/2011

b1
b3
b7E

Set Lead 6: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) All recipients: read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 09/30/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

ASC
SFTO
IA

From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~

Title: ~~(S)~~

ANWAR NASSER AULAQI
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20360930

(U)

Administrative: ~~(S)~~

Details: ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

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b7E

~~SECRET//OECON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/30/2011

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) For [redacted] read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//OECON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/21/2011

To: Charlotte
Counterterrorism
Intelligence Directorate

Attn: SA [REDACTED]
Attn: [REDACTED]
Attn: SC [REDACTED]
ASC [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

From: Intelligence Directorate
[REDACTED]

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U)
(U)

b3
b7E

(U) Title: (S//NF) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: (S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20360921

Administrative: (S) [REDACTED]

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b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/21/2011

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

Details: ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(U)~~

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

To: Charlotte From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/21/2011

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b7E

b1
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b6
b7C

(S)

X

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/21/2011

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For information only.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

(U) For information only.

b7E

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/04/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

SOS [redacted]

(S)

Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(S)
(S)
(U)
(S)

(S)

(S)

Title: (S) [redacted]

(S)

(U)

(S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

(S)

(S)

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Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

(S)

Derived From: FBI NSISCG 20090615

Declassify On: 20361004

(U) [redacted]

b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted]

From: [redacted]
10/04/2011

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For information of [redacted]

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For information of [redacted]

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For information of [redacted]

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Action)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

[redacted] (S)

Set Lead 5: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) (S) For information of [redacted]

b7E

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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b7E

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/30/2011

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted]
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]
(U) [redacted]
(U) [redacted]
(U) [redacted]

Title: (S) [redacted]

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20360930

Reference: (U) [redacted]

Enclosure(s): (S//NF) [redacted]
(U//FOUO) One copy of the document [redacted]

Details: (S) [redacted]

b1
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b7D
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[redacted]

b3
b7E

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-08-2019

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/30/2011

To: [REDACTED]

Attn: ASAC [REDACTED]

ASAC

ASAC

ASAC

ASAC

SSA

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-08-2019

b6
b7C

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/04/2011

Pursuant to a signed [redacted]

Date of Birth [redacted]

Place of Birth [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Large redacted area]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 10/03/2011 at New York, NY

File # [redacted] Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 06-08-2019

b6
b7C

- 1 -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/28/2011

Pursuant to a signed [redacted]

[redacted] Date of Birth [redacted]

Place of Birth [redacted]

b6
b7C
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b1
b3
b6
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b7E

Investigation on 09/27/2011 at New York, NY

File # [redacted] Date dictated [redacted]

Investigator [redacted]

by SA [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/02/2011

To: Charlotte

From: Charlotte

Squad [REDACTED]

Contact: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(U)

(U)

b3
b7A
b7ETitle: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

(U) STATS

(U) [REDACTED]

b3
b7E

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To document stats/[REDACTED] contacts from
09/01/2011 to 09/30/2011 in captioned case (fourth quarter).

~~(S)~~

Derived From : G-1

Declassify On: 10/02/2036

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ This report documents all statistics, and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] earned from 09/01/11 to present (09/30/11) in captioned
case (note for record-keeping purposes that all of the statistics
reported below occurred within the fourth quarter of 2011). Many
of these stats were a team effort and thus, all team members will
receive credit for many of the below-listed stats. Due to high
workload, substantial details of the below statistics are not
included in this EC. See case file or

[REDACTED]
for further details.~~SECRET~~b3
b6
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~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 10/02/2011

CASE STATS (nine total)

(U)

~~(S)~~

b7E

(U) Major media reported that Samir Khan (along with Anwar Aulaqi) was killed by an airstrike in Yemen on 09/30/2011 (1).

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 10/02/2011

b3
b7E

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 8

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

Number: 1

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

Number: 25

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

Number: 8

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad: [REDACTED]

Number: 1

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 10/02/2011

b3
b7E

Number: 8

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad: [REDACTED]

Number: 1

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

Number: 8

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad: [REDACTED]

Number: 1

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/30/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

International Operations

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: LEGAT

Attn: LEGAT

Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted]

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

(S) Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (X)

(X)
(U)

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b7E

(S) Title: (X)

[redacted]

b1
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b7C
b7E

(U) (X) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (X)

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

Derived from: FBI NSISCG-20080615
Declassify On: 20360930

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

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[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~/~~ORCON~~ [redacted]

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b7E

(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [redacted] 09/30/2011

[redacted]
Administrative: (X) [redacted]

(S)

b1
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b7E

Reference: [redacted]

b1
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b7E

Details: (X) [redacted]

(S)

BACKGROUND

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~/~~ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~/~~ORCON~~ [redacted]

b1
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b7E

(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/30/2011

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~/~~ORCON~~ [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

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b7E

(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/30/2011

(S)

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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

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b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~/~~ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [redacted] 09/30/2011

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

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b7C
b7D
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b1
b3
b7D
b7E

Set Lead 3: (Information)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Information)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~/~~ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/30/2011

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Information)

[redacted]

b7E

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Information)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-09-2019

b1
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 5:49 PM
To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~ (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361003
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

b6
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[REDACTED] - to close the loop, this particular [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] best of luck in your upcoming trial.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 5:34 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~ (S)

b1
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b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20360923
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

b1
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b6
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b7E

Thanks!
Have a nice weekend-

b3
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b7C
b7E

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 5:28 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Subject: RE: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360923

Derived From: FBI NSISC

Hi [redacted]

b1
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b7C
b7E

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Thanks again—please let us know how else we can help,

From: [redacted]

Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 5:12 PM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

WA [redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20360923

Derived From: FBI NSISC

b1
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(S)

b1
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Many thanks,

SA [redacted]

FBI Charlotte [redacted]

b6
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b6
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b7E

Command

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/06/2011

b6
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b7E

To: Intelligence Directorate
✓Charlotte

Attn:

Attn:

SA

Attn:

SA

Attn:

IA

From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(S)

(S)

(U)

(U)

(U)

Title: (S//NF)

(S)

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b7E

Synopsis: (S//NF)

(S)

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615

Declassify On: 20361006

Reference: (U)

Administrative: (S//NF)

(S)

Details: (S//NF)

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

To: Intelligence Directorate
(S) Charlotte From: [REDACTED]
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 10/06/2011

Attn: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

To: Intelligence Directorate
(S) Charlotte From: [REDACTED]
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 10/06/2011

Attn: [REDACTED]

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-09-2019
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/06/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Charlotte

Attn: [redacted]

SSA
SA [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Contact: TFO [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (S)

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Title: [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)
SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: [redacted] (S)

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Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20361006

Reference: [redacted] (S)

Details: [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] 10/06/2011

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(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 10/06/2011

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]

b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ Information only. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) ~~(S)~~ Information only. Read and clear.

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/14/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

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Charlotte

Attn: IA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

From: [redacted]
[redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (S)
(U)

Title: (S)

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Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

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Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20360914

Reference: (S)
(S) [redacted]

Details: (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

(S)

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: ~~(U)~~ [redacted] 09/14/2011

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/14/2011

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(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (X) [redacted] 09/14/2011

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

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Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-13-2019

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]
From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2011 1:16 PM
To: [redacted]

Cc:
Subject:

FW: [redacted]

(S)

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20361011~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC~~
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[redacted]

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[redacted] please correct me if I'm wrong!

Best,

(S) [redacted]
From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2011 12:46 PM
To: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted] (S)

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UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

[redacted] (S)

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This message is automatically generated. DO NOT REPLY TO THIS EMAIL.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~



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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-13-2019

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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[redacted]

From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:

[redacted]

Tuesday, October 11, 2011 10:58 AM

[redacted]

Subject:

RE: Samir

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassify On: 20361011

Derived From: Multiple Sources

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☐ all -

[Large redacted area]

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[Redacted] (S)

Please advise how to proceed.

Respectfully,

SA [Redacted]
FBI Charlotte
[Redacted]

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From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2011 9:51 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: FW: Samir

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [Redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20361011~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
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[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2011 9:13 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: Samir

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: FBI~~
~~Declassify On: 20361011~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
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~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2011 11:38 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: Samir

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By:~~ [Redacted]
~~Declassify On:~~ 20361004
~~Derived From:~~ Multiple Sources
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From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2011 10:36 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: Samir

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By:~~ [Redacted]
~~Declassify On:~~ 20361004
~~Derived From:~~ Multiple Sources
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From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2011 10:07 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: Samir

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~


Classified By:

Declassify On: 20361004

Derived From: Multiple Sources

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(S)



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From:



Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2011 9:22 AM

To:

Cc:



Subject: RE: Samir

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By:

Declassify On: 20361004

Derived From: Multiple Sources

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Sorry - thanks ☐

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[Redacted]

(S)

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2011 9:20 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: Samir

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By:~~ [Redacted]
~~Declassify On:~~ 20361004
~~Derived From:~~ Multiple Sources

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(S) H [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Would you mind touching base with the case agent?

Thank you.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 5:48 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: Samir

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: FBI
Declassify On: 20361003
Derived From: Multiple Sources
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Classification: SECRET
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[redacted]
From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2011 8:29 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Removal from Seeking More Info List

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Morning [redacted]

Hope all is well and you enjoyed the long weekend!

My apologies for not responding to your voicemail- I was out of the office. It was a good week for [redacted]

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I will be out in Charlotte Thurs and Fri Oct 27th-28th doing some [redacted] so if you're around, I'll stop by and say hi. ☺

Have a great day,

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South Yemen – a summary of a series of articles

by the “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” newspaper

Between December 19th and 30th 2010, the “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” newspaper published a series of investigative reports on southern Yemen, including impressions from a tour in the remote region and interviews with the tribal leaders in the area. This series of articles demonstrates that the press has good access to the area, to the tribal leaders there, and to the leaders of the local militias affiliated with Al-Qaeda. The following points arise from this series of reports:

- Most of Al-Qaeda's activity is focused on southern Yemen. This is due to the geographical isolation, the mountainous terrain, the difficulty in reaching the area, and the lack of an official government presence.¹
- Over the course of the previous months, the Yemeni security forces waged a war against Al-Qaeda entities in the Abyan and Shabwah Provinces, and made extensive use of fighter aircraft in the Radfh region in the Shabwah Province. The Awlaqi tribes, which are divided into two - the Upper and the Lower Awlaqi - reside in Radhf. Amongst the members of the Upper Awlaqi tribes are Fahd Al-Quso and Anwar Al-Awlaqi, Al-Qaeda operatives who at the time of publication were wanted by the American authorities (Al-Awlaqi has since been killed), but these tribes are large and also include senior members of the government holding key positions.²

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¹ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 19th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11709&article=600063>

² Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 19th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11709&article=600063> ; Al-Sharq
Al-Awsat, December 20th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=600194&issueno=11710>

- The article describes the living conditions in the area as being harsh: the roads are unpaved, there is no electricity, water or education, and many of the region's people live a primitive life. It is further reported that there is one school in the area that was taken over by Al-Qaeda until it was closed down due to a bombing.³
- The local residents vehemently deny that Al-Qaeda has any presence in the region and that the tribes give patronage to the organization's operatives in their territory. They also claim that the government is exaggerating the Al-Qaeda phenomenon.⁴
- The Yemeni authorities have tried to fight Al-Qaeda in the Shabwah region through "Awakening Councils" similar to those in Iraq, trying to enlist the local tribesmen. Up until this point, these councils were not part of any real action against the organization and it is doubtful that they can be effective. This is due to the tribal social structure in the region, and in view of the experience of the Awakening Councils in Iraq - they themselves became a target for Al-Qaeda.⁵
- The Abyan Province in the south of the country suffered from a wave of assassinations against security personnel, a large part of which were carried out in broad daylight by armed men on motorcycles. This pattern is reminiscent of the assassinations carried out by Al-Qaeda in Iraq,⁶ and coincides with the doctrine of personal Jihad carried out by individuals and

³ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 19th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11709&article=600063>

⁴ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 20th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=600194&issueno=11710>; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 26th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=601047&issueno=11716>

⁵ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 20th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=600194&issueno=11710>

⁶ See for example:
http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWVG_Arab_Media_Sources_February_2011_1.pdf, page 3.

small groups which is preached by Abu Musab Al-Suri.⁷ In September 2010, Al-Qaeda issued a manifesto containing a hit list of 54 security force personnel in the province. Following these assassinations and threats the authorities tried to limit motorcycle riding in the province, which they succeeded in enforcing in the provincial capital, Zinjibar. However, in the second largest city in the province, Jaar, the security forces failed to enforce these limitations. In Jaar, armed men move about freely and do as they please. As well as Da'awa activity, military activity and attacking the security forces, the Jihad organizations' members take the law into their own hands undisturbed – they execute homosexuals, and punish prostitutes and individuals who consume alcohol. The article notes that before the conflicts between the security forces and the Jihadi organizations began, the latter controlled Jaar almost completely. Some people likened it to an Islamic Emirate or to "Yemen Kandahar".⁸

In Abu Musab Al-Suri's book, "Da'awat Al-Muqawamah Al-Islamiyyah Al-'Alamiyyah" (The Call of Global Islamic Resistance), Al-Suri writes about the benefits the Jihad theaters can derive from the activity of individual Jihadi cells: "These cells' activities are a long arm in managing Jihad... Through their activity they provide the required deterrence of the attacking forces, they eliminate the enemy's leaders, operate behind enemy lines and carry out special operations in collaboration with the emirs of these theaters in a clandestine and planned manner".⁹

⁷ Da'awat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya Al-Alamiya, December 2004, pages 1355 – 1500.

⁸ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 21st 2010,

<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=600341&issueno=11711>

⁹ Da'awat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya Al-Alamiya, December 2004, page 1403.

- There are many disagreements as to the question of whether the acts of violence in the south of Yemen are carried out by Al-Qaeda or by criminal elements, and with regards to the level of sympathy these criminal elements have with Al-Qaeda's ideas. Furthermore, there are many elements that oppose Ali Abdullah Salah's regime, such as the separatist Al-Harak movement that claims the south is discriminated against by the authorities and calls for its independence. However, the locals deny any connection between the Al-Harak movement and Al-Qaeda, despite the government's claims.¹⁰
- The Jihad movements in the south of the country included fighters who had returned from Afghanistan, and some claim that the movements grew in the 1990s with the support of elements from within the government following the resistance to the Socialist Party, however - "the puppet rose against its maker".¹¹
- There is some dispute as to whether Al-Qaeda is carrying out criminal acts in southern Yemen in order to finance its terrorist activity. Over the past two years, a series of robberies were carried out which resulted in the theft of almost US\$2 million. Al-Qaeda did not claim responsibility for these robberies, but there are claims that Al-Qaeda carried them out to finance its

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¹⁰ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 21st 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=600341&issueno=11711>; Al-Sharq
Al-Awsat, December 22nd 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=600516&issueno=11712>; Al-Sharq
Al-Awsat, December 26th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=601047&issueno=11716>

¹¹ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 23rd 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=600639&issueno=11713>, and Al-
Sharq Al-Awsat, December 24th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=600798&issueno=11714>

activities after its governmental financing sources dried out and fatwas were given which permitted obtaining funds through theft.¹²

From all of the above, one can conclude that the main reasons for Al-Qaeda's success in the south of Yemen are the lack of ability on the part of the security forces in operating in this region, the absence of a strong central government, terrain which makes it difficult to carry out regular military activity, and the strong tribal social structure which places tribal interests before those of the state. The contribution of the tribal structure of Yemen society to Al-Qaeda's development has been discussed in previous JWMG reports.¹³ It seems that the weakened Yemeni state is facing pressure from Al-Qaeda's direction and from the direction of the separatist movement opposing the government - both weaken the state's presence in the region, thus undermining its legitimacy. The recent protests in Yemen calling for the downfall of Ali Abdullah Salah are also an expression of the absence of legitimacy and of the government's weakness and also feed the anarchy which serves as fertile ground for Al-Qaeda's continued growth.

¹² Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 30th 2010,
<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=601608&issueno=11720>

¹³
<http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/JihadiWebsitesMonitoring/JWMGInsights/tabid/320/Articlsid/865/currentpage/1/Default.aspx>

YEMEN
Political Map

The map displays the following regions and cities:

- Regions:** KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, SULTANATE OF OMAN, AL JAWF, HADRAMAWAT, AL MAHRAH, SHABWAH, ABYAN, ADAN, BAHJA, AL MAHRAH, AL GHAYDAH, AL MUKALLA, AL BAYDAH, AD DAWADBI, TALIZ, LAHIJ, ZINJIBAR, ADAN, BAHJA, AL MAHRAH, AL GHAYDAH, AL MUKALLA, AL BAYDAH, AD DAWADBI, TALIZ, LAHIJ, ZINJIBAR, ADAN.
- Cities:** Sana'a (National Capital), Aden, Al Hudaydah, Al Mukalla, Al Baydah, Ad Dawaibi, Taliz, Lahij, Zinjibar, Al Mahwil, Hajjah, Amran, Marib, Ataq, Aden.
- Geographical Features:** RED SEA, ARABIAN SEA, GULF OF ADEN, BABEL MANDEB, ERITREA, SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, SOCOTRA (YEMEN).

LEGEND

- International Boundary
- - - Governorate Boundary
- National Capital
- Governorate Capital

0 50 100 150 Km

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- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/11/2011

On October 04, 2011, [REDACTED] (Protect Identity),
Date of Birth, [REDACTED] cell phone number [REDACTED] was
interviewed at his residence located at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] by the interviewing agents. Also present was
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the agents and
the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following
information:

[REDACTED] stated that he was unsure why the FBI and/or the
[REDACTED] were present at his
residence with a search warrant and requested an explanation. The
interviewing agents informed [REDACTED] that they would explain, but
first told [REDACTED] that this was a voluntary interview and that he was
not in custody nor was he being charged with a crime. [REDACTED] asked
the interviewing agents if he had to answer any questions without
an attorney present. The interviewing agents responded telling
[REDACTED] that he did not have to say anything if he did not wish to.
The interviewing agents and [REDACTED] then proceeded to the basement
floor of his townhome so that they could speak in private, away
from [REDACTED] family.

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The interviewing agents again explained to [REDACTED] that he
was not under arrest and that he currently was not being charged
with a crime. The interviewing agents further explained that the
reason for the law enforcement presence in his home was to execute
a Montgomery County search warrant supporting a MCPD investigation
of [REDACTED]

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Once [REDACTED] heard the reason for the search warrant,
[REDACTED] initiated conversation with the interviewing agents saying he
understood why the [REDACTED] were there and appreciated the fact that
the agents kept the matter private.

The interviewing agents informed [REDACTED] that he had come to
their attention due to his connections to several subjects of FBI
Counterterrorism investigations and were working the matter [REDACTED]
with the [REDACTED]

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After being informed of the reason for the FBI presence
and the [REDACTED] search warrant, [REDACTED] voluntarily stated that he now
understood the reason for the presence of both agencies. At this

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Investigation on 10/04/2011 at [REDACTED] Maryland

File [REDACTED] Date dictated [REDACTED]
by SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

b3
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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 10/11/2011, Page 2

[REDACTED]

point, the interviewing agents again reiterated to [REDACTED] that the interview was voluntary and that he was not in custody. [REDACTED] acknowledged that he understood the situation.

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[REDACTED] entered the room in which the interviewing agents and [REDACTED] were situated, [REDACTED] voluntarily apologized to Det. [REDACTED] for originally acting like he did not know why [REDACTED] were at his residence. [REDACTED] said that he was simply confused as to why FBI was there because he did not think he had done anything wrong federally, but said that he now understood why [REDACTED] were present.

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[REDACTED] said that he was actually not surprised that the FBI wanted to talk to him because several of his friends had been recently interviewed by the FBI. [REDACTED] was advised several more times that his responses were voluntarily, and acknowledged that he understood. [REDACTED] then voluntarily provided the following information:

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b7D**SAMIR KHAN:**

[REDACTED] said he recognized a profile picture from [REDACTED] of a what appears to be a close up of a man wearing white holding an AK-47 type rifle over the name [REDACTED] as belonging to SAMIR KHAN. [REDACTED] acknowledged that he was aware that KHAN had been killed a few days prior in Yemen by an alleged drone strike along with Anwar Al-Awlaki.

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[REDACTED] said [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED] said he saw [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but said that he did not personally know [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7Db6
b7C
b7D

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 10/11/2011, Page 3

b3
b6
b7C
b7Db6
b7C
b7Db6
b7C
b7D**DRUGS:**

[REDACTED] said that he himself did not do drugs. [REDACTED] also said that he did not know anyone or call anyone that he knew to be a drug dealer. [REDACTED] said that if he did ever call anyone who was a drug dealer, then their activities were unbeknownst to him.

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED] stated that he was available for recontact for interview but would possibly like to contact an attorney first. [REDACTED] stated he would contact the interviewing agents in the near future once he contacted an attorney.

b6
b7C
b7D

b7E

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/13/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Charlotte

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Title: (S)

(S)

(S)

(U)

(S)

(S)

SAMIR KHAN

(U)

(S)

ANWAR NASSER AULAQI

Synopsis: (U) To notify recipients of intention to conduct captioned subject interviews within [redacted]

b7E

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301

Declassify On: 20361013

(U)

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]
Re: (X) [REDACTED] 10/13/2011

b1
b3
b7E

Details: [REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

X

(U) Lastly, writer will notify recipients, at a later date, of the results of the intended investigation described herein.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]
Re: (X) [REDACTED] 10/13/2011

b1
b3
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

[REDACTED]

b7E

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-13-2019

[redacted] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2011 12:26 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Hi [redacted]

FYI – thought at least parts of this may be of interest to you. Your guy appears about halfway down, items 4 a, b, c.



b6
b7C
b7E


From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2011 10:12 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: [redacted]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Hi [redacted]

(S)

Thanks again for your time,



b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

From:

[REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2011 7:08 PM

To:

[REDACTED]

Cc:

Subject: RE:

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====

(S)

H:

[REDACTED]

b1
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b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2011 5:17 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED


=====

Hi [redacted]

b1
b3
(S) b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

b1
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b7C
b7E



Thanks for your help with this!



b6
b7C
b7E

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-13-2019

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (CE) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 3:22 PM
To: [redacted]

Subject: Samir Khan (deceased) update - 10/13/2011

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20361011
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

All -

[redacted] (S)

SA [redacted]
FBI Charlotte [redacted]
[redacted]

b1
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b7E

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-30-2019

[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:22 PM
To: [REDACTED]

(S) Cc:
Subject: [REDACTED]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] - FYI, as we discussed.

Team - feel free to attend if you want/can!

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:17 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
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b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

(S)

From: [REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:15 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

[REDACTED] - can we push it to 3:30pm? Our SVTC is being used until that time...

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 1:14 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

How does 2pm on Tuesday, 10/18 sound? Hopefully your schedule is more open these days after [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 12:09 PM
(S) To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
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b7C
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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

[REDACTED]

(S)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 11:53 AM
(S) To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Were you working with someone at [REDACTED] on this that I could sit down with in DC? Otherwise, maybe a quick 15-20 VTC next week?

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 11:49 AM
(S) To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

[REDACTED] I'd be happy to visit with you. Let me know when you are available.

(S)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 11:41 AM

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted]

b1
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b6
b7C

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

[redacted]

[redacted]

b1
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b7C
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[redacted]

[redacted]

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(S) ~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] / ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/27/2011

To: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

TFO SC [redacted]

Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

SOS [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Attn: [redacted]

Intelligence Directorate

Attn: [redacted]

SC [redacted]

ASC [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

IA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

b1
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b6
b7C
b7E

~~Charlotte~~

(S) ~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] / ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

~~NO~~CON/~~NO~~FORN

To: [REDACTED] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 09/27/2011

Attn:

Contact: IA

Case ID #:

100% Satisfaction
 24/7 Support
 100% Satisfaction

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

2

~~SECRET~~

~~FOR CON/NOT FORN~~

(S) To: [REDACTED] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 09/27/2011

[illegible]

.....

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

CS

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
b3
b7E



(S) To: Washington Field From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (X) [REDACTED] 09/27/2011

[illegible]

CS

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

Title: ~~(S)~~

--

53

~~(S)~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

--	--

b1
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b7C
b7E

--

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

(U)

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

b1
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b7E

Synopsis:

~~(S//OC/NF)~~

(S)

Classified by: C66W84B33

Derived From: FBI NSISCG Handbook

Declassify On: 20360927

(U)

Administrative: ~~(S//NF)~~

b1
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Inadvertent or deliberate disclosure or unauthorized dissemination of this information may be considered a violation of 18 USC §793 and/or §798, punishable by fine or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years.

b1
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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S) ~~SECRET~~ [redacted] / ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

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b7E

(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/27/2011

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b7E

(S)

(S) ~~SECRET~~ [redacted] / ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/OFCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:

[REDACTED]

From: Intelligence Directorate

Re:

(S)

[REDACTED]

09/27/2011

(S)

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b7C
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/OFCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

(X)

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

(S)

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/~~

~~ORCON~~

~~/NOFORN~~

b1
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(S)

To:

[REDACTED]

From: Intelligence Directorate

Re:

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

09/27/2011

(S)

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

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~~ORCON~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

09/27/2011

[Large Redacted Block]

(S)

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

To:

Re:

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

(S) [Redacted]

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(S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

To:

Re:

~~(U)~~

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

(S)

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~


b1
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(S)

To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 09/27/2011

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(S)



(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S) ~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] / ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/27/2011

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(S)



(S) ~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] / ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~/

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

To:

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate

Re:

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

09/27/2011

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(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~/

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

To:
Re:

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7C

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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (X) [redacted] 09/27/2011

(S)

[Large redacted area]

[Redacted bar]

(S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

To:

Re:

(S)

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

(S)

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(S)

To:

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate

Re:

(S)

[Redacted]

09/27/2011

(S)

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (X) [redacted] 09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

To:
Re:

~~(S)~~

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

To:
Re:

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

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(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

To:
Re:

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

~~(U)~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: ~~(U)~~ [redacted] 09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

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b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

[Redacted]

(X)

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

~~(S)~~

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

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b7E

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

~~(S)~~

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

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b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

(S)

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b1
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b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

(S)

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
b3
b7E

(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 09/27/2011

b1
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b7C
b7E

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

To:

[REDACTED]

From: Intelligence Directorate

Re:

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

09/27/2011

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~


b1
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(S)

To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (X) [redacted] 09/27/2011

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b7E

(S)



(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b1
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b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

~~(U)~~

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/27/2011

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(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

~~(S)~~

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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(S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

~~(U)~~

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

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b7E

(S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

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b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate
09/27/2011

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

b1
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(S) To: [redacted] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7C
b7E

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b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

~~(S)~~

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

~~(S)~~

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

(S)

b1
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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:

[Redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate

Re:

(S)

[Redacted]

09/27/2011

(S)

b1
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b7E

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
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b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

[redacted]

(U) [redacted]

From: Intelligence Directorate

09/27/2011

(S)

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b7C
b7E

(U) Questions regarding this communication should be directed to [redacted] SA [redacted] at [redacted] or [redacted] IA [redacted] at [redacted].

b6
b7C
b7E

(U) If possible, please take a moment and complete the FBI Customer Satisfaction Survey located at [redacted] Your response will help us to serve you more effectively and efficiently in the future. Upon completion, please e-mail the form to SIA [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET~~/

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

To: [REDACTED] From: Intelligence Directorate
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 09/27/2011

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET~~/

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/14/2011

To: Charlotte

Attn:

SA
SA

b6
b7C
b7E

From: Charlotte

Contact:

Approved By:

(S) Drafted By:

Case ID #: (S) (U) (U)

Title:

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

(U)

(S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

(S)

Synopsis: (S//NF) To request the destruction of evidence that is no longer needed.

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20361014

Reference: (S//NF)

(S)

Details:

(S)

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [redacted] 10/14/2011

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [redacted] 10/14/2011

b1
b3
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) SA [redacted] Read and Clear.

b6
b7C

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) SA [redacted] Read and Clear.

b6
b7C
b7E

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG C69W32B10
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-20-2019

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 11:13 AM
To: [REDACTED]
(S) Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]
Importance: High

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361019
Derived From: FBI NSISC 20090615
=====

FYI,

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-29-2019

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 10:00 AM
To: [redacted]
(S) Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted]

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: ~~25X1-human~~
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

Thanks [redacted]
[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 9:57 AM
To: [redacted]
(S) Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted]

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: ~~25X1-human~~
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

(S)

b1
b3
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b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Best,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

P.S. [Redacted] to keep you in the loop as best as I can.

P.S.S.S. [Redacted] hope all is well.

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2011 7:58 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [Redacted]

Declassify On: 25X1-human

Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615

=====

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Thanks

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2011 3:26 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [Redacted]

Declassify On: 25X1-human

Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615

=====

Thanks.

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

Have a good one.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2011 2:20 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted]

(S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassify On: ~~25X1-human~~
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615

(S)

=====

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2011 1:40 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassify On: ~~25X1-human~~
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615

(S)

=====

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 4:38 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 25X1-human
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

[redacted]
[redacted] (S)

Thanks

[redacted]
Charlotte Division
[redacted]
[redacted]

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-28-2019

b1
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[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 5:19 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

b1
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Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361020
Derived From: Other Guide

=====

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2011 10:44 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

b1
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b7E

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361020
Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/25/2011

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

b6
b7C
b7E

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

(U)

(S)

b1
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b7E

Title: (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - Sunni Extremism - Middle East

(S)

(S)

Synopsis: (S)

(S)

Derived From : FBI NSISGC, 20080301
Declassify On: 10/25/2036

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(U)

Details: (S)

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

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b3
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 10/25/2011

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(S)

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 10/25/2011

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~~SECRET~~

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b7E

b1
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b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 10/25/2011

(S)

X

X

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 10/25/2011

b3
b7E

Set Lead 1: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

♦♦

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-20-2019

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2011 12:43 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Ms. [REDACTED]

(S)
b1
b3
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b7C
b7E

Thank you very much,

SA [REDACTED]
FBI Charlotte [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

FD-515 (Rev. 8-30-2010)

Accomplishment Report

Date Prepared 10/21/11
Date Loaded 10/26/11
Date Loader's Initials [redacted]

Squad supervisor approval
(please initial)

(Accomplishment must be reported and loaded into
ISRAA within 30 days from date of accomplishment)

Accomplishment involves:
(check all that apply)

Drugs ☐
A Fugitive ☐
Bankruptcy Fraud ☐
Computer Fraud/Abuse ☐
Corruption of Public Official ☐
Money Laundering ☐
Sub Invest Asst by FO(s) ☒

Asst. FO(s) CD
A. B. C. D.

File Number

Stat Agent Soc. Sec. No.

Stat Agent Name

RA Squad

Assisting Agents Soc. Sec. No. X

Investigative Assistance or Technique Used									
1. Used, but did not help				3. Helped, substantially					
2. Helped, minimally				4. Absolutely essential					
For Sub. Invest. Assist. by other FO(s) indicate A, B, C, D for corresponding FO									
Rate	FO	IAT	Rate	FO	IAT	Rate	FO	IAT	
	Fin. Analyst			Lab. Field Sup			UCO - Nat.Back		Vict-Witn Coor
	Aircraft Asst.			Pen Registers			NCAVC/ Vi-CAF		IO Wanted Flyer
	Computer			Photo Cover			Crim/NS Intel Ass		SARs
	Consen Mon.			Polygraph			Crisis Neg.- Fed		CART
	ELSUR / FISC			Search Warrant			Crisis Neg.- Local		Asset Forf Prog
	ELSUR / T. III			Show Money			ERT Asst.		Forf Support Proj
	Eng. Field Spl.			SOG Asst.			Butte - OSC		TFOS/CTD
	Eng. Tape Ex.			Swat Team			Sav - OSC		CXS/CTD
	Legats Asst.			Tech. Ag/Equip.			Poc - SC		InfraGard/CyD
	Evid. Purchase			Phone Toll Rec			Tech Resp Unit		OFC/CID
	Inf/CW Info			UCO - Group I			For. Lang Asst.		PPP
	Lab. Div. Exam			UCO - Group II			Non FBI Lab Ex		Fusion Centers

A. Complaint / Information/ Indictment

☐ Federal ☐ Local ☐ International

Complaint Date: _____

Check if Civil Rico Complaint ☐

Information Date: _____

Indictment Date: _____

B. Locate / Arrest

☐ Federal ☐ Local ☐ International

Subject Priority: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C

Locate Date: _____

Arrest Date: _____

☐ Subject Resisted Arrest

☐ Subject Arrested was Armed

C. Summons Date: _____

☐ Federal ☐ Local

D. Recovery / Restitution / PELP X

☐ Federal ☐ Local ☐ International

Recovery Date: _____

Code * ☒ Amount \$ _____

Code * ☒ Amount \$ _____

Restitution Date: _____

☒ Court Ordered ☐ Pretrial Diversion

Code * ☒ Amount \$ _____

PELP Date: _____

Code * ☒ Amount \$ _____

E. Hostages(s) Released Date: _____

Released by: ☐ Terrorist ☐ Other

Number of Hostages: _____

F. Conviction

☐ Federal ☐ Local ☐ International

Conviction Date: _____

Subject Description Code _____ • (_____) •

For 6F, G, H-Include Agency Code

☐ Felony or ☐ Misdemeanor

☐ Plea or ☐ Trial

State: _____ Judicial District: _____

G. U.S. Code Violation

Required for sections A, B, F and J
(Federal Only)

Title	Section	# Counts
-------	---------	----------

_____	_____	_____
-------	-------	-------

_____	_____	_____
-------	-------	-------

_____	_____	_____
-------	-------	-------

_____	_____	_____
-------	-------	-------

H. Sentence Date: _____

Sentence Type: _____ •

In Jail: Years _____ Months _____

Suspended: Years _____ Months _____

Probation: Years _____ Months _____

Fines: \$ _____

I. Disruption/Dismantlement: ☒

Disruption Date: 9/30/2011

Dismantlement Date: _____

Completion of FD-515a Side 2 Mandatory

J. Civil Rico Matters Date: _____

Also complete "Section G"

Other Civil Matters Date: _____

Judgment _____ •

Judicial Outcome _____ • x

Amount \$ _____

Suspension: Years _____ Months _____

K. Administrative Sanction Date: _____

Subject Description Code _____ •

Type: Length: _____

☐ Suspension ☐ Permanent

☐ Debarment or _____

☐ Injunction Year _____ Months _____

L. Asset Seizure Date: _____

Asset Forfeiture Date: _____

CATS # Mandatory _____

Circle below one of the three asset forfeiture:

Admin, Civil Judicial, or Criminal

Do not indicate \$ value in Section D

M. Acquittal/ Dismissal/ Pretrial Diversion

(Circle one) Date: _____

N. Drug Seizures ☒ Date: _____

Drug Code * _____

Weight _____ Code * _____

FDIN _____

Do not indicate \$ in Section D

O. Child Victim Information

Child located / identified Date: _____

☐ Living

☐ Deceased

P. Subject Information - Required for all blocks excluding block D (Recovery/PELP), blocks E, I, L and N

Name	Race*	Sex	Date of Birth	Social Security No. (if available)
Samir Zafar Khan	W	M	12/25/1985	091-80-3487

For Indictments/Convictions only:

☐ Subject related to an LCN, Asian Organized Crime (AOC), Italian Organized Crime (IOC), Russian/Eastern European, Caribbean, or Nigerian Organized Crime Group - Complete FD-515a, Side 1 Blocks A-E mandatory, F-H as appropriate.

☐ Subject related to an OC/Drug organization, a VCMO Program National Gang Strategy target group, or a VCMO Program National Priority Initiative target group - Complete FD-515a, Side 1 Blocks A-C only.

x Additional information may be added by attaching another form or a plain sheet of paper for additional entries.

• See codes on reverse side.

✓ Requires that an explanation be attached and loaded into ISRAA for recovery over \$1 m and PELP over \$5 m, disruption, dismantlement, and drug seizures.

Serial No. of FD-515

b6
b7C

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U) On 09/30/2011, Samir Khan and Anwar Aulaqi were killed when a US drone struck the vehicle they were driving.

(U) Khan is a self-admitted member of AQAP who was responsible for significant AQAP propaganda and recruiting efforts via AQAP's English-language magazine, "Inspire."

(U) Aulaqi is a designated terrorist associated with AQAP. AQAP is a designated terrorist organization.

(U) The death of Khan and Aulaqi, as reported in the media, has significantly impacted AQAP's ability to motivate and recruit English-speaking extremists via "Inspire" magazine.

(U) Stat case agents/FBI contributed significant intelligence to the [REDACTED] regarding Khan (see [REDACTED] for unclass information relative to this contribution). [REDACTED]

Page 1

10/26/11 14:46:44

10/26/2011

***** DISRUPTION *****

~~SECRET~~

Case Number: [redacted]
Serial No.: [redacted]

Stat Agent Name: [redacted]
Stat Agent SOC.: [redacted]

Report Date: 10/26/2011
Accom Date.: 09/30/2011

b6
b7C
b7E

Does Accomplishment Involve

Subject Name

Drugs : N
A Fugitive. : N
Bankruptcy Fraud. : N
Computer Fraud/Abuse. : N
Corruption of Public Officials: N
Money Laundering. : N

Sub. Invest. [redacted]

1 = Used, but did not help
2 = Helped, Minimally
3 = Helped, Substantially
4 = Absolutely Essential

b7E

Investigative Assistance or Technique Used

FINAN ANALYST	LAB FIELD SUP	UCO - NAT BACK	VICT-WITN COOR
AIRCRAFT ASST	PEN REGISTERS	NCAVC/VI-CAP	IO WANTED FLYR
COMPUTER ASST	PHOTO COVERGE	CRIM/NS INTEL	SARS
CONSEN MONITR	POLYGRAPH	CRIS NEG-FED	CART
ELSUR/FISC	SRCH WAR EXEC	CRIS NEG-LOC	ASSET FORF PRO
ELSUR/III	SHOW MONEY	ERT ASST	FORF SUPPORT P.
ENG FIELD SUP	SOG ASST	BUTTE OSC	TFOS/CTD
ENG TAPE EXAM	SWAT TEAM	SAV OSC	CXS/CTD
LEGATS ASST.	TECH AG/EQUIP	POC SC	INFRAGARD/CYD
EVIDNCE PURCH	TEL TOLL RECS	FT. MON-NRCSC	OFC/CID
INFORMANT/CW	UCO-GROUP I	FOR LANG ASST	PPP
LAB DIV EXAMS	UCO-GROUP II	NON FBI LAB EX	FUSION CENTERS

DATE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT: 20110930
ORGANIZATION DISRUPTED: AQAP
SCOPE OF ORGANIZATION: INTERNATIONAL

Accomplishment Narrative

ON 9/30/11 SAMIR KHAN AND ANWAR AULAQI WERE KILLED WHEN A US DRONE STRUCK THE VEHICLE THEY WERE DRIVING. KHAN IS SELF-ADMITTED MEMBER OF AQAP RESP FOR SIGNIF AQAP PROPOGANDA AND RECRUITING EFFORTS VIA AQAP'S ENGLISH-LANG MAG INSPIRE. AULAQI IS DESIGNATED TERRORIST ASSOC W/ AQAP WHICH IS DESIG TERR ORGANIZ. DEATH OF KHAN AND AULAQI AS REPORTED IN THE MEDIA HAS SIGNIF IMPACT ED AQAP'S ABILITY TO MOTIVATE/RECRUIT ENGLISH-SPEAKING EXTREMISTS VIA INSP MAG. STAT CASE AGENTS/FBI CONTRIBUTED SIGNIF INTEL TO [redacted] RE KHAN. [redacted]

b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-20-2019

[redacted] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2011 4:08 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Samir Khan (deceased) update - 10/13/2011

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20361011
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2011 3:22 PM
To: [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

Subject: Samir Khan (deceased) update - 10/13/2011

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20361011
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

All -

(S)

[redacted]


b1
b3
b5
b6
b7C
b7E

SA [redacted]
FBI Charlotte [redacted]
[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)
=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-20-2019

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From:
Sent:
To:

[redacted]
Thursday, October 20, 2011 4:25 PM

(S)

Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20361020
Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

SA [redacted]
FBI Charlotte [redacted]
[redacted]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

attachment is
serial [redacted] in

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-29-2019

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From:
Sent:
To:

[REDACTED]
Wednesday, October 26, 2011 6:23 PM

Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361026
Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

[REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

SA [REDACTED]
FBI Charlotte [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
=====

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-20-2019

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2011 11:42 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361031
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

[REDACTED] - sounds good on the de-tasking since there has been NO activity in well over six months (that CE has seen).

b6
b7C

Best,

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2011 11:35 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

(S) Subject: [REDACTED]

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361031
Derived From: Other Guide
=====

We will check, but if you want to rescind [REDACTED] we will shoot and email to [REDACTED] and get it done. We will let [REDACTED] know just for visibility.

SSA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2011 10:35 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) Subject: [REDACTED]

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Classified By: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Declassify On: 20361031
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Best,

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 12:18 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Subject: [Redacted] (S)

10-4

SSA [Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:59 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S)

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 2:02 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] (S)

Thanks [Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

SSA [Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 2:01 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

From:

[Redacted]

Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2011 12:17 PM

To:

[Redacted]

Cc:

Subject:

[Redacted]


(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~



b1
b3
b7E

First Previous Next Last

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: Routine

Date: 10/4/2011

To: ✓Charlotte

Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

Attn: SSA [redacted]
IA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]
Attn: [redacted]
Attn: SA [redacted] / SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Attn: ASAC [redacted]

From: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (X)
(U)
(X)

[redacted] (S)
[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

Title: (X)

[redacted] (S)

(U) (X)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(X)

[redacted] (S)

Sponsia: (X) (X)

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

(S) b1
b3
b7E

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615
Declassify On: 20351209

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7A
b7E


(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: [redacted] 10/04/2011

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

Reference: (S) [redacted]

Administrative: (S) [redacted]

(S) (U//FOUO)




(S)

(S) Details: (S//OC/NF) [redacted] The above referenced serial detailed the following:

b1
b3
b7E

Summary: (S//OC/NF) [redacted]



(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

(S)

To: Counterterrorism

From: [redacted]

Re: [redacted]

10/04/2011

(S)

×

×

×

×

×

×

b1
b3
b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~ORCON~~/~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: [redacted], 10/04/2011

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

(S)

X

[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT

[redacted]

(U)

[redacted]

Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT

[redacted]

(U)

[redacted]

Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT

[redacted]

(U)

[redacted]

Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 5: (Info)

~~SECRET~~//~~ORCON~~/~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: [redacted], 10/04/2011

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

♦♦

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-21-2019

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2011 12:24 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

(S) Subject: [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361104
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

Absolutely. We'll do.



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2011 3:41 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E


(S) Subject: [REDACTED] -- ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361104
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

(S) b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

Thank you!



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2011 11:18 AM
To: [REDACTED]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20361104
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

Thanks [redacted] I replied on [redacted]
[redacted] (S)
I will be in touch soon with a follow-up.
[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2011 11:10 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20361104
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[redacted] (S)
[redacted]

Thanks

[redacted]

(S) From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 8:25 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20360707
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

b6
b7C

(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

SSA [redacted]
[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-29-2019

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2011 2:23 PM
To: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2011 12:32 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Somehow I did not get you on the "to" line. Sorry about that...

(S) From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2011 9:42 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

(S)

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~



Thanks



b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-21-2019

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, November 09, 2011 1:32 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361109
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

Sorry forgot to copy you on this.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, November 09, 2011 1:15 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20361109
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

(S)

Thanks,

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-21-2019

[redacted] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2011 12:41 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted]
Attachments: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20361104
Derived From: FBI NSISC
=====

(S)

[redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

How do you want to proceed? Do you want me to spearhead and send an email to [redacted] Do you want to? Do you want to ask [redacted] to?

(S) [redacted]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2033
DATE: 05-21-2019

[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2008 2:14 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

~~SECRET~~
RECORD [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Thanks.

[REDACTED]
Technical Advisor
FBI Charlotte Division

[REDACTED] fax
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2008 12:13 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~
RECORD [REDACTED]

(S)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2008 9:16 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~
RECORD [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

Technical Advisor
FBI Charlotte Division

fax

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 4:24 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~
RECORD

Thanks [redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 4:23 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~
RECORD

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

I forwarded your request on to [redacted] I talked to [redacted] over there (she's awesome) and she is going to try to get you all fixed up tomorrow. If in the future you need to contact them [redacted], their number is [redacted]

V/R,

Systems Administrator

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 3:53 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED]

In communicating with [REDACTED] about this matter, he offered the following two options:

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] - FYI on this.

SA [REDACTED]
FBI Charlotte [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 2:32 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]
Importance: High (S)

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD~~

[REDACTED]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) Good afternoon [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S)

Thanks! :)

[REDACTED]

Visit our program on the intranet:

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, October 10, 2008 8:38 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD~~

[redacted]

What do we do about this?

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, October 09, 2008 7:22 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

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~~RECORD~~

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

V/R,

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

[Redacted]
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 08, 2008 7:05 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] (S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD~~ [Redacted]

Hi [Redacted]

Can you please provide SA [Redacted] with the requested information below? If you need anything from me, please advise.

Thank you for your help! :)

[Redacted]

Visit our program on the intranet:

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2008 1:21 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD~~ [Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3
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b7C
b7E

Any insight you can provide would be very much appreciated.

Please know that the fact that help is available is also very much appreciated; I just want to ensure everyone is on the same page.

SA [Redacted]
FBI Charlotte [Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Sunday, October 05, 2008 12:24 PM
To: [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Cc:

Subject:

~~SECRET~~
~~RECORD~~

(S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

SA

(S)

Thank you.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Fax

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
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DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/10/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (X)
(U)

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7A
b7C

Title: (X)

(U) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

(S)

Synopsis: (X)

(S)

b1
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b6
b7C
b7E

~~Derived From : Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassify On: 20361109~~

Enclosure(s): (X)

(S)

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b7C
b7E

Details: (X)

(S)
(S)

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b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] (S)

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [Redacted]
Re: (X) [Redacted] 11/10/2011

(S)

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b7E

X

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

(S)

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (U) [redacted] 11/10/2011

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

~~(S)~~

(S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/10/2011

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

IA

From:

Contact: TFO

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

Title: (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S)

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301
Declassify On: 20360811

Details: (S)

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ (S)

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b7A
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b1
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b1
b3
b6
b7C

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~



(S)

(S)

To: Counterterrorism From:



Re: (X)



11/10/2011

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b1
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b7C
b7D
b7E

(S)

X

X

X

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~



(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7A
b7D
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (U) [redacted] 11/10/2011

[redacted] (S)

(U) On 11/9/2011, TFO [redacted] and SA [redacted] contacted [redacted] at her home located in [redacted] at [redacted] Ave for the purpose of interviewing [redacted]. Both TFO [redacted] and SA [redacted] were greeted by [redacted] and her husband [redacted], SSN: [redacted] D.L. [redacted]. The investigators were allowed into their home by [redacted].

b6
b7C
b7E

(U) Both were informed by the investigators of their identity using credentials and providing business cards. The investigators explained the reason for the contact was part of an outreach program to speak with the Muslims in the area and see how things were going for them in their community.

(U) [redacted] was on his way to work and TFO [redacted] spoke with him briefly before he needed to leave. [redacted] currently works two jobs, one is at the [redacted] where [redacted] works [redacted]. The other is [redacted] where [redacted] also stated he was originally from [redacted] and ended up in [redacted] by way of Job Corps. [redacted] left after a few minutes of visiting to catch his bus.

b6
b7C
b7E

(U) [redacted] allowed for TFO [redacted] and SA [redacted] to stay and talk after his husband had left. [redacted] explained she enjoys and fits into the [redacted] area fairly well other than the stares she gets at the grocery store for wearing a black burqa and niqab.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] (S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (U) [redacted] 11/10/2011

b1
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b7E

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U) Database checks were performed to the above parties along with their individual identifiers with no derogatory information being located.

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7A
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] 11/10/2011

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) Information only for Counterterrorism [redacted]
[redacted]. Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 05-21-2019

[redacted] (CE) (FBI)

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, November 10, 2011 9:56 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1
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b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20361110
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

[redacted]

(S)

Let me know if you have any other questions or concerns.

IA [redacted]

[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

THIS EMAIL MAY BE CLASSIFIED UP TO: ~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
DERIVED FROM: FBI NSICG, DATED 20090615
DECLASSIFY ON: 2036XXXX

(S)

×

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, November 09, 2011 3:02 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20361109
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

b3
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b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

There's no rush, but I did want to see what the latest is.

Thank you!

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 4:58 PM

To: [Redacted]

Cc: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Subject: [Redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
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b7C
b7E

Classified By: [Redacted]

Declassify On: 20360927

Derived From: Multiple Sources

=====

Phenomenal, thanks so much Rich.

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 4:52 PM

To: [Redacted]

Cc: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Subject: [Redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classified By: [Redacted]

Declassify On: 20360927

Derived From: Multiple Sources

=====

[Redacted]

[Redacted] concurs with [Redacted] IA [Redacted] earlier response to your message. (S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

IA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

THIS EMAIL MAY BE CLASSIFIED UP TO: ~~SECRET//NOFORN//OC~~ [Redacted] (S)

CLASSIFIED BY: [Redacted]
DERIVED FROM: FBI NSISCG, DATED 20090615
DECLASSIFY ON: 2036XXXX

(S)

×

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 10:22 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassify On: 20360927
Derived From: Multiple Sources

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted] anything else on your end?

Counterterrorism [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 7:57 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassify On: 20360927
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

(S)

[Redacted]

Thank you very much!

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 6:42 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] (S)

b1
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b7C
b7E

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassify On: 20360926
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

Sir,

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

Thanks,

IA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

THIS EMAIL MAY BE CLASSIFIED UP TO: ~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [Redacted]

(S)

CLASSIFIED BY: [Redacted]
DERIVED FROM: FBI NSISCG, DATED 20090615
DECLASSIFY ON: 2036XXXX

(S)

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1193607-0

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Page 329 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 330 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 331 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 332 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 333 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 334 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 335 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 336 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;

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X For this Page X
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/23/2012

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

IA
IA

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b7E

Attn: [REDACTED]

A/UC
SSA

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte [REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U)
(S)

b1
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b7E

Title: (U) (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

b1
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b6
b7C

Synopsis: (S)

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 01/23/2037~~

Administrative: (U) Writer coordinated the release of this EC
with [REDACTED]

b7E

Details: (S) (NR)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 01/23/2012

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(S) b7C

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 01/23/2012

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(S)

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To: Counterterrorism

From: Charlotte

Re: (U)

01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) 01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism

Re: (U)

From: Charlotte

01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism
Re: (U)

From: Charlotte
01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism
Re: (U)

From: Charlotte
01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) 01/23/2012



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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) 01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism

From: Charlotte

Re: (U)

01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism
Re: (U)

From: Charlotte
01/23/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 01/23/2012

b3
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

For information.

b6
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b7E

Set Lead 2 (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

For information.

Set Lead 3 (Info)

AT [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

For SA [redacted]

For information.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/01/2012

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

A/UC [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

SOS [redacted]

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Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

IA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

IA [redacted]

Intelligence Directorate

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

Charlotte

Attn: SSA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

SOS [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (U) [redacted] (Closed)

b3
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b1
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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

b3
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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted], 02/01/2012

b1
b3
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b7E

(U) **Title:** ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: (U) [redacted]
[redacted]

b7E

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 02/01/2037~~

(U) [redacted]

b7E

(U) **Administrative:** ~~(S)~~ Captioned investigation has a sharepoint site that can be found on the FBINET Intranet at:
[redacted]

No permission is required to access this site.

b1
(S) b3
b7E

Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~ Case Progress Report (CPR), List of Investigative Techniques Used, [redacted]
(S) [redacted] and Overview Timeline of Khan In Yemen. (S)

(U) **Details:** CASE PREDICATION ~~(S)~~
[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted], 02/01/2012

(S) The [redacted] discovered an online blog maintained by Khan, which identified his interest in the Tanzeem-e-Islami-affiliated, US-based organization, Islamic Organization of North America (IONA), and in jihad. It was discovered that Khan stated that his view of jihad and IONA's view of jihad differ in that IONA does not publicly support the physical fighting aspect of jihad.

[redacted] (S)

(U) (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

X
[redacted] (S)

(U) An earlier version of Khan's online blog was ranked among the top one percent of one hundred million Internet web sites in the world. His most recent online blog contained postings that support violent jihad to include links to hundreds of videos that graphically depict the killing of US soldiers in Iraq, suicide attacks on coalition facilities, and speeches by [redacted] and UBL. On his online blog, Khan has stated his desire to bring about the Islamic Caliphate and that he feels the west is a hypocrisy.

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] From early 2007 until late 2009, investigation of Khan revealed that this self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi became increasingly religious and radical over time. Major discoveries of the investigation include: [redacted] (S)
[redacted] Khan became a radicalizing influence on others, possibly motivating/recruiting them for jihad; individuals close to Khan expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr, and he himself indicated an interest in becoming a martyr; Khan created the first US-based, English language, pro-jihad magazine, known as "Jihad Recollections," which published four issues online and received significant international attention; and in October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted], 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U)  02/01/2012



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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted], 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 02/01/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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
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
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
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) , 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted], 02/01/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U)  02/01/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U)  02/01/2012

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

[redacted] (S)

(U) It is noted that Khan was officially represented by a defense attorney beginning in July 2010.

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 02/01/2012

DESCRIPTIVE DATA ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

Main Subject

Name -

Last: Khan

First: Samir

Middle: Zafar

(S)

Race:
Sex: M
Date of Birth: 12/25/1985
Date of Death: 09/30/2011
POB: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012



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Languages: English, Arabic, Urdu (speak) [Immigration records from 1992 indicate Khan speaks Urdu and reads Arabic. Khan traveled to Yemen in 10/2009 to study Arabic.]
Ht: 5'7" (per North Carolina DL), 5'6" (per medical exam dtd 3/2009)
Wt: 178 lbs (per medical exam dtd 3/2009)
Eyes: Brown (wears eyeglasses)
Hair: Brown
ARN: A040061311
SSAN: 091-80-3487
Passport: US, 301708539, expires 5/28/2012
DL: 25188737 (North Carolina), expired 12/25/2010



b7E

Citizenship: USPER (automatically with naturalization of mother on 03/18/1999). Prior to naturalization, he was considered Pakistani.



b7E

Past Address -

City: Unknown
Country: Yemen

[Note: Khan moved to Hadramout sometime in 11/2009 or 12/2009, but was not believed to stay in one location.]

Past Address -

City: Sana'a
Country: Yemen

[Note: Khan lived here from 10/23/2009 until 11/2009 or 12/2009.]

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

Past Address -

House #: 11231
Street Name: Tradition View
Street Suffix: Dr.
City: Charlotte
State: NC
Postal Code: 28269
Country: USA



b7E

Past Address -

House #: 1916
Street Name: Plymouth
Street Suffix: Dr.
City: Westbury
State: NY
Postal Code: 11590
Country: USA

Past Phone #:

© - US) [redacted] [note: as of June 2010, now being used by [redacted]]

© - Yemeni) 967714433612




(H) 704/549-8097 (home phone on Tradition View Dr. - see EC dtd 11/4/2008)

(H) [redacted] = subscriber)

© 704/533-0354 (inactive)


(H) 516/334-1813

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012



(S)

Miscellaneous -
Religion:


Islam/Sunni (self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi). In 1999 Khan attended a mosque in Queens, NY, that was also attended by ALM followers. After 9/11/2001, Khan was influenced by their extreme views. [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] According to NY Times article, @ age 15 in August 2001, Khan attended one week long IONA summer camp that captivated him. Khan separated from IONA in summer 2006 because the organization would not support violent jihad w/o endorsement of a Muslim nation's leader, with which Khan disagrees. Khan attended Masjid Al Mustafa, Islamic Society of Greater Charlotte (ISGC), 7025 East The Plaza, Charlotte, NC (Plaza Mosque) as well as ICC. In April 2009, Khan became a member of Dawa Committee for ISGC. In August 2009, became disenchanted with ISGC due to the Imam. In October 2009 made hijra to Sana'a, Yemen. In November/December 2009, Khan left Sana'a for Hadramout region of Yemen to study Arabic, Fiqu, and Shariah.

(S)

Family:



(S)



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
(S)

(S)

Education:



Al-Iman University (?) (as per [redacted])



Central Piedmont Community College (CPCC), Charlotte, NC
(8/2007 – 10/2009)[IT major – Networking Technology, Sociology minor]
Walter Tresper High School, Westbury, NY (9/1999 – 6/2003)
-- played JV and Varsity football, JV basketball, soccer
-- average grades

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

Certifications: A+ (Information Technology) [2/12/2009]

b7E

[redacted]

Pets: Cats

Work: Taught English (at Yemen University in Sana'a, Yemen, 10/2009 – 11/2009)
[see DWS # 19174036E Customer Service Representative for NCO Financial Systems, Inc. (call
for much of this] center for Apple iPhones/Macintosh computers) (4/2009 – 10/2009 [took
leave of absence to travel to Yemen, then was terminated via mail])
Unemployed (7/2008 – 4/2009)
Call Center Associate, Convergys, Charlotte, NC (6/2008 – 7/2008)
Front Desk Agent, Super 8 Motel, 4930 Sunset Rd., Charlotte, NC (7/2007–12/2007)
Spherion Atlantic (3/2006)
Sales (cellphones), One-Stop Cellular (4/2006 – 10/2006)
Sales (knives), Vector Marketing, Charlotte, NC (11/2004 – 2/2005)
Home Tutor (taught science to youth), Charlotte, NC (1/2004 – 4/2006)
Sales (clothing/shoes), Tantrum, Charlotte, NC (8/2004)
Sales (footwear), Finish Line, Charlotte, NC (7/2004 – 8/2004)
Sales (food), Halal International, Charlotte, NC (5/2004 – 7/2004)

Volunteer: Sunday School teacher (10/2004 – unknown)
Model United Nations (9/2005 – 1/2006)
Red Cross (9/2002 – 6/2003)

Skills: Computers, Sales

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b7E

[redacted] (S)

Bank: First Charter (as per application to IIUI summer 2007 and Ebay records)
Fifth Third (as per 10/9/2008 cellphone tech cut)
[First Charter is now Fifth Third]
- Checking Acct: 125558866
- Visa 4661 2930 0777 1085 (debit, as per Fifth Third)
- Visa Debit 4661 2930 0498 6272
- Visa Debit 4661 2930 1775 1713

US Bank (from Ebay records)
- Checking Acct: [redacted] (used by Khan, owned by [redacted])

b6
b7C
b7E

Travel:

[redacted]

2004 - Saudi Arabia w/ father (for Umra, returned 8/22/2004)
2009 - Yemen (for hijra, to teach, and to study 10/2009)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E


~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted], 02/01/2012

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

(S)



~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

(S)

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 02/01/2012

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

(S)



(U)

X

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

(S)

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

Summary/Conclusion

(U) ~~(S)~~ It is noted that the evidence in this investigation has been addressed as per [redacted]

(S) ~~(S)~~ It is also noted that, despite this investigation being closed, numerous analytical products will likely continue to be produced about Khan, his radicalization process [redacted] (S)

(U) ~~(S)~~ FBI Charlotte has completed baseline collection against this subject in accordance with the guidance specified in [redacted] Additionally, this subject has been disrupted via an OGA drone attack that killed him on 09/30/2011. FBI Charlotte is closing captioned matter.

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] For information. [redacted] efforts in this matter are very much appreciated by FBI Charlotte.

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

For information.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

For information.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

For information.

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

Set Lead 6: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

For information.

b6
b7C
b7E

Set Lead 7: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

For information.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

For information.

Set Lead 9: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

For information. [redacted] efforts in this matter are very much appreciated by FBI Charlotte.

Set Lead 10: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

For information. IA [redacted] efforts in this matter are very much appreciated by FBI Charlotte.

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 02/01/2012

Set Lead 11: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] For information.

b6
b7C
b7E

Set Lead 12: (Info)

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] For information. [redacted] efforts in this matter are very much appreciated by FBI Charlotte.

Set Lead 13: (Info)

AT [redacted]

(U) SA [redacted] For information. SA [redacted] efforts in this matter are very much appreciated by FBI Charlotte.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

(S) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Case Progress Report - Summary

Samir Zafar Khan (Sumat Extremism - Middle East)		U.S. Citizenship	
Points of Contact:		Field Office Points of Contact	
A/UC		SSA	
SSA		SA	
SOS		TFO	
		IA	
		SOS	



b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Biographical - Samir Zafar Khan

Citizenship	POB	DOB	Location	Custody
U.S. (naturalized)	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	12/25/1985	Deceased (Yemen)	No

(S)

(U) ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

New Intelligence:

(U)

Predication/Synopsis of Subject:

--

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

(S)

Case Progress Report - Summary

(U) The [redacted] discovered an online blog maintained by Khan, which identified his interest in the Tanzeem-e-Islami-affiliated, US-based organization, Islamic Organization of North America (IONA), and in jihad. It was discovered that Khan stated that his view of jihad and IONA's view of jihad differ in that IONA does not publicly support the physical fighting aspect of jihad.

b7E

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7D
b7E

(U) [redacted] (S)

b7E

(S) [redacted] On Khan's popular online blog, as well as on several other online blogs, forums, and web sites with similar content, Khan expressed a radical Islamic worldview. This online blog, which he operated from 2005 until 2009, gained him international attention in 2007. From early 2007 until late 2009, investigation of Khan revealed that this self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi became increasingly religious and radical over time. Major discoveries of the investigation include: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

[redacted] Khan became a radicalizing influence on others, possibly motivating/recruiting them for jihad; individuals close to Khan expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr, and he himself indicated an interest in becoming a martyr; Khan created the first US-based, English language, pro-jihad magazine, known as "Jihad Recollections," which published four issues online and received significant international attention; and in October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra.

(S)

Case Progress Report - Summary

Current Situation:

[Large redacted area]

(S)

(U) On 30 September 2011, major media reported that Khan was killed, along with Anwar Aulaqi, in a CIA drone strike in Yemen. In October 2011, US State Department and AQAP both confirmed Khan's death.

(U) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b7E

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

Case Progress Report - Summary

Analytical Comments:

(S)

X

Investigative Strategy:

(U) (S) This case was closed on 02/01/2012 due to the fact that Khan is deceased.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Subject		Citizenship	DOB/ POB	Location	Custody	
Samir Zafar Khan		U.S. Citizen (naturalized)	12/25/1985 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	Deceased (Yemen)	No	
Anwar Nasser Aulaqi		U.S. Citizen	04/22/1971 Dona Ana County, New Mexico	Deceased (Yemen)	No	

b3
b7E

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-23-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

File Number

(U)

Case Title

(S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

SA [REDACTED]

Investigative Techniques

2/2/2012 3:09 PM

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

(S) ~~(S//NF/OC)~~ [redacted] OVERVIEW TIMELINE - KHAN IN YEMEN
(unless otherwise noted, source is FBI Charlotte investigation)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

SA [redacted]
2/2/2012

Timeline

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-23-2019

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 03, 2012 4:59 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: evidence
Attachments: [redacted]

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By [redacted]
Declassify On: 20370106
Derived From: FBI NSISC~~

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

=====
All - evidence in the Khan case will be handled as [redacted] (attached). [redacted] (S)
[redacted] Their leads are administratively covered but we will get a report (S)
upon completion of their analysis (likely six months).
[redacted]

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[redacted] (FBI)

From: [redacted] (CON)
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:08 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] SAMIR KHAN

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

[redacted] The only database the subject remains in at this time is [redacted] and he being dead doesn't affect such.

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:03 PM
To: [redacted] (CON)
Subject: RE: [redacted] SAMIR KHAN

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

No worries. Does the fact that the subject is dead affect the fact that his [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted] (CON)
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:01 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: [redacted] SAMIR KHAN

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

[redacted] inadvertently typed [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:00 PM
To: [redacted] (CON)
Cc: [redacted] (CON)
Subject: RE: [redacted] SAMIR KHAN

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Thanks. Two quick items: the case number is [redacted] and the subject is dead - in case that makes a difference [redacted]

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

From: [redacted] (CON)
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 1:58 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (CON)
Subject: [redacted] SAMIR KHAN

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Good Afternoon SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] has processed your removal FD930, however, due [redacted] [redacted] has decided to keep the subject in [redacted] Your case number as well as all other FBI information has been removed, but the subject's record will remain in [redacted] until the deconfliction has been resolved.

There is nothing needed on your part.



=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2012 2:40 PM
To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370202~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Thank you

[redacted]
[redacted] Desk
[redacted] Cell

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/02/2012

To: Charlotte

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED] (Closed)

(U) **Title:** (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

(U) **Synopsis:** (S) To request closure of captioned investigation's subfiles.

~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG 20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 02/02/2037~~

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) **Administrative:** (S) The EC to close the main file for captioned investigation was uploaded into [REDACTED]

Details: (S) This EC requests the closure of all subfiles related to [REDACTED] to include the following:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.

[REDACTED]

(S)

SECRET

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

b7E

b3
b7E

b1
b3
b7E

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 02/02/2012

b1
b3
b7E

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.



(S)

(S)

◆◆

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 8:46 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: RE: hey!

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370106~~
~~Derived From: Other Guide~~

Both of those are duplicates.

b6
b7C
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 8:41 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: RE: hey!

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370106~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC~~

Oy vey!

I was at the range yesterday.

The Inspire EC and [REDACTED] were two that stuck out for me. Are we putting the
brakes on those?

b6
b7C
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 8:37 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: RE: hey!

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370106~~
~~Derived From: Other Guide~~

I was waiting for your response. What took you so long?

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 8:24 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: hey!

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20370106
Derived From: FBI NSISC

=====

[REDACTED] I got spammed! I see these say completed, but... what's the dealio?

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICC [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-09-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[redacted] (FBI)

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 2:01 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis - [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] has been changed

Modify my alert settings View [redacted] View Request Analysis

Case File Number: [redacted]

Type of Analysis or Support: Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops
Only):

Type of Intelligence Product
Requested: [redacted] (S)

(S) Security Classification: ~~S//NF~~ [redacted]

Request Details:

[redacted] (S)

Records to be Analyzed:

Requested by Date:

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram: [redacted]

Issue: [redacted]

Threat Priority:

Submitter: [redacted] (FBI)

Squad: [redacted]

Location: [redacted]

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: ~~Not Started~~ Completed

Edited

Task Priority: [redacted]

Tactical/Strategic: Tactical

Assigned To: [redacted] (FBI)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Month: 2011/10 (October)

Discussion Area:

Edited
(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Quarter: Q1

Fiscal Year: FY2012

IA Priority: 0.0

Modified: 10/2/2011 2:00 PM 2/7/2012 2:00 PM

Edited

Created: 10/24/2011 1:44 PM

Last Modified 2/7/2012 2:00 PM by (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-09-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 1:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings View [REDACTED] View Request Analysis

Case File Number: [REDACTED]

Type of Analysis or Support: Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence Product Requested: [REDACTED] (S)

Security Classification: ~~S//NF~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED] (S)

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date:

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram: [REDACTED]

Issue: [REDACTED]

Threat Priority:

Submitter: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: [REDACTED] Completed

Edited

Task Priority: [REDACTED]

Tactical/Strategic:

Assigned To: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Month: 2011/10 (October)

Discussion Area:

[REDACTED] Edited (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Quarter: Q1
Fiscal Year: FY2012
IA Priority: 0.0
Modified: 1/8/2012 7:30 AM 2/7/2012 1:28 PM
Created: 10/25/2011 5:37 PM

Edited

Last Modified 2/7/2012 1:28 PM

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (FBI)

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 12:41 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis - [redacted]

[redacted] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [redacted] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

[redacted]

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops
Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

Security Classification:

ⓧ

Request Details:

Writer requests SOS [redacted] complete an analysis EC on issue 7 of Inspire magazine and combine this with information from issue 6 (as she did for Issue 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). Links to Khan should be highlighted. It is also requested that a copy of Issues 7 (and 6) be attached to the EC for the file.

Records to be Analyzed:

Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date:

Program:

Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

[redacted]

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

[redacted] (FBI)

Squad:

[redacted]

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status:

No Status - Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

[redacted]

Tactical/Strategic:

Assigned To:

[redacted] (FBI)

Month:

2011/09 (September)

Discussion Area:

Duplicate entry.

Edited

Quarter:

Q4

Fiscal Year:

FY2011

IA Priority: 0.0

Modified: 9/22/2011 4:13 PM 2/7/2012 12:38 PM

Edited

Created: 9/22/2011 5:29 PM

Last Modified 2/7/2012 12:38 PM by

[REDACTED]

(S)

b6
b7C

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b7E

(FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 12:36 PM
To: (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis -

has been changed

Modify my alert settings View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or Support: Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence Product Requested: (S)

Security Classification: ~~S//NF~~ (S)

Request Details:

If possible, writer requests that this project be pushed towards the top of the list for Khan-related requests.

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date:

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter: (FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

Tactical/Strategic: Strategic

Assigned To: (FBI)

Month: 2011/07 (July)

b1
b3
b7E

b6
b7C
b7E

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Discussion Area:

Quarter: Q4

FiscalYear: FY2011

IA Priority: 0.0

Modified: 7/21/2011 10:20 AM 2/7/2012 12:31 PM

Edited

Created: 7/21/2011 12:59 PM

Last Modified: 2/7/2012 12:31 PM (Feb)

b6
b7c

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 12:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [REDACTED] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

[REDACTED]

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air
Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

[REDACTED] (S)

Security Classification:

~~S//M~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED] (S)

Records to be
Analyzed:

Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date:

Program:

Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

[REDACTED]

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

[REDACTED] (FBI)

Squad:

[REDACTED]

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status:

Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

[REDACTED]

Tactical/Strategic:

Tactical

Assigned To:

[REDACTED] (FBI)

Month:

2010/12 (December)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Discussion Area:

Quarter: Q1

Fiscal Year: FY2011

IA Priority: 0.0

Modified: 12/12/2011 2:29 PM 2/7/2012 12:29 PM

Edited

Created: 12/1/2010 8:25 AM

Last Modified 2/7/2012 12:29 PM by [REDACTED] (STC)

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-09-2019

b6
b7C
b7E

(FBI)

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 11:26 AM
To: (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

has been changed

Modify my alert settings

View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air
Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

Investigative Summary

Security Classification:

~~S~~

Request Details:

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Records to be
Analyzed:

EC

Requested by Date:

6/1/2010

Program:

Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

(FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

(FBI)

Item Status:

Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

Tactical/Strategic:

Tactical

Assigned To:

(FBI)

Month:

2010/03 (March)

Discussion Area:

Edited

~~SECRET~~



(S) b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Quarter: Q2

Fiscal Year: FY2010

IA Priority: 0.0

Modified: 3/6/2010 8:27 AM 2/7/2012 11:24 AM

Edited

Created: 3/23/2010 2:56 PM

Last Mod Sys 2/7/2012 11:24 AM by  (U)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 11:26 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [REDACTED] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or Support: Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence Product
Requested:

Security Classification:

~~S//NF~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date: 9/1/2010

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

Issue:

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

Threat Priority:

Submitter: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Squad:

Location:

[REDACTED]

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

[REDACTED]

Tactical/Strategic:

Assigned To: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Month: 2010/08 (August)

Discussion Area: Refusing to provide information without a subpoena. Edited

Quarter: Q4

Fiscal Year: FY2010

IA Priority: 0.0

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Modified: 8/2/2010 10:02 AM 2/7/2012 11:25 AM

Edited

Created: 8/5/2010 2:03 PM

Last Modified 2/7/2012 11:25 AM by (FBI)

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-28-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 10:46 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis - [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [REDACTED] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

[REDACTED]

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops
Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

Security Classification:

~~S//M~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

It was learned that on 02/19/2010, the Director was briefed on a paper about Khan that was written by the [REDACTED] and fully coordinated with [REDACTED] earlier that week.

[REDACTED] (S)

Coordination with [REDACTED] is necessary. [REDACTED] may take the lead on this but it is vital for [REDACTED] to have final input on the product.

THIS IS A PRIORITY REQUEST - TOP ONE OR TWO!

Thanks!

[REDACTED]

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date: 2/24/2010

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

[REDACTED]

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

[REDACTED] (FBI)

Squad:

[REDACTED]

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: ~~Not Started~~ Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

[REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Tactical/Strategic:

Strategic

Assigned To:

(FBI)

Month:

2010/02 (February)

Discussion Area:

Quarter:

Q2

Fiscal Year:

FY2010

IA Priority:

1.0

Modified:

2/7/2012 10:44 AM

Edited

Created:

2/22/2010 6:46 PM

Last Modified: 2/7/2012 10:44 AM

(FBI)

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-28-2019

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 10:46 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis - [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [REDACTED] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

[REDACTED]

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops
Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

Intelligence Bulletin

Security Classification:

~~S//NF~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date: 2/15/2010

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

[REDACTED]

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

[REDACTED] (FBI)

Squad:

Location:

[REDACTED]

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status:

~~Not Started~~ Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

[REDACTED]

Tactical/Strategic:

Strategic

Assigned To:

[REDACTED] (FBI)

Month:

2010/01 (January)

Discussion Area:

Information may be included in potential intel products.

Edited

Quarter:

Q2

Fiscal Year:

FY2010

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IA Priority:

0.0

Modified:

5/1/2010 8:20 AM 2/7/2012 10:43 AM

Edited

Created:

1/19/2010 3:56 PM

Last Modified 2/7/2012 10:43 AM by (FBI)

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-28-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 10:36 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [REDACTED] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

[REDACTED]

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air
Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

Investigative Summary

Security Classification:

~~S~~

Request Details:

Request review of [REDACTED] results associated with Khan.

I added an additional EC from [REDACTED] to be included in analysis.

b7E

If possible, please use this as a way to research [REDACTED] for Khan for possible material support to terrorism.

6/7/2011

[REDACTED]

b1
(S) b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b7D**Records to be Analyzed:** Other (Detailed in Comments)**Requested by Date:** 12/15/2009**Program:** Counterterrorism**Subprogram:****Issue:****Threat Priority:****Submitter:**

(FBI)

Squad:**Location:****cc Other Case Agent:****Item Status:** In Progress Completed

Edited

Task Priority:**Tactical/Strategic:** Tactical**Assigned To:**

(FBI)

Month: 2009/11 (November)**Discussion Area:****Quarter:** Q1**Fiscal Year:** FY2010**IA Priority:****Modified:** 6/28/2011 12:53 PM 2/7/2012 10:34 AM

Edited

Created: 11/5/2009 4:23 PMLast Modified 2/7/2012 10:34 AM by (FBI)b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-09-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 8:47 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370213~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

I wish I would have known this before I closed the case – they could've been added to "the list." Glad some action is finally being taken...

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2012 10:47 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370210~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

You're right about that.

A/UC [redacted]
[redacted]
Desk/STE [redacted]
NSTS [redacted]
SVTC [redacted]
T/S email: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2012 9:40 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By:~~ [redacted]

~~Declassify On:~~ 20370210

~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSISC-20090615

=====

[redacted] - FYI on below... it's about time!

b7E
b6
b7C

[redacted]
Staff Operations Specialist
Charlotte Division

(O): [redacted]

(C): [redacted]

UNET: [redacted]

SCION: [redacted]

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2012 7:33 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By:~~ [redacted]

~~Declassify On:~~ 20370210

~~Derived From:~~ FBI NSISC-20090615

=====

[redacted]

I wanted to bring the below to your attention in the event you were not already aware. I was wondering if you could provide me with your thoughts on the highlighted portion below. I am no where as familiar with Khan as the two of you, but it just seemed a bit off to me.

b6
b7C
b7E

Thanks, [redacted]

IA [redacted]
FBI Counterterrorism Division

Desk: [redacted]
NSTS: [redacted]
Cell: [redacted]

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 11:42 AM
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20370209
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

Team. [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[REDACTED] Fyi...pls forward to your folks.

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 10:31 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20370209
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

fyi

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 4:45 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20370208
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-09-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2012 9:18 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370210~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

[REDACTED]
Thanks for the background. Very helpful.

b6
b7C
b7E

IA [REDACTED]
FBI Counterterrorism Division
[REDACTED]

Desk: [REDACTED]
NSTS: [REDACTED]
Cell: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2012 9:02 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370210~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

[REDACTED]
GREAT news!! We've been pushing for this case for a while...

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Hope that helps... should you be interested in additional information and/or have additional questions, please let us know!

[redacted]
Staff Operations Specialist
Charlotte Division

(O) [redacted]
(C) [redacted]
UNET: [redacted]
SCION [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2012 7:33 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20370210
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~
=====

[redacted]

I wanted to bring the below to your attention in the event you were not already aware. I was wondering if you could provide me with your thoughts on the highlighted portion below. I am no where as familiar with Khan as the two of you, put it just seemed a bit off to me.

b6
b7C
b7E

Thanks [redacted]

IA [redacted]
FBI Counterterrorism Division
[redacted]

Desk: [redacted]
NSTS: [redacted]
Cell: [redacted]

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 11:42 AM
To: [redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Cc: [redacted]
Subject: FW: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20370209
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

Team: [redacted] (S)

[redacted] Fyi...pls forward to your folks.

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 10:31 AM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: FW: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20370209
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

fyi

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 4:45 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20370208
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
=====

b1
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~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/10/2012

To: [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]
TFO [redacted]
IA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]
IA [redacted]

Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
SOS [redacted]

[redacted]

Attn: [redacted]
SA [redacted]
IA [redacted]

Intelligence Directorate

Attn: [redacted]
IA [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (U) [redacted] (S)
(X)
(U)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Title: (S) [redacted] (S)

Synopsis: (S) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

To:

From:

02/10/2012

(S) Re:

(X)

~~Derived From : Multiple Sources~~

~~Declassify On: 20370210~~

Enclosures: (X)

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Details: (X/)

(S)

X

X

X

X

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

To:

From:

02/10/2012

(S) Re:

~~for~~

(S)

X

X

X

X

X

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

To:

From:

02/10/2012

(S) Re: (X)

(S)

X

X

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X

X

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

To:
Re:

From:

02/10/2012

(S)

(S)

×

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×

×

×


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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b7C

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (X) [redacted] 02/10/2012



(U) Samir Khan was a member of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and killed along with AQAP leader, Anwar al-Awlaqi on September 30, 2011 in a drone strike in Yemen.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 02/10/2012

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

[redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 05-28-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 1:22 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: (S) [redacted]

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370217~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615~~

=====

b1
b3
b7E
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b7C

I'll make a point of identifying the above referenced check within the info lead in the event you think it merits an interview of that person (or others).

I intend to close/consolidate my case in the very near future.

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Best,

SA [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]
[Redacted] (Desk)
[Redacted] (B-berry)

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: Routine

Date: 02/12/2012

To: Charlotte

Attn: SSA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

IA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

From [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (S)

(U)

(S)

Title: (S) [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S) [redacted] (S)

Synopsis: (U) To close lead.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20370212~~

Reference: (U) [redacted] (S)

(U)
(S)
(U)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: [redacted] 02/12/2012

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Administrative: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

×

(S)

(S)

(S) Details: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [redacted] The above referenced serial detailed the following:

Summary: ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [redacted]

(S)

Requested Action: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(S)

Investigative Actions: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(S)

Conclusion: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED] 02/12/2012

b3
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT

(U)

[REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT

(U)

[REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT

(U)

[REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

AT

(U)

[REDACTED] Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b1
b3
b7E

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (OGA)
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2012 12:21 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

=====

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Let us know.

Thanks

[redacted]
[redacted] Desk
[redacted] Cell

b6
b7C
b7E

=====
Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (FBI)

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:20 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: [redacted]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====

Because [redacted] is complaining about the number of old [redacted] I am closing a number of the pending [redacted]
This doesn't mean that I won't complete the tasks. It just keeps [redacted] from complaining.

b7E

=====

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

b6
b7C
b3
b7E



~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:31 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [redacted]

[redacted] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [redacted] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

[redacted]

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air
Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

[redacted] (S)

Security Classification:

~~S//M~~ [redacted] (S)

Request Details:

[redacted] (S)

Records to be
Analyzed:

[redacted] (S)

Requested by Date:

Program:

Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

[redacted]

Issue:

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

(FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status:

Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

Tactical/Strategic:

Tactical

Assigned To:

(FBI)

Month:

2010/09 (September)

Discussion Area:

Quarter:

Q4

Fiscal Year:

FY2010

IA Priority:

0.0

Modified:

10/05/2010 3:40 PM 2/22/2012 4:28 PM

Edited

Created:

9/30/2010 10:07 AM

Last Modified: 2/22/2012 4:28 PM by

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:36 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis - [redacted]

[redacted] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [redacted] View Request Analysis

Case File Number: [redacted]

Type of Analysis or Support: Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence Product Requested: [redacted] (S)

Security Classification: ~~S//M~~ [redacted] (S)

Request Details: [redacted] (S)

Records to be Analyzed:

Requested by Date:

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram: [redacted]
Issue: [redacted]
Threat Priority: [redacted]
Submitter: [redacted] (FBI)
Squad: [redacted]
Location: [redacted]

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: [redacted] Completed Edited

Task Priority: [redacted]

Tactical/Strategic:

Assigned To: [redacted] (FBI)

Month: 2011/11 (November)

Discussion Area:

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

Quarter: Q1
FiscalYear: FY2012
IA Priority: 0.0
Modified: 11/8/2011 11:03 AM 2/22/2012 4:31 PM
Created: 11/8/2011 11:03 AM

Edited

Last Modified: 2/22/2012 4:31 PM



(S)

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:36 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [REDACTED] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or Support: Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops
Only):

Type of Intelligence Product
Requested: Intelligence Bulletin

Security Classification:

~~S//NF~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date:

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

(FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Tactical/Strategic:

Assigned To:

[Redacted]

(FBI)

Month:

2011/07 (July)

Discussion Area:

Quarter:

Q4

Fiscal Year:

FY2011

IA Priority:

0.0

Modified:

2/22/2012 4:31 PM

Edited

Created:

7/11/2011 4:11 PM

Last Modified: 2/22/2012 4:31 PM by

[Redacted]

(FBI)

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [REDACTED] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or Support: Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence Product Requested:

Security Classification: ~~S//NF~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED]

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date: 8/1/2011

Program: Counterterrorism

b7E
b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

(S)

~~SECRET~~

Subprogram:

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

(FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

(OGA)

Item Status:

Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

Tactical/Strategic:

Strategic

Assigned To:

(FBI)

Month:

2011/06 (June)

Discussion Area:

Quarter:

Q3

Fiscal Year:

FY2011

IA Priority:

0.0

Modified:

2/22/2012 4:30 PM

Edited

Created:

6/30/2011 4:23 PM

Last Modified: 2/22/2012 4:30 PM by

(FBI)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings [REDACTED] View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or Support: Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence Product Requested: Intelligence Assessment

Security Classification: ~~SI/NE~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
(S) b6
b7C

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date: 2/20/2010

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

Tactical/Strategic: Strategic

Assigned To: [REDACTED] (FBI)

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Month: 2010/01 (January)

Discussion Area:

Quarter: Q2

Fiscal Year: FY2010

IA Priority: 0.0

Modified: 2/22/2012 4:27 PM

Edited

Created: 1/19/2010 4:18 PM

Last Modified: 2/22/2012 4:27 PM by [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:26 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings

View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops
Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

Intelligence Bulletin

Security Classification:

~~S//NF~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments); Published IIRs

Requested by Date: 1/4/2010

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

(FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Item Status: ~~Not Started~~ Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

b6
b7C
b7E

Tactical/Strategic:

Strategic

Assigned To:

(FBI)

Month:

2009/12 (December)

Discussion Area:

Quarter:

Q1

Fiscal Year:

FY2010

IA Priority:

Modified:

~~1/22/2012 4:21 PM~~ 2/22/2012 4:21 PM

Edited

Created:

12/28/2009 10:35 AM

Last Modified: 1/22/2012 4:21 PM by

(FBI)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

(FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:31 PM
To: (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis

has been changed

Modify my alert settings

View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air
Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

(S)

Security Classification:

~~S//NF~~

(S)

Request Details:

(S)

Records to be
Analyzed:

Requested by Date:

Program:

Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

(FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status:

Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

Tactical/Strategic:

Tactical

Assigned To:

(FBI)

Month:

2011/04 (April)

Discussion Area:

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Quarter: Q3

Fiscal Year: FY2011

IA Priority: 0.0

Modified: 1/10/2012 8:55 AM 2/22/2012 4:30 PM

Edited

Created: 4/11/2011 3:03 PM.

Last Modified: 2/22/2012 4:30 PM by [REDACTED]

60

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings

View Request Analysis

Case File Number: [REDACTED]

Type of Analysis or Support: Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence Product Requested: Intelligence Bulletin

Security Classification: ~~S//NF~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3
b7E

Records to be Analyzed:

Requested by Date: 2/15/2010

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram: [REDACTED]

Issue: [REDACTED]

Threat Priority: [REDACTED]

Submitter: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Squad: [REDACTED]

Location: [REDACTED]

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority: [REDACTED]

Tactical/Strategic: Strategic

Assigned To: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Month: 2010/01 (January)

Discussion Area:

Quarter: Q2

Fiscal Year: FY2010

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IA Priority:

0.0

Modified:

2/22/2012 4:27 PM

Edited

Created:

1/19/2010 4:02 PM

Last Modified 2/22/2012 4:27 PM



(FBI)

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings

View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air Ops
Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

Investigative Summary

Security Classification:

~~S/P~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

Writer requests that this research be memorialized in an EC.

Records to be Analyzed: Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date:

Program:

Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

[REDACTED]

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

[REDACTED] (FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status:

Assigned Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

[REDACTED]

Tactical/Strategic:

Assigned To:

(FBI)

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Month: 2010/10 (October)

Discussion Area: For assignment of personnel to operations

Edited

Quarter: Q1

Fiscal Year: FY2011

IA Priority: 0.0

Modified: 10/21/12 7:18 AM 2/22/2012 4:29 PM

Edited

Created: 10/26/2010 1:19 PM

Last Modified 2/22/2012 1:20 PM by [REDACTED] (FBI)

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ (U)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has been changed

Modify my alert settings

View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air
Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

Intelligence Assessment

Security Classification:

~~S/M~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Request Details:

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

Records to be
Analyzed:

Other (Detailed in Comments)

Requested by Date:

2/15/2010

Program:

Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

[REDACTED]

Issue:

Threat Priority:

b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Submitter: [Redacted] (FBI)

Squad:

Location:

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: Not Started Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

[Redacted]

Tactical/Strategic: Strategic

Assigned To: [Redacted] (FBI)

Month: 2010/01 (January)

Discussion Area:

Quarter: Q2

Fiscal Year: FY2010

IA Priority: 0.0

Modified: 2/6/2010 9:40 AM 2/22/2012 4:28 PM

Edited

Created: 1/19/2010 4:25 PM

Last Modified: 2/22/2012 4:28 PM [Redacted] (FBI)

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Forms Work Flow
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 4:21 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: Request Analysis [redacted]

[redacted] has been changed

Modify my alert settings

View Request Analysis

Case File Number:

Type of Analysis or
Support:

Intelligence Analysis

Type of Support (Air
Ops Only):

Type of Intelligence
Product Requested:

[redacted] (S)

Security Classification:

~~S//NF~~

[redacted] (S)

Request Details:

[redacted] (S)

Records to be
Analyzed:

Requested by Date: 12/19/2008

Program: Counterterrorism

Subprogram:

Issue:

Threat Priority:

Submitter:

[redacted] (FBI)

Squad:

Location:

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

cc Other Case Agent:

Item Status: In Progress Completed

Edited

Task Priority:

Tactical/Strategic:

Tactical

Assigned To:

(FBI)

Month:

2008/12 (December)

Discussion Area:

For general information, please refer to the attached report. The attached report contains information that is not for public release.

Edited

Quarter:

Q1

Fiscal Year:

FY2009

IA Priority:

Modified:

01/14/2011 10:18 AM 2/22/2012 4:19 PM

Edited

Created:

12/3/2008 5:08 PM

Last Modified 2/22/2012 4:19 PM by

(FBI)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2012 7:40 AM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20370223
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

[REDACTED] - sorry, I was at [REDACTED] yesterday afternoon.
I will get the last page signed, scanned, and Fed Exed. Do you have the address where it should be sent?
I noted that on para 50, there is a period after the first word where it appears a comma should be.
Thanks-
[REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 3:36 PM
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: 20370222
Derived From: Multiple Sources
=====

[REDACTED]
Please see below. Please review, sign and fed-ex the signature page.

Thanks [REDACTED]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 3:11 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

H [REDACTED]

Here is the final for signature (once FBI has added the classification info to bottom of p. 1), which incorporates the latest changes and corrections to conform to the accompanying declaration in this case.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Please send the signed original to or myself, and also send us a PDF once signed.

b6
b7c

Thank you,

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

=====

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

=====

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C
b5

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 3:59 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Cc: [redacted]

Subject:
Attachments:

[redacted] (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20370206
Derived From: Multiple Sources~~

[redacted] here is my input for this draft:

b6
b7C

Top of page 1:
Declarant of Special Agent [redacted]
I, [redacted]

Para 1: I am a Special Agent, not Supervisory Special Agent...
Para 1: I have been employed with the FBI since 1999...
Para 1: I am currently assigned to the Charlotte field office...

Bottom of p. 1: I am not a classifying authority

b1
b3
b7E
b5

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b7E
b5

Last Page: I am a Special Agent, not Supervisory Special Agent

Please let me know if you have any further questions.

Thank you!

SA
FBI Charlotte

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 03, 2012 5:02 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C
b5

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Declassify On: 20370203~~
~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~
=====

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C
b5

Thanks, [redacted]

[redacted]
Assistant General Counsel
National Security Law Branch
Classified Litigation Support Unit
Desk [redacted]
Blackberry [redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, February 03, 2012 11:02 AM
To: [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3
b7E
b6
b7C
b5

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Hi [redacted] Two things.

(S)

Thanks
[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/09/2012

To: [REDACTED]

Attn: [REDACTED]

Charlotte

Attn: [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

From: [REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U)
(U)
(U)

(S)

b1
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Title: (S)

(S)

Synopsis: (U/LES) To annotate receipt of OPM investigative records to respective files and notify recipients of same.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 20370309~~

(U) [REDACTED]

b7E


Details: (S)

b1
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~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~



(S)

b1
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~~SECRET~~

b3
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~~SECRET~~

To:

[REDACTED]

From:

[REDACTED]

Re:

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

03/09/2012

b1
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[REDACTED]

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (X) [redacted] 03/09/2012

b1
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b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT

[redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/13/2012

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

TA

Attn:

SSA

Attn:

SSA

Attn:

SA

Attn:

SA

Charlotte

From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)
(U)
(U)

(U)

Title: (S)

(U)

(S)

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: (U) To report analysis of captioned subject's primary financial account (checking) to file and notify recipients of same.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 03/13/2012

b1
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~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 20370313~~

(U) [redacted]

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Reference:

(U) [redacted]

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Details:

(S) [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 03/13/2012

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(S)

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To:

[Redacted]

From:

[Redacted]

(S)

Re:

(S)

[Redacted]

03/13/2012

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[Large Redacted Area]

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To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] 03/13/2012

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To: [redacted] From: [redacted]

(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 03/13/2012

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(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] 03/13/2012

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/15/2012

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA
IA

Attn:

STIS

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Intelligence Directorate

Attn:

Attn:

LEGAT

Attn:

LEGAT

Attn:

SA

Charlotte

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (S)
(U)
(U)

Title: (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

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(U) (S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 03/15/2012

Synopsis: (U) [redacted]
[redacted]

b7E

~~Derived from: FBI NSISCG-20080615~~
~~Declassify On: 20370315~~

[redacted]

Administrative: ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

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Enclosure(s): (U) Current Case Progress Report (CPR).

Details: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (S) 03/15/2012

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[Redacted]

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (S) [Redacted] 03/15/2012

[Large Redacted Area]

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[Redacted]

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

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(S) ~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 03/15/2012

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte

(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 03/15/2012

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
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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (S) [redacted] 03/15/2012



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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 03/15/2012

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(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (S) [redacted] 03/15/2012

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(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 03/15/2012

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 03/15/2012

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte

(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] 03/15/2012

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[Large Redacted Area]

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[Redacted]

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(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (X) [redacted] 03/15/2012

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
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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 03/15/2012

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 03/15/2012

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


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


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
(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (X)  03/15/2012

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: ~~(S)~~ 03/15/2012

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(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (S) [redacted] 03/15/2012

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted] Review and as appropriate provide [redacted] concurrence to close captioned matter. Charlotte Field Office will presume [redacted] concurs with case closure unless [redacted] provides written documentation to the contrary within one (1) month.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Please review this EC to determine if the

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

(S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 03/15/2012

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

b7E

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 9: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted] Read and clear.

(S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 03/15/2012

Set Lead 10: (Info)

[redacted]

b7E

AT

[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~

Read and clear.

Set Lead 11: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U)

~~(S)~~

Read and clear.

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/28/2012

To: Charlotte

Attn:

SA
TFO
SA

From:

Contact: TFO

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)
(U)
(U)

b1
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b7A

Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

(S)
(S)

(S)

b1
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b6
b7C
b7E

Synopsis: (U) To cover lead from FBI Charlotte to interview [redacted] about her relationship with captioned subjects.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 20370328~~

Reference: (U)
(U)
(U)

b3
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b7A

Enclosure(s): (U) FD-302 interview of [redacted]

b6
b7C

Details: (U) On 03/22/2012, [redacted] SA [redacted] and TFO [redacted] (Police Department) located and interviewed [redacted] at her apartment at [redacted]

b6
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[redacted] TFO [redacted] conducted a follow-up telephonic interview of [redacted] on 03/26/2012. [redacted] was cooperative and forthcoming during the interviews. She is available to be contacted again.

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To: Charlotte From: [redacted]
Re: (U) [redacted] 03/28/2012

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(U) [redacted] provided responses to all the interview questions and topics suggested in [redacted]'s lead to [redacted]. Refer to the enclosed FD-302 for interview details. [redacted] consider the lead covered.

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To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 03/28/2012

b3
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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Cover lead set in [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]
Division. Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/26/2012

On 03/22/2012 at approximately 0900 hours, SA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and TFO [REDACTED] (Police Department)
interviewed [REDACTED] at her apartment in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] agreed to be interviewed after SA [REDACTED] and TFO
[REDACTED] identified themselves and reason for the interview.

b6
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[REDACTED] identified herself with a valid [REDACTED]
Driver's License and provided the following personal information:

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 03/22/2012 at [REDACTED]
File # [REDACTED] Date dictated N/A
by TFO [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

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b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

b6
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[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Monday, April 02, 2012 6:16 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: request

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: 20370106
Derived From: FBI NSISC~~

=====

[Large redacted block]

If you have any questions, please call and I'll do my best to explain. I'm out of the office the rest of the week but will be back on 4/9/12.
Thanks and I'm sorry for the admin headache.

Best,

SA [redacted]
FBI Charlotte
[redacted]

[Large redacted block]

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~~SECRET~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET//NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 10/26/2011

To:

[Redacted]

Attn:

[Redacted]
SA [Redacted]
[Redacted]
SA [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
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Counterterrorism

From: Laboratory
BAS/Latent Print Operations Unit
Contact: [Redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 06-05-2019

Approved By:

[Redacted]

Drafted By:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Case ID #:

(U)
(U)
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(U)

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3
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Title:

(S) [Redacted]

(S)

Synopsis:

(U)

[Redacted]

(S)

(U) Classified By:

[Redacted]

(U) Derived From :

Washington EC

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)
(S)

b6
b7C

(U) Declassify On: 20351213

Reference:

(U)
(U)

[Redacted]

(S)

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SECRET//NOFORN

[Redacted]

b6
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: Laboratory
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 10/26/2011

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Details: (S) (S) (NF)

(S)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: Laboratory
(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 10/26/2011

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COPY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 09/28/2011

To:

[Redacted]

Attn:

[Redacted]
SA [Redacted]

b6
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b7E

From: Laboratory

Latent Print Operations Unit

Contact:

[Redacted]

Approved By:

[Redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036

DATE: 06-05-2019

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

[Redacted]

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1
b3
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Title:

(S) [Redacted]

(S)

Synopsis: (U) Report results of laboratory examinations

(U) ~~Classified By:~~ [Redacted]

(U) ~~Derived From:~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

(U) ~~Declassify On:~~ 20351102

b1
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Reference:

(U) [Redacted]
(U) [Redacted]
(U) [Redacted]
(U) [Redacted]
(U) [Redacted]
(U) [Redacted]

(S)

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SA [Redacted]

(U) Counterterrorism

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(S)

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

(S)

COPY

b1
b3
b7E
b7D

To: [redacted] From: Laboratory
(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 09/28/2011

Details:

(S)

(U) Note: This report contains information for intelligence purposes only. This information, or any information derived there from, may not be used in criminal proceedings.

(U) Documentation supporting the opinions expressed in this report is retained in the FBI Laboratory files.

Technical Reviewer: [redacted]

Date: 11/3/11

Administrative Reviewer: [redacted]

Date: 11/8/11

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

(S)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/20/2012

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

TFO [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte [REDACTED]

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U)

(S)

(U) Title: (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
IT-SUNNI EXTREMISM-MIDDLE EAST

(S)

Synopsis: (S)

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301

Declassify On: 20370420

(U)

Details: (S//NF)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 04/20/2012

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 04/20/2012

b3
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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

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Set Lead 2: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



AQAP Releases Very Different Issues of Inspire

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's release of issues eight and nine of its English-language terrorist magazine, *Inspire*, serves as a reminder of the group's continued effort to target western audiences.

These issues, released on May 2, 2012, are the first since Samir Khan, believed to be the principal author of the magazine, was killed in a September 2011 drone strike along with popular jihadist ideologue and magazine contributor Anwar al-Awlaki. At the time, their deaths led to speculation of the media franchise's demise.

Inspire 8 is dated fall 2011 and does not address the eight-month delay of its publication. The feature article, written by al-Awlaki, offers religious justifications for attacking civilian populations. The article was written in response to reader-submitted questions, the most prevalent of which apparently concerned the religious authorization for attacks on civilians.

Awlaki condones and encourages the use of explosives, firearms, poisons, and chemical and biological weapons. The only limitation he apparently places is a prohibition on "the execution of women or children when the target is clear."

An article by Samir Khan condemns "the 'moderate' Muslims in America," calling such a lifestyle inherently inconsistent.

The issue includes a recurring feature titled "Open Source Jihad," which provides instruction on using handguns and tips for building remote detonators for bombs. Other content in issue 8 includes profiles of martyrs, book reviews and translations of messages from Al Qaeda ideologues and leaders such as Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, Abu Yahya al-Libi and Osama bin Laden.

As in the past, the magazine requests reader assistance, particularly for creating permanent links for the magazine for help writing "on women-related issues," and with "research and translation." Highlighting the role of reader contributions, one article about Pakistan's role in aiding the West "in the Crusades" was noted as being a reader submission by a former Pakistani soldier.

Inspire 9, dated "winter," differs slightly from past issues in visual quality, but more significantly in the quality of its written materials. One article, purportedly written by Awlaki himself, presents "his side of the story." However, the tone and style of the piece are not consistent with Awlaki's previous messages.

Another indication that *Inspire* 9 was created, in part, by a new team of propagandists is the spelling conventions. For instance, the doctrine of propagating the faith is transliterated as "da`wah" in previous issues, is spelled "da`awah" in issue nine.

The overall tone of the magazine is still clearly trying to target Western audiences with continued references to American culture. For example, issue 9 includes an advertisement encourages assassinations with the Obama campaign slogan, "Yes We Can."

The theme of martyrdom is prevalent throughout the magazine, with a particular emphasis on the deaths of al-Awlaki and Khan. Al-Awlaki is eulogized as a traditional scholar and great orator.

While issue 9 does not include any featured articles by Khan, it does include a eulogy and what purports to be his "last will which was found in his hard-drive." In the will, he warns that "for Muslims it is dangerous to live in America, it is dangerous since America and the Western world are lands of war, giving Muslims the ability to freely attack them in whatever methods they choose... as long as they continue to kill our people, occupy our

lands, support Israel, fund the tyrannical puppets in the Muslim lands and try to re-interpret Islam, we will punish them and their nation severely."

A special "Letter from the Editor" harps on this theme, noting that since "the martyrdom of Shaykh Anwar and brother Samir... we have been inundated with emails and requests by young inspired Muslims who are persistently offering their help, not just intellectually but with whatever the mujahideen need in the West." The letter describes *Inspire* as "America's worst nightmare" because it is "an effective tool" "to call for and inspire to jihad in the English speaking world and... to deliver to every inspire Muslim anywhere around the world the operational know-how of carrying out attacks from within the West."

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO.
 CLASSIFIED BY NSICG [REDACTED]
 REASON: 1.4 (c)
 DECLASSIFY ON: 12-19-2039
 DATE: 12-19-2014

b6 Per FBI
 b7C

From: Resnick, Michael D. [REDACTED]
 Sent: Monday, October 05, 2009 8:02 AM

b6 Per NSC

To: [REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)

b6 Per FBI
 b7C

Subject: RE: Samir Khan - Update for 09/12/2009 - 09/18/2009 [~~SECRET~~, Record]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

b1 Per NSC
 b5

Hope all is well and you had a good holiday.

Michael D. Resnick
 Senior Director for Information Sharing Policy
 National Security Staff

b6 Per NSC

From: [REDACTED] (CE) (FBI) [mailto:[REDACTED]]
 Sent: Friday, October 02, 2009 9:53 AM
 To: Resnick, Michael D.
 Subject: FW: Samir Khan - Update for 09/12/2009 - 09/18/2009

b1 Per FBI
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 b6
 b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
 RECORD [REDACTED]

Mike -

Since you are not up on FBINET, I have attached the reference update below:

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)
 nber 25, 2009 11:05 AM
 [REDACTED] (FBI)

b1 Per FBI
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 b7C

[REDACTED]
 Samir Khan - Update for 09/12/2009 - 09/18/2009

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
 RECORD [REDACTED]

b1 Per FBI
 b3
 b7E

Mike - I hope this email finds you well.
 Here is an update from the Khan case as of last Friday.

(S)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

b3 Per FBI
 b7E

10/5/2009

[REDACTED]

Because people who get paid more than me make such decisions, I'm sending this your way so that you (who get paid more than me) can coordinate with [redacted] SSA [redacted] (who also gets paid more than me) on whether or not such a notification should happen.

All the best and Happy New Year-

b6 Per FBI

b7C

b7E



(chan - Update for 09/12/2009 - 09/18/2009

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

RECORD [redacted]

b3 Per FBI

b7E

****PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU WANT TO BE REMOVED FROM THIS DISTRIBUTION LIST****

Information related to the following offices can be found in this update:



b7E Per FBI

THE LATEST UPDATE (NEW INFORMATION IS BROWN):



b7E Per FBI

SA [redacted]
FBI Charlotte [redacted]
[redacted]

b6 Per FBI

b7C

~~DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information
DECLASSIFY ON: 20340918~~

10/5/2009

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20340918~~
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20340918~~
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they
are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify
the system manager.

This footnote also confirms that this email message has been swept by
MIMESweeper for the presence of computer viruses.

www.mimesweeper.com

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

10/5/2009

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-11-2040
DATE: 02-11-2015

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

11/05/2009

Internal Revenue Service
320 Federal Place, Room 409
Greensboro, NC 27401-2718
Attention: IRS Disclosure Supervisor

From: [REDACTED]

Special Agent in Charge
Charlotte FBI Field Office
400 South Tryon, Suite 900
Charlotte, NC 28226
Telephone # (704) 377-9200

b6
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IN RE: (U) [REDACTED]
b6 Per IRS
b7C

(U) Samir Zafar Khan, a/k/a Sameer Zafar Khan;
DPOB: 12/25/1985 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia;
11231 Tradition View Dr., Charlotte, NC 28269;
SSN 091-80-3487

(U) RELEVANT TO RESPONDING TO OR INVESTIGATING A TERRORIST
INCIDENT, THREAT OR ACTIVITY. (S)

b6 Per IRS
b7C

(U) (S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(U) (S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Derived From: G-1
Declassify On: X25-1

Net: Date: 09NOV09 SHIPPING: 4.69
Dep: Wgt: 1 0 LBS SPECIAL: 0.33
DV: 0 00 HANDLING: 0.00
TOTAL: 5 02

Svcs: PRIORITY OVERNIGHT DSR
TRCK: 9495 4904 3790

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~~SECRET~~
Duplicate for file - original fed exp

~~SECRET~~

Internal Revenue Service
Attention: IRS Disclosure Supervisor

(U) ~~(S)~~ The FBI's investigation has found that Samir Zafar Khan, a/k/a Sameer Zafar Khan, DPOB: 12/25/1985 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and SSN 091-80-3487 may be a relevant terrorist threat. [REDACTED]

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(S)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Information shared with the FBI may uncover unreported earnings used in the furtherance of terrorist threats to national security.

(U)

~~(S)~~

(U) Please send your response to this request to the following address:

b6 Per IRS
b7C

Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Director Robert Mueller III
Attention: National Security Law Branch
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Room 7975
Washington DC 93035

(U) It is also requested that a copy of this response to be sent to our local field office:

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Charlotte Division
400 South Tryon Street, Suite 900
Charlotte, NC 28285
Attn: Special Agent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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b7C

(U) If you have any questions concerning this request please contact Special Agent [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1193607-0

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SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 10/21/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA
SOS

Attn:

FBI Senior Rep

Attn:

Attn:

to FBIHQ

Room 5069

Attn:

From: Charlotte

Contact:

Approved By:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U) (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Submission of Request For Information (RFI) to
FBIHQ, for passage to to FBIHQ, (S)
Room 5069.

(U) Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301
Declassify On: 10/21/2034

(U)

Reference: (U)

Details:

CASE OVERVIEW

~~(S)~~ /NF

SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 10/21/2009.

(S)

[redacted] Finally, individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(S)

(S) ~~(S)~~ In the course of captioned investigation, CE has determined that it requires support [redacted] and submits the below-listed information for analysis. CE understands and acknowledges that any information which might be provided to the FBI in response to this request is to be used for lead purposes only and to develop intelligence to further assess FBI operations. It will not be utilized as evidence nor made available to other Federal, State, or local officials responsible for the prosecution of criminal cases.

1) PRIORITY:

___ Urgent (24-48 hour response - needs justification)
__x__ Priority (five working days - needs justification)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[redacted] CE requests this RFI be processed in a priority fashion, if possible.

___ Routine

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 10/21/2009

2) REQUESTOR:

Name: SA [redacted]
Division: [redacted] Unit/Squad: [redacted]
Phone (secure): [redacted] Fax (secure): [redacted]
[redacted]/SCION [redacted] e-mail: [redacted]

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3) Has any of the information contained within this request been acquired via electronic means? Title III no (yes/no)

(S) [redacted]

(S//NF) [redacted]

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4) TYPE OF INVESTIGATION:

[redacted] (if applicable):

5)

(S)

[redacted]

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b7E

Does your RFI include a request for any of these types of information?

(S)

[redacted]

Financial information (specific) no
Proliferation issues no
Drugs or Alien smuggling no

6) TYPE OF ANALYSIS REQUESTED:

Retrospective from (date) to (date) (please limit to 2 years max)

Databases you have already researched?

(S)

[redacted] NO x YES

results?

b1
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Prospective x from 10/22/2009 to 10/22/2010.

(S)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 10/21/2009

7) DESCRIPTIVE DATA ABOUT YOUR SUBJECT (if applicable):

Last: Khan
First: Samir
Middle: Zafar
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: 12/25/1985
POB: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Ht: 5'7"
Eyes: Brown
Hair: Brown
ARN: A040061311
SSAN: 091-80-3487
Passport: US, 301708539, expires 5/28/2012
DL: 25188737
Citizenship: Subject is a USPER
Frequency of intrnl travel? rarely (only one other time, in 2004 to Saudi Arabia)

8) [redacted] INFORMATION:

b7D

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (S)

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[redacted] With that in mind, please answer the following regarding this specific RFI:

a. Is any person a [redacted] nation? (S)

yes

b. Does any person have [redacted] (S)

no

c. Is any organization [redacted] (S)

no

If YES to any of the above, please explain here:

Samir Khan [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted], 10/21/2009 .

9) USE THIS AREA TO DESCRIBE ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTION/REQUESTS
RELATED TO THIS RFI, e.g., special handling requirements or
restrictions such as ~~LES, ORCON, NOFORN~~, etc.

[redacted]

[Large redacted area]

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (U) [redacted] 10/21/2009

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(S) Coordinate with [redacted] and [redacted] to get (S)
[redacted]s request processed.

♦♦

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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